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LABOR LAW
1. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL AcriVITY
A. *Status of Paid Union-Organizers as "Employees" Under the National
Labor Relations Act: Sunland Construction Co. 1 and Town & Country
Electric2
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act") protects
employees from unfair labor practices including, but not limited to,
hiring discrimination.' The scope of persons protected extends to all
persons falling under the definition of "employee" in section 2(3). 4
Judicial interpretation of section 2(3) has expanded the term em-
ployee to encompass job applicants as well.' In order to gain access to
employees and encourage unionization, unions have sent paid organ-
izers to work as regular employees at non-union job sites.' Because
management often opposes union organization, it has refused to hire
union organizer applicants or has fired them upon learning about
their organizing activities.? Thus, the courts and the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") have had to consider
* By Malcolm A.H. Stewart, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 142 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1992).
2 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 142 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1992).
3 29
	
§ 158(a) (3) (1973).
29 U,S.C. § 152(3) (1973), § 2(3) provides, in relevant part:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not he limited to the
employees of a particular employer ... and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of ... or because of any unfair labor practice ....
Id,
5 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186, 8 L.R.R.M. 439, 442 (1941) (job
applicants are employees tinder NLRA § 2(3)). In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that
Congress believed that labor disputes could "arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee ... ." Id. at 192, 8 L.R.R.M. at 445 (quoting
H.R. Rm.. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935) and also citing S. Rem'. No, 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7 (1935)).
6 See, e.g., Willmar Elec. Serv. v, NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2745-46
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993); H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB,
886 F.2d 70, 71, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2377-78 (4th Or. 1989); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599
F.2d 26, 28, 101 L.R.R.M. 2247, 2248 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Elias Brothers Big Boy, 327 F.2d
421, 424, 55 L.R.R.M. 2402, 2404 (6th Cir. 1964); Dee Knitting Mills, 214 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1041,
88 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1274 (1074), en/breed, 538 E2d 312, 93 L.R.R.M. 2336 (2d Cit .. 1975).
7 See, e.g., Willmar, 968 E2d at 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746; Zachry, 886 E2d at 71, 132
L.R.R.M. at 2377-78; Henlopen, 599 E2d at 28-29, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2248-49.
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whether paid union organizers qualify as employees under section 2(3)
of the NLRA.8
The jurisdictions have split over whether a paid union organizer
qualifies as a section 2(3) employee. 9 Two early cases exemplify this
split, but neither adjudicator elaborated on the reasoning behind its
conclusions." In 1964, in NLRB v. Elias Brothers Big Boy, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a waitress paid
by her union to organize restaurant employees did not constitute a
bona fide employee under section 2(3). 11 The waitress met with the
union secretary prior to applying at Big Boy, received fifteen dollars
from the union weekly, and worked as a full-time organizer after she
left Big Boy." From these facts, the court inferred that she worked for
the union prior to applying at Big Boy and, thus, was not a bona fide
employee within the intent of the Act."
Conversely, in 1974, in Dee Knitting Mills, the NLRB held that a
worker did not lose her employee status despite concurrently being
paid by the union to organize." A garment worker worked full-time
for Dee Knitting Mills while simultaneously employed by the union to
organize) Nevertheless, the Board concluded that she was a bona fide
full-time employee within the meaning of section 2(3). 16
In 1975, in Oak Apparel, the NLRB held that paid union organizers
who worked for an employer in order to organize the employer's work
force qualified as employees under NLRA section 2(3). 17 The union
sent two paid union organizers to work at Oak Apparel for the purpose
g See, e.g., Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746; Zachry, 886 F',2d at 72, 132
L.R.R.M. at 2378; Henlopen, 599 F.2d at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250; Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 427, 55
L.R.R.M. at 2406-07; Oak Apparel, 218 N.L.R.B. 701, 701, 89 L.R.R.M. 1381, 1381-82 (1975); Dee
Knitting Mills, 217 N.L.R.B. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
9 Compare Escada (USA), Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 845, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1131 (1991)
(holding paid union organizers qualify as NLRA § 2(3) employees), enforced, 970 F.2d 898, 898,
140 L.R.R.M, 2872, 2872 (3d Cir. 1992) and Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1331, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747 (D.C.
Cir. holding same) and Henlopen, 599 F.2d at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250 (2d Cir. holding same)
and Oak Apparel, 218 N.L.R.B. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1382 (NLRB holding same) and Dee Knitting
Mills, 217 N.L.R.B. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274 (NLRB holding same) with Zachry, 886 F.2d at
72, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2378 (4th Cir. holding paid union organizers do not qualify as NLRA § 2(3)
employees) and Big Bay, 327 F.2d at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407 (6th Cir. holding same).
111 See Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 422-27, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2402-07; Dee Knitting Mills, 214 N.L.R.B.
at 1041-42, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75.
11 327 F.2E1 at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407.
12 Id. at 423, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2403.
is Id. at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407.
14 214 N.L.R.B. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
15 id.
16 1d. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75.
17 218 N.L.R.B. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
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of gauging Oak Apparel's employees' interest in unionization.' 8 Both
organizers were experienced sewing operators who performed ably
and diligently.'` Oak Apparel discharged both organizers after they
allegedly disrupted work by trying to organize anti-union employees. 20
In reaching its decision, the Board recognized the broad defini-
tion of "employee" in section 2(3) of the NLRA and case precedent
holding that unlawful discrimination includes discrimination against
applicants as wel1. 21 The Board reasoned that whether the organizers
sought an employment relationship of a permanent nature was irrele-
vant because all job applicants fall within the scope and protection of
the NLRA. 22 Thus, the Board ruled that paid union organizers consti-
tute employees within the definition of the NLRA."
In contrast, in 1989, in H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a paid union organ-
izer was not a bona fide applicant for employment and, therefore, was
not covered by the NLRA's definition of employee. 24 A full-time paid
union organizer applied for employment with H.B. Zachry Company
("Zachry") so that he could organize the plant." The Zachry court
determined that paid union organizers do not fall within the plain
meaning of employee.26 The court interpreted the plain meaning of
employee to include a person working under the direction of a single
employer and not two different employers at the same time. 27 The
court reasoned that the payment arrangements constituted evidence
that the organizer would be on union business while working at Zachry
and, therefore, worked under the union's supervision, not Zachry's."
Thus, the court decided that the paid union organizer did not consti-
tute a section 2(3) employee.°
The court emphasized that including paid union organizers
within the scope of "employee" would contravene the policies under-
16
 Id. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1381.
20 Id.
21 Oak Apparel, 218 N.L.R.B. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1381-82; see, e.g., Dee Knitting- Mills, 214
N.L.R.B. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274 (worker dirt not lose status as employee under NLRA
because she was also paid by union to organize); Phelps Dodge Corp. v, NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186,
8 L.R.R.M. 439, 442 (1941) (union affiliated job applicants are employees under NLRA § 2(3)).
22 See Oak Apparel, 218 N.L.R.B. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1381-82.
28 1d. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
24 886 F.2d 70, 72, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378 (411) Cir. 1989).
25 /d. at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2377-78.
26 Id. at 73, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 73, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
29 Zaeltry, 886 F.2d at 72, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2378.
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lying the NLRA." The court reasoned that treating a paid union
organizer as an employee would upset the NLRA policy of balancing
the presupposed adversarial relationship between employers and un-
ions. 3 ' Further, if a paid union organizer held the status of employee,
he or she could impinge upon the Zachry employees' right to self-de-
termination by being paid by the union to vote pro-union. 32 Thus, the
court held that a paid union organizer did not qualify as a bona fide
applicant for employment and, accordingly, did not constitute a sec-
tion 2(3) employee."
Between 1979 and 1992, three appellate court cases agreed with
the NLRB's position that paid union organizers qualified as section
2(3) employees. 34 In 1979, in NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a paid union
organizer constituted an employee." An assembly line worker, em-
ployed part-time by Henlopen Manufacturing, concurrently received
fifty dollars per week as a union organizer." Without elaborating on
its reasoning, the court concluded that the paid union organizer
qualified as an employee.37 Similarly, in 1992, in Escada (USA), Inc. v.
NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit en-
forced an NLRB decision which held that a full-time paid union or-
ganizer was an employee entitled to the protections of the NLRA. 38
Similarly, in 1992, in Willmar Electric Serv. v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enforced an NLRB
decision that an applicant who would have been simultaneously em-
ployed by the union and the company qualified as an employee." The
applicant testified that he probably would have stopped receiving pay
from the union if hired, but would have retained the title of union
field organizer and would have used his free time during lunch and
after work to try to organize Willmar employees. 4" The Willmar court
3° See id. at 74-75, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
31 Id. at 74, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
" Id. at 74-75, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
33 /d. at 72, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2378.
34 See Escada (USA), 970 F.2d 898, 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872, 2872 (3d Cir. 1992), enforcing,
304 N.L.R,B. 845, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1991); Willmar Elec. Serv. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1331,
140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2745 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993);
NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2(1 26, 30, 101 L.R.R.M. 2247, 2250 (2d Cir. 1979).
33 599 F.2d at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250.
" Id. at 28, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2248.
37 See id. at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250.
38 970 F.2d at 898, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2872. The court issued a brief one-sentence order without
providing reasoning for its decision. See id,
3° 9(i8 F.2d at 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M, at 2747.
40 1d. at 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2745-46.
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reasoned that the applicant's dual loyalties to his employer and his
union would not exclude him from qualification as a section 2(3)
employee." To support its reasoning, the court first cited the congres-
sional assumption, manifested in related legislation, that an employee
may be employed by both a union and another entity:42 Second, the
court noted the widespread nature of moonlighting. 43 Lastly, the court
relied on the common law agency principle that a person can be the
servant of two masters." Thus, the court reasoned that the applicant's
concurrent union employment would not disqualify him from the
scope of section 2(3). 45
The court factually distinguished Zachry by noting that, unlike the
Zachry employee, the present applicant would not have remained em-
ployed and supervised by the union during the hours worked for
Willmar:16 The court also discounted the policy arguments that em-
ployee status would upset the balance between employer's rights and
union rights, 47 or would impinge on employee self-determination
rights. 48 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the NLRB
by holding that an applicant retained section 2(3) employee status
despite the fact that he would have worked for the union as an organ-
izer and for the employer as a worker: 19 Thus, prior to the Survey year,
41 See id. at 1329-30, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746-47.
42 1d, at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746. The court cited § 302 of the Labor Management
Relations Act which generally prohibits payments from an employer to an employee of a union,
except, "to any . . . employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee .......such
employer, as compensation for ... his service as an employee." Id. at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1) (1988)).
43
 Willmar, 968 F,2d at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
44 Id. at 1329-30, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747. RESTAThMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 226 (1958)
states; "tal person may be the servant of' two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one
act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other." The Willmar
court cited Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. a Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348-49 (1992), in which the
United States Supreme Court applied common law master-servant relationship principles to
define the term "employee" in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Willmar,
968 F.2d at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
45 Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1330, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
46 1d.; H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2379 (4th Cir. 1989).
The court stated t.ltat in most respects the organizer employee would have been indistinguishable
from a zealous volunteer who resolved to use his free time during lunch and after work to advance
the union's interests. Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
47 See Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1330, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747. Although the court conceded that
employment would provide the union organizer with a better position from which to propagan-
dize, it reasoned this was also true for any union zealot who gained employment with Willmar.
Id.
"See id. The qualification as an employee is not Synonymous with eligibility to vote; an
employee can only be included in a bargaining unit if he or she is ibund to share the necessary
community of interest with other workers. Id.
49 1d, at 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
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federal jurisdictions were split over the status of paid union organizers
under NLRA section 2(3)." The Second, Third and District of Colum-
bia Circuits, as well as the NLRB, treated them as employees while the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits did not. 51
During the Survey year, in Sunland Construction Co. and Town &
Country Electric, the Board held that paid union organizers qualified
as employees under section 2(3) of the NLRA. 52
 The Board heard
arguments in both cases consecutively and issued identically reasoned,
unanimous opinions." Sunland Construction Co. ("Sunland") refused
to hire qualified, union-affiliated applicants, including two paid union
organizers, because of their union affiliation. 54 Town & Country Elec-
tric ("Town & Country") refused to hire union-affiliated applicants,
and when it did hire one, it soon dismissed him because he was a union
organizer.55
 In reaching its decision, the Board examined the ordinary
meaning of the term employee, congressional intent, judicial interpre-
tations of "employee," and the policies underpinning the NLRA. 58
While restating the NLRB rule that paid union organizers qualify as
section 2(3) employees, the Board also carved out a significant excep-
tion: due to the "economic battle" between employer and union during
a strike, an employer may protect its business interests by refusing to
hire a paid union organizer, even though he or she is still a section
2(3) employee. 57
 Thus, the Board continued its alignment with the
Second, Third and District of Columbia Circuits by holding that paid
union organizers constituted NLRA section 2(3) employees. 58
"See supra notes 9-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
51 Id.
"Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1032 (1992); Town &
Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. 1036, 1045 (1992).
53 See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 1-10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1026-36; Town Ce Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 1-8, 142 L,R,R.M. at 1037-45.
54
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 1, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
55 Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 1-3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1038-39.
56
 See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 2-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027-33; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 3-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040-45.
57 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032-33. This exception was created
in the Sunland opinion only.
as
	 Sunland 309 N.L.R.B. No, 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045. The court reaffirmed its adherence to Oak Apparel
and its progeny, that being Escada (USA), 970 1 2.2d 898, 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872, 2872 (3d Cir.
1992), enforcing, 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1991), Willmar Eke. Serv. v. NLRB, 968
F.2d 1327, 1331, 140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2747 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1252, 142
L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993), and NLRB v. lienlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30, 101 L.R.R.M. 2247, 2250
(2d Cir. 1979). Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B, No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045.
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In Sunland, the Boilermakers' Union submitted approximately 90
applications, including two from full-time paid union organizers, to
Sunland for work on a boiler overhaul project!' Although Sunland did
not hire any of the batched applicants, it subsequently hired welders
and boilermakers for the project." While striking the jobsite, one of
the paid union organizers telephoned the jobsite foreman and learned
that Sunland desperately needed welders." When the paid union or-
ganizer identified himself and his union affiliation, the foreman said
he would check with his supervisor and phone back. 62 When the fore-
man called back, he stated that no welders were being hired.° During
the next five days, however, Sunland hired eight welders."
In Town & Country, the employer engaged a temporary employ-
ment agency to recruit non-union, licensed electricians." The Electri-
cians' Union authorized members to work at non-union jobsites for
organizational purposes and promised them reimbursement for wage,
travel and health benefit differentials incurred in the process." Re-
sponding to a newspaper advertisement placed by the agency, union-
affiliated applicants arrived at a hotel for interviews and filled out
application forms. 67 Despite Town & Country's need to fulfill a statu-
tory requirement for licensed electricians on the jobsite, the employer
refused to interview all but one of the union applicants!'" Town &
Country eventually hired the one union interviewee, but fired him two
days into his work because he attempted to organize the employees at
the jobsite."
In both cases, the Board addressed the issue of whether paid
union organizer applicants constitute employees under NLRA section
59 Sunland, 309 N.L.R,B. No. 180 at 1, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027. Both union organizers were





Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 1, 142 LARK at 1027.
65 Town ea' Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 1-2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1038. Because Town &
Country Electric retained exclusive discretion to interview, hire, set wage rates, supervise and
discharge employees obtained through the employment agency, the Board stated that the em-
ployment agency was an agent whose conduct in connection with hiring was binding on Town &
Country Electric, Id.
" Id. at 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1038-39.
67 See Id. at 2, 142 L.R.R.M at 1038-39.
as Id. at 2-3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1038-39. Based upon the facts, the Board concluded that Town
& Country Electric had discriminatorily refused to consider these applicants for hire, notwith-
standing its subsequent hire of one union applicant. Id. at 2-3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
69 Id. at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1039.
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2(3). 7° Noting that applicants qualify as employees, the Board exam-
ined the definition of employee." Relying on the broad language of
section 2(3) and the ordinary usage of the term employee, the Board
reasoned that, so long as union organizers working for or applying for
work with an employer do so for wages in exchange for assigned work,
they meet the standard dictionary definition of employee. 72 Examining
the specific types of persons excluded from the section 2(3) employee
definition, the Board concluded that paid union organizers were not
listed and, therefore, were not statutorily excluded from its definition."
The Board determined that the legislative history of section 2(3) also
supported this view because it reflected congressional intent to expan-
sively interpret the term employee."
Next, the Board considered the various judicial interpretations of
section 2(3).• First, the Board noted that the United States Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted section 2(3) expansively to include
all individuals not explicitly excluded." The Board analogized the
Supreme Court's application of common law agency principles in
" See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No, 180 at 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
71 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; 'Aron & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
72 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 2-3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
73 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Timm fa' Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1040-41. NLRA § 2(3) provides in relevant part that the definition
of employee excludes:
... any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family or person at his borne, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 H.S.C.A. § 152(3) (1973).
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028-29; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No, 181 at 4-5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041. When Congress added the exceptions to § 2(3)
in 1947, it continued to refer to employees as individuals "working for another for hire" and
"working for wages and salaries under direct supervision." Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3,
142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Leo. His-r. 309 (LMRA 1947)). In addition, Congress
reassessed and rebalanced the right of an employer to require undivided loyalty from some
workers by placing "supervisors" within § 2(3) exclusions. Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3,
142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 4-5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041. The
Board reasoned that had Congress concluded that paid union organizers were not entitled to
NLRA protection, it knew how to and would have excluded them. Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180
at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
75 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3-5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029-30; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 5-6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041-42.
76 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3-4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041; see also supra note 5.
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interpreting the term "employee" under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) to the task at hand." Finding no contrary
congressional intent, the Board applied the agency principle that a
servant can have two masters. 78
 Consequently, the Board concluded
that paid union organizers could not be excluded from the definition
of employee simply because they are paid by both their union and the
employer they attempt to organize. 79 Thus, the Board concluded that
Supreme Court decisions supported an interpretation of section 2(3)
that included paid union organizers in the definition of employee."
Similarly, the Board examined the prior holdings of Courts of
Appeals to support its position." The Board cited the opinions of
Henlupen (2d Cir.), Escada (3d Cir.) and Willmar (D.C. Cir.) for sup-
port, but noted that the opinions in Zachry (4th Cir.) and Elias Brothers
Big Boy (fith Cir.) disagreed. 82
 Bolstering its reasoning with the most
recent Court of Appeals case, Willmar, the Board rejected the Zachry
court's argument that a paid union organizer cannot be an employee
because he or she receives wages from two entities." The Board agreed
with and followed the Willmar court's use of common law agency
principles to conclude that concurrently paid union organizers are
employees." Thus, the Board distinguished Zachry and concluded that
the Courts of Appeals' decisions supported the NLRB's reasoning in
Oak Apparel and its progeny. 85
The Board considered whether classifying paid union organizers
as employees would advance the policies of the NLRA.8° Given that the
77
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No, 180 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041-42; see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct.
1344, 1348-9 (1992).
78
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town 6" Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041-42.
7`l
	 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
8°
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
81 Sunland, 509 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030; 'Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B,
No. 181 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No, 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
" See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B, No. 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030; Tbwn & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 6-7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043; see also H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70,
72-74, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378-80 (4th Cir. 1989).
"4
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030-32; Thum & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5, 7, 142 L,R.R.M. at 1030, 1032; 'Town &' Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 7, 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043, 1045.
Ae Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
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right to organize is a central purpose of the Act, the Board determined
that protecting paid union organizers as employees furthered this
purpose by allowing employees to obtain information on their rights
of self-organization while not impinging on the employer's legitimate
managerial rights. 87 The Board perceived no conflict in a paid union
organizer working for a non-union employer, because, during work
time, the organizer is still subject to the employer's direction and
control and must perform assigned work just like other employees. 88
Furthermore, the organizer's activities, like those of other employees,
may be limited during work time by lawful non-solicitation rules. 89
The Board dismissed Sunland's argument that an organizer-em-
ployee would impinge on other employees' self-determination rights
because the organizer would be paid by the union to vote pro-union
in an election. 9° The Board stated that an organizer's status as a statu-
tory employee does not guarantee the right to vote, because organizers
may be excluded from voting either as temporary employees or be-
cause their interests sufficiently differ from those of their coworkers. 9'
Furthermore, the Board dismissed Sunland's argument that allowing
paid union organizers to be section 2(3) employees would upset the
balanced adversarial relationship which Congress carefully established
between union and employer. 92 Although the Fourth Circuit accepted
this same argument, the Board viewed it as misplaced, because the
cases upon which it relied only dealt with the lawful restrictions em-
ployers may place on nonemployees, and did not intend to interpret
section 2(3).93
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5-6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030-31; "linon & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
88 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Thum & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; TOwn & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
g° Sun/and, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043-44.
91 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. Nu. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Town e.g.' Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043-44.
92 See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
93 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct 891, 846, 139
L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228, 2230 (1992) (so long as nonemptoyee union organizers have reasonable
access to employees outside the employer's property, employer may bar nonemployees from its
property); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113-14, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004-05
(1956) (employer has a right to keep union organizers off employer's property where other
reasonable avenues for communication do not exist); Note, Access Rights of Nonemployee Union
Organizers to an Employer's Property: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 34 B.C. L. REV. 311 (1993). In
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The Board disagreed with arguments that the union organizer
would engage in union activities to the detriment of work assigned by
the employer." Based upon the statute's premise that an employee
could be loyal to both employer and union, the Board reasoned that
a paid union organizer's intentions to organize the employer's work-
force did not imply that the organizer would be unwilling or unable
to perform the assigned work." According to the Board, engaging in
conduct warranting legal discharge would be antithetical to the organ-
izer's objective to work alongside other employees and organize
them.96
 The Board cautioned, however, that its decision should not be
interpreted to give paid union organizers "carte blanche" in the work
place; if the organizer violates legitimate work rules or fails to perform
adequately, the employer may subject the organizer to the same non-
discriminatory discipline as other employees.97
While the Board restated its position that a paid union organizer
qualified as a section 2(3) employee, on the facts of Sunland, it created
an exception: although a paid union organizer is an employee, the
employer may refuse to hire an agent of the union during a strike."
Based on its experience, the Board indicated that when a company's
employees are striking, an abnormal business situation exists whereby
the union engages in an economic battle with the employer to try to
shut down the business in order to force the employer to accede to
footnotes, the Survey opinion's stated that arguments were made that "paid union organizers are
not employees because their request for employment is a guise to gain access to the employer's
private property to further the union's objective." Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6 n.35, 142
L.R.R.M, at 1031 n.35; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8 n.34, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044
n,34. The Board stated that "although gaining such access will likely facilitate the paid organizer's
union activities, as long as the organizer is able, available, and fully intends to work for the
employer if hired, he or she will not be disqualified from 'employee' status." Sunland, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6 n.35, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031 n.35; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B, No. 181
at 8 11.114, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044 n.34. Further, the Board noted that "a paid union organizer
employee arguably poses no greater threat to an employer's property rights than a pro-union
employee who voluntarily engages in organizational activity." Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6
n.35, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031 11.35; Thwn & Country, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8 n.34, 142 L.R.R.M.
at 1044 n.34 (citing Note, li.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB: Paid Full
-Time Union Organizer Not an
"Employee", 50 L. L. REv. 1211, 1215-16 (1990)).
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M, at 1031-32; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
95
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B, No. 180 at 6-7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Thwn & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
98 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 8, 192 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
98
 See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032-33.
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union demands.9° The Board noted that the employer has an equally
legitimate interest in continuing business by hiring replacements.'°°
The Board reasoned that, because the union is seeking to induce
employees to withhold services from the employer, a conflict of interest
arises and the employer has a substantial and legitimate business
justification for declining to hire a paid agent of the union for the
duration of the strike. ] °'
Although the Survey cases were decided unanimously, two Board
Members wrote concurring opinions.'" Member Oviatt reconsidered
his former, opposing position in light of the arguments presented and
the Willmar decision.'°3 Despite the non-union employer's disadvan-
tage in having to hire a paid union organizer who may be viewed as a
Trojan Horse entering the non-union jobsite, he reasoned that Con-
gress intended to extend the protections of the NLRA to such indi-
viduals to facilitate the goals of organization and recognition of un-
ion s. 1 °4
In his concurring opinion, Member Raudabaugh argued that the
Board's decision did not foreclose an employer from protecting itself
against the union stratagem of sending paid union organizers to work
at non-union jobsites.'" He opined that a violation of the Act's section
8(a) (3) for discriminatory refusal to hire occurs only when the refusal
was unlawfully motivated. 106 Thus, Member Raudabaugh believed that
an employer with a nondiscriminatory policy or practice against hiring
temporary employees may lawfully refuse to hire someone who only
planned to work during an organizational drive and then leave.'"
Similarly, Member Raudabaugh argued that an employer with a non-
discriminatory policy or practice of refusing to hire persons who will
be simultaneously employed by another employer, will have moonlight
employment, or will be employed by institutions that are adversarial to
" Id. at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032.
too Id.
lin Id. at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032-33.
1 °2 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 8-10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1034-36; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 9, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045.
105 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at. 1034; see, e.g., Escada (USA), Inc.,
304 N.L.R.B. No. 109 at 1-2, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1132-33 (1991), enforced by 970 E.2d at 898, 140
L.R.R.M. at 2872 (1992).
104 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 8-9, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1034-35,
105 Id. at 9-10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
"6 Id. at 9, 142 L.R.R.M, at 1035. § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973),
provides in relevant part: it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .."
107 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 9, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
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the employer could lawfully refuse to hire a paid union organizer.'"
Finally, Member Raudabaugh argued that, absent these loopholes,
employers would be forced to hire qualified paid union organizers that
they could otherwise legally exclude from company property.'" Thus,
in Sunland and Town & Country, the Board concluded that paid union
organizers were employees within the definition of section 2(3) of the
NLRA and that both employers discriminated in refusing to hire paid
union organizers."°
The Survey cases represent a full airing and analysis of an issue
that has divided and continues to divide the Circuit Courts. By con-
cisely and methodically addressing the language, legislative history,
disparate court interpretations, and policies of the NLRA, the Board
clarified the rationale behind its prior declarations that paid union
organizers are NLRA section 2(3) employees. Furthermore, the Board
solidified its position on this issue because Board Member Oviatt, who
had previously disagreed, joined the majority to form a unanimous
position.'" In addition, Sunland created an important exception to the
rule: even though paid union organizers are employees, an employer
can lawfully refuse to hire them during a strike.
Consistent with previous cases, NLRB decisions hinging on the
issue of whether paid union organizers are section 2(3) employees will
continue to be affirmed and enforced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second, Third and District of Columbia Circuits. The
response of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, however, becomes a critical
question. Both Sunland and Town & Country skillfully countered the
Fourth Circuit's contrary arguments and, in addition, created an ex-
m8 Id, at 10, 142 1,RR.M. at 1035.
1°9 See id. at 10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1036; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 846,
139 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228, 2230 (1992) (so long as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable
access to employees outside the employer's property, employer may bar nonemployees from its
property); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113-14, 38 L.R.R.M, 2001, 2004-05
(1956) (employer has a right to keep union organizers off employer's property where other
reasonable avenues for communication do not exist). Member Raudabaugh asserted that absent
the aforementioned employer policies, the paid union organizer could circumvent these cases'
holdings by entering the property as an applicant Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 10, 192
L.R.R.M. at 1036.
liG Suniand, 309 N,LR,B, No. 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Thum & Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045 (additionally, the Board found that Town & Country Electric
had discriminated in its firing of the paid union organizer employee after only two days of work).
111 Sunland 309 N.L.R,B, No. 180 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1034; "Town & Country, 309 N.L.R.B,
No. 181 at 9, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045. Consistent with the Board's position, it repeatedly has cited
Sunland in subsequent decisions. See Sunland Construction Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 69 at 1 (1993)
(holding paid union organizers are § 2(3) employees); Ultrasystems Western Constructors, 310
N.L.R.B. No. 83 at 1-2 (1993) (holding same); l & L Enterprises, 310 N.L.R.B. No. 23 at 1 (1993);
Electro-Tec, 310 N.L.R.B. No. 16 at 1 (1993).
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ception which represents an important "limited safety valve" for em-
ployers." 2
In Zachry, the Fourth Circuit's primary arguments against grant-
ing paid union organizers employee status were: (1) that an employee
can only have one employer; (2) that employees self-determination
rights would be impinged upon by having a union employee pack the
bargaining unit with a pro-union vote; and (3) that the employer's
qualified property right to exclude union organizers would be de-
feated."' In the Survey cases, the Board skillfully defeated the first
argument with Supreme Court precedent which utilized common law
agency principles that a servant can have two masters."' The Board
rendered the second argument moot because a person's status as an
employee was not synonymous with the eligibility to vote for unioniza-
tion."' The Survey cases' majority opinions dismissed the third argu-
ment, calling it misplaced, but in Member Raudabaugh's concurring
opinion in Sunland, he advanced two potential employer practices that
could satisfy the Fourth Circuit's concerns about the employer's prop-
erty rights." 6
 Member Raudabaugh's arguments, however, are merely
dicta and the legality of these suggested practices has not been ad-
dressed by the Board.
Nevertheless, provided that the proposed employer practices are
lawful, the Board's opinions in the Survey cases successfully counter all
of the Fourth Circuit's arguments against a paid union organizer's
employee status. In addition, Sunland's strike time exception provides
an important exemption during a critical time period. This exemption
is appropriate and properly addresses the disparate interests and rights
of employer and union at the peak of their conflict. While Sunland
and Town & Country are not binding precedent on the Circuit Courts,
the courts have traditionally given deference to administrative deci-
sions in the area of labor law. 17
 Therefore, the Board's thoughtful
opinions and newly created exception to the rule should persuade the
minority circuits to change their position.
In conclusion, in Sunland and Town & Country, the NLRB held
that the NLRA protects paid union organizers because they qualify as
112
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1033.
"3 See 886 R2d 70, 72-75, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378-80 (4th Cir. 1989).
114
 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 3-4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029; Town ce Country, 309
N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1041-42.
115 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031; Town? Country, 309 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1043-44.
116 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No, 180 at 6, 9, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1031, 1035.
117 ARctithAto Cox ET. AL, CASES ON LABOR LAW 310-11 (11th ed. 1991).
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employees under section 2(3) of the Act.'" The Board reached this
conclusion by reviewing the language of section 2(3), its legislative
history, its judicial interpretations, and NLRA policies. 19 In Sunland,
however, the Board carved out an exception to discrimination in hiring
paid union organizers, holding that even though a paid union organ-
izer is a section 2(3) employee, it is not unlawful to refuse to hire a
paid union organizer during a strike.'"
B. *Employee Participation Programs Under Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5)
of the National Labor Relations Act: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.'
Section 8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
"Act") provides, in relevant part, that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation or admini-
stration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it .... ... Section 8(a) (2) was intended to abolish employer-
dominated or "company" unions); A labor organization, as defined in
section 2(5) of the Act, is any employee group which exists for the
purpose of "dealing with" employers concerning wages, hours or con-
ditions of work.4 Evaluation of a section 8(a) (2) charge, therefore,
requires a two-tiered analysis.' In order for a union to prevail in a
section 8(a) (2) charge it must be shown, both that the group is a labor
118 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B, No, 180 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032; Thum	 Country, 309 N.L,R.B.
No, 181 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1045.
118 Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 180 at 2-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027-32; Town & Country, 309
N.L.R.13. No. 181 at 3-8, 142 L.R.R.M, at 104045.
1 " Sunland, 309 N.L.R.13, No. 180 at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1032-33.
* By Eric N. Einhorn, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE LAIN REVIEW.
1
 Si t N.L.R.B. No. 88, 143 L.R.R.M. 1121, as corrected by 143 L.R.R.M. 1268 (N.L.R.B. 1993).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1988).
3 78 Cong. Rec. 3443, vprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGisi,KrivF, His-rutty OF TIIE NATIONAL. LABOR
REtivrtoNs AcT, 1935, at 15-16 (1949). Senator Robert Wagner viewed company unions as "[t]he
greatest obstacles to collective bargaining . . . ." Id. at 15. Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the
NLRA or Wagner Act, believed that to have meaningful collective bargaining, employees must
be represented by people who are "not subservient to the employer with whom they deal ... ."
Id. at 16; ROBERT H. ZINGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985, at 40 (1986).
Thus, the term labor organization" was given a broad definition in § 2(5) to reflect Senator
Wagner's view. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1005 (1992),
petition for review pending sub nom, Electromation, hie. v. NLRB, No. 92-4129 et seq. (7th Cir.).
4 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988). A labor organization is "any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Id.
5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 209, 44 L.R.R.M. 2204, 2206 (1959);
NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 291, 111 L.R.R.M. 2673, 2675 (6th Cir, 1982);
Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B, Nu. 163 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1006.
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organization under section 2(5) and that the labor organization is
dominated or supported by the employer. 6 Although the United States
Supreme Court provided guidance for determining when domination
or interference has occurred under section 8(a) (2) , 7 the evaluation of
whether a group is a "labor organization," as defined in section 2(5),
has presented difficulty.8
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1939 case National Labor
Relations Board v. Newport News Co., held that employee organizations
that are dominated or interfered with by the employer violate the Act
even if the employer has good motives or the interference is incidental
rather than fundamental.`-' The Court interpreted section 8(a) (2) as
providing for strict structural independence between employers and
employee organizations."' The Court did not, however, elucidate the
bounds of the definition of labor organizations provided in section
2(5) . 11
Two decades after Newport News, in 1959, the United States Su-
preme Court directly addressed the meaning of section 2(5) in Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Cabot Carbon Co.' 2 The Court held that
Congress did not intend the term "dealing with," in section 2(5), to
be synonymous with the more limited term "bargaining with," in the
context of the collective bargaining process." The Court relied upon
the legislative history of the Act to support its interpretation." The
Court found that when the original version of the Wagner Act was
debated in the Senate, the Secretary of Labor proposed that "bargain-
ing collectively" be inserted instead of "dealing." 19 The proposal, how-
ever, was rejected. 16 The Court held that the rejection of this proposal
6 See, e.g., Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 209, 44 L.R.R.M. at 220; Scott `t.:9" Fetzer; 691 F.2d at 291,
11 l L.R.R.M. at 2675; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1006. See also 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a) (2).
7 See NLRB v. Newport News Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251, 5 L.R.R.M. 665, 670 (1939).
"See, e.g., Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 210, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2206; Scott &Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 291,
L.R.R.M. at 2675; General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1232, 1235, 96 L.R.R.M. 1204,
1204 (1977).
9 308 U.S. at 251, 5 L.R.R.M. at 669-70.
1 ° See id. at 249-50, 5 L.R.R.M. at 669.
11 See id. at 244, 5 L.R.R.M. at 667.
12 360 U.S. at 204-05, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2204. The employer established employee participation
cominittecs at each of its plants which were to examine problems of mutual interest to the
employer and employees, including: safety, efficiency, production, conservation of capital and
resources, encouragement of ingenuity and initiative, and non-union grievances. Id. at 205, 206
n.2, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2204, 2205 n.2.
13 hi at 211, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
'I Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 211, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
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meant that Congress did not intend the two terms to be used inter-
changeably.' 7
The Court reasoned that the handling of non-union grievances by
the employee committee was enough in itself to bring the committee
within the definition of a labor organization under section 2(5). 18
 The
Court, however, observed that the committees also actively engaged in
making proposals to the employer covering nearly the entire scope of
the employment relationship and subjects which were commonly dealt
with in collective bargaining.'`' The Court rejected the employer's con-
tention that although the committees engaged in activities such as the
handling of non-union grievances this handling did not constitute
"dealing" within the meaning of section 2(5), because the committees
only made recommendations; the final decision rested with the em-
ployer. 2° The Court reasoned that such characteristics were true of all
dealing, whether an employer is dealing with an independent or em-
ployer-dominated employee organization. 21 Thus, after Cabot Carbon,
any employee group that proposed terms or conditions of work and
was assisted or supported by the employer, in any way, would violate
section 8(a) (2).22
In 1977, the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") issued
three decisions which limited the scope of Cabot Carbon." In General
Foods Corp., the Board adopted an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ")
finding that an employer created job enrichment program, which was
comprised of the entire non-supervisory work crew, was not a labor
organization as defined in section 2(5), but rather was an administra-
tive subdivision. 24 The ALJ concluded that the work groups were a
method of organizing the company's workforce, not labor organiza-
tions. 25 Thus, the Board, in General Foods Corp., limited Cabot Carbon
by creating an exception for employers which establish employee par-
17 Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2207.
18 1d. at 213, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2208.
L9 M. at 213-14, 44 L.R.R.M, at 2208.
20 1d. at 214, 44 L.R,R.M. at 2208.
71 Id.
22 See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213-14, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207-08.
23 General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1239, 1235, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1204; Mercy-Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 231 N.1,,R.13. 1108, 1121, 96 L,R,R.M. 1239, 1240 (1977); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B.
275, 276, 95 L.R.R.M. 1298, 1300-01 (1977), enforced as modified sub nom. NLRB v. Silver Spur
Casino, (123 F.2d 571, 109 L.R.R.M. 3068 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, Silver Spur Casino v. NLRB,
451 U.S. 906, 106 L.R.R.M. 3077 (1981).
24 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234, 1235, 96 L.R.R.M. 1204, 1204 (1977).
25 Id. The A1,3 ktiled to cite any cases to support this conclusion. Id.
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ticipation groups that are comprised of their entire employee comple-
ment instead of a representative group of employees. 26
In Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp., the Board upheld an ALJ's deci-
sion that an employee committee which merely decided the validity of
employee complaints and the appropriateness of disciplinary action
was not "dealing with" management. 21 The ALJ reasoned that the
committee was not "dealing with" the employer because the committee
decided the outcome of the grievance without consulting with the
employer.28 The Board, therefore, limited Cabot Carbon by allowing
employers to delegate some managerial authority to employees without
violating section 8(a) (2). 29
Finally, in Sparks. Nugget, Inc., the Board found that an employee
committee was not a labor organization because it provided a purely
adjudicatory function." The committee had the power to render final
and binding decisions on employee grievances."' The Board reasoned,
therefore, that the committee did not "deal with" management be-
cause it performed a traditional management function delegated to it
by management." After Sparks Nugget, employers could avoid violating
section 8(a) (2) of the Act when establishing employee participation
programs, by delegating traditional management functions and the
discretion to administer these functions to employee groups.""
In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
also limited the breadth of Cabot Carbon's interpretation of the Act, in
NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co."'' The Court denied enforcement of the
Board's finding that an employer had violated section 8(a) (2) by
establishing a committee to promote in-plant communications be-
tween the employees and the company. 35 The expressed goal of the
26 Id.
27 23 1 N.L.R.B. at 1121, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1240.
28 See id.
29 See id.
"230 N.L.R.B. at 276, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1300-01.
91 Id.
32 Id. at 276, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1300. Chairperson Fanning dissented, in part, because the
committee was composed of one employee representative and two management representatives.
Id. at 277, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1301 (Fanning, dissenting in part). Chairperson Fanning concluded
that the committee was controlled by management and thereby supplanted the grievance proce-
dure contained in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. (Fanning, dissenting in part).
"See id. 230 N.L.R.B. at 276, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1301.
99 691 F.2d 288, 289, I I 1 L.R.R.M. 2673, 2674 (6th Cir. 1982).
35 Id. The court rejected an overly broad interpretation of the Act, quoting Circuit Court
Judge John Minor Wisdom's dissent in NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co. Id. at 292-93, 111 L.R.R.M. at
2677 (quoting Walton Mfg., 289 F.2d 177, 182, 47 L.R.R.M. 2794, 2797 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting)). Judge Wisdom concluded that such an interpretation "erects an iron curtain
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committee was to provide a process for communicating company plans
and programs, as well as to define and identify problem areas and elicit
suggestions for improving operations. 36
 The court reasoned that en-
forcement of the Board's decision would be detrimental to the em-
ployer's good-faith attempt to communicate with its employees. 37
The Sixth Circuit followed the Scott & Fetzer decision, in 1989, in
Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB. 38
 The court denied enforcement of a Board
order which found that an employee participation committee was
an employer-dominated labor organization in violation of section
8(a) (2). 39
 The court reasoned that the committee did not violate sec-
tion 8(a) (2) because it did not "deal with" the employer concerning
the subjects outlined in section 2(5), rather it merely functioned as a
communication channel.°
In 1992, the Board, in Electromation, Inc., addressed the legality
of several employer-created committees under section 8(a) (2) of the
Act. 4 ' The Board held that an employer violated section 8(a) (2) by
creating five Action Committees which were to propose solutions to
certain company problems. 42 The Board reasoned that the committees
were labor organizations under section 2(5) of the Act because the
committees made proposals to the company's management and man-
agement adopted the proposals if they believed the committees' pro-
posals were generally within the budget and acceptable to the employ-
ees as a whole." Furthermore, the Board observed that the committees
between employer and employees, penetrable only by the bargaining agent of a certified union,
if there is one, preventing the development of a decent, honest, constructive relationship between
management and labor." Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
96
 69 1 E2d at 292-93, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2677.
97 See Scott & Fetzer, 691 E2d at 295, Ill L.R.R.M. at 2679. The court noted, as additional
support for its holding, that the employer did not show any hostility or anti-union animus, and
neither the employees, the committee nor the union considered the committee a labor organi-
zation. Id.
38
 Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 E2d 1291, 1297, 131 L.R.R.M. 2899, 2904 (6th Cir. 1989).
22 1d. at 1300, 131 L.R.R.M at 2906.
40 Id. at 1295-96, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2903.
41 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 1-2, 142 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1002-03.
42 /d. at 1, 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1002, 1003. The five committees were (1) Absenteeism/Infrac-
tions, (2) No Smoking Policy, (3) Communication Network, (4) Pay Progression for Premium
Positions and (5) Attendance Bonus Program. Id. at 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
43 Id. at 7-8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1008-09. In its analysis, the Board looked to the legislative
history of the Act and to Cabot Carbon !Or guidance. Id. at 3-6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1004-07. It stressed
that the legislative history showed that Congress sought to eliminate "company unions" through
§§ 8(a) (2) and 2(5). Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 3, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1004. In addition,
the Board noted that Cabot Carbon provided that "dealing with" is broader than the term
"collectively bargain with" and applies to situations that do not contemplate the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1006 (citing Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at
211, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207).
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were dominated by the employer because they were created and sup-
ported by the employer." The Board concluded, therefore, that the
committees were employer-dominated labor organizations in violation
of section 8(a) (2). 45
In addition, the Board clarified its interpretation of the section
2(5) phrase "dealing with" in footnote twenty-one.° The Board stated:
[WI e view "dealing with" as a bilateral mechanism involving
proposals from the employee committee concerning the sub-
jects listed in section 2(5), coupled with real or apparent
consideration of those proposals by management. A unilat-
eral mechanism, such as a "suggestion box," or "brainstorm-
ing" groups or meetings, or analogous information ex-
changes, does not constitute "dealing with."47
Member Devaney filed a concurring opinion critical of the
breadth of the majority's interpretation of "labor organization" under
section 2(5) . 48
 He stressed that section 8(a) (2) should not create ob-
stacles to the implementation of employee participation plans so long
as those programs do not impair the employees' right to freely choose
a bargaining representative.° To support his conclusion, Member
Devaney observed that: a pure employee participation plan was not
before Congress in 1935 and had never been before the Supreme
Court; the legislative history of the Act did not show concern over
employer initiated plans dealing with managerial issues such as
efficiency, quality or productivity; and finally, Board precedent demon-
strated that such plans may be legal under a number of circum-
stances. 50
 Thus, after Electromation, employers were free to establish
The Board further concluded that the employer dominated the committees. Electrornation,
309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1008. The employer established, oversaw and partici-
pated in each committee. Id. at 2, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1003. Each committee consisted of six
employees, one or two members of management and the Employee Benefits Manager. Id. at 2,
142 L.R.R.M. at 1003. The employer determined the goals of each committee and the number
of employees who could join. Id. Employees were compensated for time spent participating, and
necessary materials were provided by the employer. Id. As evidence of the employer's control of
the committees, the Board noted that two employees who had signed-up for more than one
committee were informed by the employer that each would be limited to participation on one
committee. Id. at 2, 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1003, 1009.
44 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 8, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
45 Id. at 7, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1008.
45 Id. at 5 n.21, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1006 n.21.
47 Id.
45 Id. at 9, 11, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1010, 1012.
Etearomation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
5° Id. at 9-10, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1010. Members Oviatt and Raudabaugh also filed concur-
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unilateral mechanisms for employees to convey information to the
employer in non-union shops." In addition, as established in previous
cases, employers could establish organizations which were limited to
the performance of managerial or adjudicative functions."
During the Survey year, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Go., the
Board held that an employer violated section 8(a) (2) by establishing
and dealing with six safety committees and one fitness committee
composed of union member employees and members of company
management." The Board found that the committees were labor or-
ganizations under the Act." The Board also concluded that the em-
ployer dominated the committees, in violation of section 8(a) (2). 55 In
addition, the Board held that the employer did not violate the Act by
conducting safety conferences at which employees discussed and sub-
mitted suggestions and ideas concerning plant safety. 56 Finally, the
Board outlined several types of employee participation activities which
it would deem lawful."
rences. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 14, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1014 (Oviatt, concurring);
Electrornation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 15, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1016 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
Member Oviatt stressed the need for employee participation in the American workplace to
compete m the world market.. Dectromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 14, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1015
(Oviatt, concurring). He outlined several employee participation programs which are designed
to enhance productivity and efficiency by increasing communication between employers and
employees as well as increasing employee morale and self-fulfillment. Id. at 14-15, 142 L.R.R.M.
at 1015 ((Matt, concurring). Member Oviatt concluded that discussions pertaining to efficiency
and productivity are not violative of the Act because they are not concerned with grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work. Id. at 15, 142
L.R.R.M. at 1015 (Oviatt, concurring).
Member Raudabaugh also filed a concurring opinion in which he argued for the reinterpre-
tation of § 8(a)(2). Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 15, 23, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1016, 1023
(Raudabaugh, concurring). H e proposed four ilactors which may be used to determine the legality
of employee participation programs: (1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure
and operation of the committee, (2) the reasonableness of the employees' perception of the
committee as a substitute i'or collective bargaining, (3) whether the employees have been assured
of their § 7 rights and (4) the employer's motives in establishing the committee. Id. at 23, 142
L.R.R.M. at 1023 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
51 309 N.L.R.B. at 5 n,21, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1006 n.21.
55 Id. at 6, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1007 (citing General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 96 L.R.R.M. 1204;
Merry-Memorial, 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 96 L.R.R.M. 1239; Sparks Nugget, 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 95
L.R.R.M. 1'298).
53 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 1, 143 L.R.R.M. 1121, 1122-23, m corrected by 143 L.R.R.M. 1268
(N.L.R.B. 1993). The Board also held that the employer violated § 8(a) (5) when it dealt with the
committees instead of the certified union. Id. at 5, 143 L.R.R,M. at 1126.
54 1d. at 1, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1122-23.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 4-5, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1125-26.
57 E.1. du Pont, 31I N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2-3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
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The employer in E.I. du Pont established six safety committees and
one fitness committee at its Chambers Works Chemical plant in Deep-
water, New jersey." The employer initiated the establishment of the
committees and decided which particular employees would be invited
to join." Members of management served on all seven committees,
employee members were compensated at their regular rate for com-
mittee work and the committees operated at the will of the company,
which could modify or abolish them at any time. 6°
The employer, in effect, had a veto power over any proposal."'
Some of the committees submitted proposals to management repre-
sentatives outside the committees and all of the committees discussed
proposals with management representatives who were members of the
committees. 62 Each committee was required by company rules to reach
a consensus on all of its proposals. 63 Management members, therefore,
had the power to block any proposal since all of the members of the
committee were required to agree. 64 In addition, the management
members acted as the head of the committees and set the agenda for
meetings. 65
The employer also held day-long safety conferences each quarter, 66
which were organized and led by management. 67 Each safety confer-
ence began with company managers making opening statements fol-
lowed by the conferees dividing into small groups to discuss specific
safety topics."' While in the groups, employees shared their experiences
with plant safety, safety problems they had encountered, how to over-
come these problems and how to implement solutions." The com-
ments of the conferees were recorded and forwarded to one of the
employee participation committees for consideration."
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the em-
ployer, claiming that the several employee committees were labor or-
ganizations which were dominated by the employer. 7' At the adminis-
38 E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 4-CA-18737-1 el seq.
59 Id. at 13.
G0 Id.
61 E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 3,143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
62 Id. at 2-3,143 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
63 Id. at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 3-4,143 L.R.R.M. at 1125.





71 E.I. du Pont, 4-CA-18737-1 et seq, at 1.
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trative hearing level, the Ag ruled that the committees were labor
organizations dominated by the employer in violation of section
8(a) (2). 72 The General Counsel appealed the ALys ruling to the
Board."
The Board agreed with the ALJ's ruling, but added rationale to
the decision in order to provide guidance to employers in unionized
settings that wish to implement lawful cooperation programs between
employees and management. 74 The Board concluded that the commit-
tees were labor organizations as defined in section 2(5). 75 The Board
stated that as a threshold question in section 8(a) (2) cases, it must be
determined whether (1) employees participated, (2) the organization
existed at least in part for the purpose of dealing with the employer
and (3) these dealings concerned the subjects enumerated in section
2(5).76 The Board concluded that the committees were organizations
in which employees participated and that the subject matter of their
discussions fell within the categories of subjects listed in section 2(5)."
Thus, the committees met the first and third requirements. 78
With regard to the second requirement, the Board relied on
language in footnote twenty-one of Electromation. 79 The Board stated
that if there was a pattern or practice in which a group of employees
made proposals to management over time and management re-
sponded to these proposals by word or deed, where compromise was
not necessary, the employee group was "dealing with" the employer for
purposes of the Act. 8° The Board stated, however, that if the proposals
were only isolated instances of ad hoc proposals followed by a manage-
ment response, then the element of dealing would be missing. 8 '
In, addition, the Board delineated four types of "safe havens" in
which employee groups would not be considered labor organizations
because their actions would be communicative rather than proposing
change.82 First, the Board noted that if the purpose of the group was
to develop a host of ideas from which the employer might glean some
72 E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 1, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1122,
73 1d. at 1 n,l, 193 L.R.R.M. at 1122 n.l.
74 /d. at 1, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
78 Id. at 2, 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
78 E.I. du Pon4 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
77 Id. The committees discussed subjects such as safety, incentive awards for safety and
benefits such as employee jogging tracks and picnic areas. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2, 193 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
80 E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
83 Id. at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
82 See id. at 2, 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
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ideas, then the "brainstorming" session would not be dealing." Second,
if the employer gathered information from the employee committee
and did what it wished with the information, then dealing had not
taken place. 84 Third, the Board concluded that a "suggestion box"
format did not constitute an organization, committee, or plan under
section 2(5) because the employees would be submitting suggestions
as individuals. 8• Finally, if the committee existed for the sole purpose
of planning educational programs then there would not be "dealing." 88
Thus, the Board concluded that these enumerated activities would not
be dealing because they constituted transmission of information, not
proposals for change.87
The Board distinguished the employee groups at issue from ones
that only conduct brainstorming, information gathering or educa-
tional programs." The Board noted that all the committees involved
group action and not individual communication; the groups made
proposals to management representatives in different ways and the
employer responded by word or deed." The Board also stated that the
activity between the employer and the groups was "virtually identical"
to the dealing in Cabot Carbon. 9° The Board concluded, therefore, that
the employee participation committees in both cases were the same
because the groups made proposals and management, with the abso-
lute power to reject any proposal, responded. 91 Thus, the Board held
that the committees at issue did not fall within any of the "safe havens"
outlined by the Board."
The Board found, however, that the activities at the safety confer-
ences were not violative of the Act.° The Board used the safety confer-
ences to illustrate permissible conduct which would not constitute
"dealing with" under the Act." The Board found the conferences were
merely "brainstorming" sessions 9' It reasoned that the conferees were
not charged with making proposals to improve safety; rather, they were
to submit suggestions and ideas.° The Board concluded that the con-
"Id. at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
H4 Id.
95 E.L du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
96 Id. at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
87 See id. at 2, 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
99 Id. at 2-3, 193 L.R.R.M. at 1124,
99 Id. at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
90 E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
91 Id. at 2-3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
92 1d. at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
93 Id. at 4-5, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1125-26.
94 Id. at 4-5, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1126.
du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 4, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1125.
" Id. at 5, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1126.
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ferences were a unilateral mechanism designed to elicit information
from the employees and not a bilateral mechanism intended to collect
specific proposals from the conferees. 97
The Board declined to adopt a rule that employee participation
committees with management members were per se dealing with man-
agement. 98 The Board reasoned that there was a distinction between a
management member who could reject any committee proposal and
a management member of an autonomous committee with a majority
of employees."9 Similarly, the Board noted that management participa-
tion on a committee as an observer or facilitator, without a vote, would
not constitute dealing. 10"
In a concurring opinion, Member Devaney stressed that, although
he agreed with the result of the majority's decision, his narrower view
of section 8(a) (2) provided employers with greater opportunities to
engage employees in participation programs without violating the
Act.'°' Member Devaney reiterated his interpretation of the Act which
he first put forth in his concurrence in Electromation. 102
 He concluded
that the legislative and precedential history of section 8(a) (2) leaves
employers with significant freedom to engage employees in communi-
cation and participation programs.'"
Member Devaney stated that if the participation program im-
paired the employees' free choice of a bargaining representative then
section 8(a) (2) had been violated. 1 "4 According to the concurring
opinion, the committees violated section 8(a) (2) because the employer
undermined the freely chosen bargaining agent by establishing, tacitly
recognizing, and bargaining over mandatory subjects with the em-
ployer-controlled employee representation committees. 105 Thus, Deva-
ney concluded that employee participation committees are legal if they
unambiguously act as agents of the employer and do not pretend to
represent the employees as distinct from the employer.' 06
The ruling in E.I. du Pont is proper in light of the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of section 8(a) (2) in Cabot Carbon and
" 7 Id.
98 Id. at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
99 Id.
100 E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 89 at 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
1 ° 1 Id. at 6, 12, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1127, 1132 (Devaney, concurring).
102 1d. at 7, 12, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1127. See also ElecIromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 at 9-15,
142 L.R.R.M. at 1010-14 (Devaney, concurring).
"E./. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B, No. 88 at 7, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1127-28.
1 °1 1d. at 7, 12, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1128.
1 °5 Id. at 8, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1128.
imqd. at 10, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1128 (citing Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No, 163 at 5 n.20, 142
L.R.R.M. at 1013 n..20 (Devaney, concurring)).
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Newport News.'" Cabot Carbon and Newport News, taken together, pro-
vide for strict structural independence between employee groups that
propose terms or conditions of work and employers with the power to
accept or reject employee proposals.m° The committees in E.I. du Pont
were created to make proposals to the employer for consideration by
the company management.'°° In addition, these committees were con-
trolled in form and procedure by the employer."° Thus, the Board
correctly concluded that the committees were employer-dominated
labor organizations in violation of section 8(a) (2) of the Act.
The dicta in E.I. du Pont which enumerates several permissible
cooperative activities or "safe havens" is not helpful, however, to em-
ployers who wish to implement participatory work programs in the
absence of collective bargaining. The Board attempted to add rationale
to the ALys decision in E.I. du Pont in order to clarify some cooperative
schemes which would not violate section 8(a) (2).'" These "safe ha-
vens," however, are simple forms of cooperative schemes which do not
cover the types of activities in which many employers believe they must
engage to be highly productive and globally competitive. In addition,
the boundaries of the "safe havens" are unclear. Absent further litiga-
tion, the precise definition of the "safe havens" will not be clarified.
The courts, as well as commentators, have not reached a consen-
sus as to the role of section 8(a) (2)." 2 Section 8(a) (2) has been called
the "keystone" of the Act because it cements the adversarial model of
industrial relations by requiring employee organizations to be com-
pletely independent of employers." 5 Others have viewed the adversar-
111 See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213-14, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207-08; Newport News, 308 U.S. at
251, 5 L.R.R.M. at 670.
108 See Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213-14, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207-08; Newport News, 308 U.S. at
251, 5 L.R.R.M. at 670.
109 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 2, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
110 E.I. du Pont, 4-CA-18737-1 et seq., at 13.
III E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 at 1, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
I IS Compare Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 213-14, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2207-08 (interpreting § 8(a) (2)
broadly) with Scott &Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 292, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2677 (concluding an overly broad
construction of statute would be as destructive as ignoring provision entirely). See also Thomas
C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L.
REV. 499, 518 (1986) (calling § 8(a) (2) keystone of NLRA).
115 Kohler, supra note 112, at 518. Professor Kohler describes the collective bargaining system
as one in which employees join and assert collective power in order to determine the private law
or collective bargaining agreement which will govern the workplace relationship. Id. at 515. He
further states that inherent conflicts of interest occur between management and its employees,
and only through collective action can employees check management's inherent power. Id. Thus,
Professor Kohler concludes that conflict is a natural part of the American collective bargaining
system, but it is checked by the interdependence of the parties. Id. at 515-16. This interdepend-
ence defines the boundaries of adversarial expression and limits actual conflict. Id.
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ial model of labor relations as an "anachronism" and an overly broad
interpretation of section 8(a) (2) as detrimental to cooperation in the
workplace."' It is a matter of opinion which view is correct. The state
of the law concerning section 8(a) (2), however, is clear—if the employ-
ees are represented by a certified bargaining representative then the
employer must bargain about cooperative schemes which are estab-
lished or supported by the employer and which allow employees to
make proposals.
If employers are to legally implement true cooperative schemes,
then either: (I) Congress must amend or revoke section 8(a) (2), (2)
the United States Supreme Court must reinterpret section 8(a) (2), or
(3) the Board must defy the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
section 8(a) (2) in Cabot Carbon. Each alternative has limitations.
Amendment or revocation by Congress is the most permanent and
authoritative option, but it is also the most difficult to effectuate. In
light of the lack of consensus as to the best approach under section
8(a) (2), the likelihood of Congress reaching conensus on this issue is
slim, Reinterpretation of the Cabot Carbon standard by the Court would
be an effective method, but such a decision would be suspect in light
of the strong indicia of congressional intent outlined in Cabot Carbon.
Finally, reinterpretation by the Board is subject to the same problems
as reinterpretation by the Court, but is compounded by the fact that
various circuit courts, or the Supreme Court, probably may not let the
Board depart from precedent.
In sum, the Board held in E.I. du Pont that an employer violated
section 8(a) (2) of the Act by establishing and dealing with several
employee participation committees comprised of union member-em-
ployees and members of management. 115 The Board relied upon the
seminal Supreme Court case interpreting section 2(5), Cabot Carbon,
to reach its holding." 6 In addition, the Board outlined several "safe
havens" in which employers may engage in communication with em-
ployees without violating section 8(a) (2). 117 The Board's attempt to
clarify this area of the law, however, probably will not serve employers
who wish to institute complex employee participation programs out-
side of collective bargaining.
114 Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 292-93, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 2677.
111 311 N.L.R.E. No. 88 at 1, 3, 143 L.R.R.M. at 1122-23, 1124.
116 Id. at 2-3, 193 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24.
117 id.
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C. *Defining the Contours of Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under
§ 158 of the National Labor Relations Act: United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union Local 150-A v. NLRB'
Sections 158(a) and (d) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act") together impose upon an employer a duty to bar-
gain collectively with its employees' union representatives with respect
to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 2
This mandatory duty to bargain collectively does not compel corporate
management to abandon its discretion in operating its business and
acquiesce to union proposals) Rather, this congressional mandate
merely requires that an employer bargain in good faith with union
representatives until an agreement is reached, or to the point of im-
passe.`' Thus, the Act serves to facilitate the peaceful settlement of
potentially divisive labor-management controversies through the neu-
tral framework of negotiation.' Employers unilaterally instituting
changes affecting employment issues that fall within the statutory
sphere of mandatory collective bargaining are subject to remedial
measures by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board").6 Thus, a major task confronting the Board and the federal
* By R. Bryan Woodard, Staff Member, BOSTON CM.I.ECIE LAw REVIEW.
1 F.3d 24, 143 L.R.R.M. 3001 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Dubuque Packing IV].
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988). Section 158(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
Section 158(d) states in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment ....
Id.
3 See First Nat'] Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 nn.16-17, 107 L.R.R.M.
2705, 2710 nn.16-17 (1981).
4 See id. at 675, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2708. Within the limited sphere of wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment, the Act does not compel an employer to reach an agreement
with union representatives on all matters, although an employer would have to risk the potential
economic consequences of union retaliatory measures. See id. at 674-75, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2708.
5 Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2612 (1964).
The intransigence demonstrated by both management and labor was recognized as one of the
most "prolific causes of strife" in the U.S.; the NLRA was established to resolve these conflicts
and preserve the peaceful flow of interstate commerce. Id. The NLRB was designed to enforce
the Act's provisions by condemning certain acts as unfair labor practices. First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at
674, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2708.
6 First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 674-75, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2708. The Board's power, however, is limited!
to condemning only that conduct which violates the Act's requirement for mandatory collective
bargaining on subjects constituting "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of emplor
March 1994]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 379
courts is to provide employers with a degree of certainty in planning
their affairs by clearly defining the scope of corporate decisions cov-
ered by the statutory language "terms and conditions of employment." 7
In 1964, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, the United
States Supreme Court held that an employer's unilateral replacement
of existing union labor with subcontracted personnel performing the
same maintenance work tinder similar conditions constituted a viola-
tion of the Act's mandatory duty to bargain.' Although the Court
found the employer's conduct was motivated purely by economic con-
siderations, as opposed to anti-union sentiments, it nonetheless viewed
the subcontracting of plant maintenance work previously performed
by union members to be an activity affecting a "condition of employ-
ment." The company admitted to the Union, and to the Court, that
its decision to subcontract stemmed from the cost savings expected
from work-force reductions, fringe-benefit decreases, elimination of
overtime payments, and other terms which have traditionally been the
subject of collective bargaining.'" Referring to the Act's unambiguous
purpose of incorporating the termination of employment as an area
subject to mandatory bargaining, the Court noted that the subcontract-
ing of any company work necessarily results in a loss of union jobs
and, therefore, is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under
§ 158(a)."
Concerned with the potentially broad implications of the Fibre-
board majority opinion, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion,
sought to confine the Court's decision to the particular facts of the
case.' 2 Justice Stewart argued that the legislative history and purpose
mein? See id. at 674, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709. With respect to these mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, the Board ensures that management and union representatives bargain in good faith
to agreement or to the point of impasse. Id. at 075, 107 L,R.R.M. at 2708. Other subjects not
related to employment are labelled as permissive subjects of collective bargaining. Id. at 683, 107
L.R,R.M. at 2711. Permissive subjects may be raised at the bargaining table to be discussed in
good faith and incorporated into an enfbrceabie collective bargaining agreement, but there is
no requirement to do so. Id. at 675 n.13, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2708 n.13. Similarly, management and
union representatives have no authority to insist on these permissive subjects during the collective
bargaining process to the point of impasse and the Board has no authority over these subjects.
See id.
7 See Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 28, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3004,
8 379 U.S. at 215, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2613.
9 Id, at 208, 210, 57 1,.R.R.M. at 2611, 2612.
1 ° Id. at 213-14, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2613.
/o/. at 210, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2612.
12 See id. at 218, 57 1,.R,R.M. at 2615 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart believed the
decision suggested an expansive interpretation of the NLRA contrary to both the Act's intended
purpose and to the decisions of several other circuits. See id. at 221, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2616 (Stewart,
J., concurring),
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of the Act strongly supported a narrow construction of the type of
management decisions subject to mandatory collective bargaining."
According to Justice Stewart, managerial decisions forming the "core
of entrepreneurial control," or which have only an indirect and uncer-
tain impact on employment, are unrelated to conditions of employ-
ment, and are therefore exempt from compulsory collective bargain-
ing." Accordingly, although the Court found that the employer in
Fibreboard had a duty to bargain collectively over its decision to subcon-
tract maintenance work, Justice Stewart declared that the holding
should not be read to imply that every management decision necessar-
ily leading to a termination of union jobs or adversely affecting the
employer-employee relationship is subject to that same duty.' 5
Mindful ofJustice Stewart's cautionary language in Fibreboard, the
United States Supreme Court, in the 1981 case of First National Main-
tenance Corp. v. NLRB, refused to impose a mandatory duty to bargain
upon an employer who failed to negotiate with union representatives
over its economically-motivated decision to terminate a service con-
tract.' ( In First National, an employer engaged in providing janitorial
services to a variety of businesses unilaterally cancelled its contract with
a nursing home after its efforts failed to achieve acceptable profits at
that site." The termination of the contract resulted in the discharge
of several union employees.'g In determining that the employer was
under no duty to bargain with union representatives over its decision,
the Court found that the termination of the nursing home contract
fell into a category of decisions that was neither clearly covered by nor
clearly excluded from the Act's "terms and conditions of employment"
15 See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 220, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2616 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 223, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2617 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart included decisions
concerning the volume and kind of advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of
financing, and sales as cure management decisions which should remain uninhibited. Id.
15 1d. at 218, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2615 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart did recognize,
however, that union demands for provisions limiting an employer's power to discharge employees
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 222, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2617 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Thus, Justice Stewart acknowledged that employment security has been recognized as a subject
of § 158 even though it may be argued that the existence of jobs is not truly a condition of
employment. Id. at 222, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2616-17 (Stewart, J., concurring). Such provisions include
freedom from discriminatory discharge, seniority rights, and the imposition of a compulsory
retirement age. Id. at 222, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2617 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, in this
particular case, found the subcontracting conduct analogous to these provisions, and thus subject
to mandatory bargaining, because it was largely equivalent to the substitution of one group of
workers for another to perform the same work in the same environment. Id. at 224, 57 L.R.R.M.
at 2617 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686, 107 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2713 (1981).
• 17 1d. at 668-69, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2706.
'8 1d. at 669, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2706.
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subject to mandatory collective bargaining.' 9 The Court acknowledged
that the employer's decision primarily concerned the economic
profitability of the contract and was, therefore, "akin to a decision to
be in business at all!'° The Court, however, also recognized the direct
and substantial impact such a decision would have on the continued
employment of union members. 21
Faced with a decision of utmost concern to both management and
union representatives, the First National Court adopted a balancing test
to determine whether an employer's decision is sufficiently tied to a
condition of employment to warrant mandatory collective bargain-
ing.22 The Court declared that managerial decisions having a substan-
tial impact on the existence of employment are subject to mandatory
bargaining only if the potential benefits to the labor-management
relationship and the collective bargaining process outweigh the bur-
dens imposed on the operation of the business.° The First National
Court found that this balancing test emphasizes both the amenability
of the subject matter to the bargaining process and the burdens that
bargaining would place upon an employer's need for unencumbered
discretion in managing its affairs. 24
10 See id. at 676-77, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709. The Court defined three categories of management
decisions. Id. at 677, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709. The first category covers those decisions which are
purely entrepreneurial in nature arid, therefore, have only an indirect and attenuated impact on
the employment relationship. Id. There is no obligation to bargain over these decisions. See id.
at 676-77, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709. Such decisions include, for example, choice of advertising and
promotion, product type and design and financing arrangement. Id. The second category in-
volves decisions which are exclusively an aspect of the employer-employee relationship and are
clearly mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Id. at 677, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709. These
decisions include, for example, layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules. Id. A newly
articulated third category includes decisions that have a direct impact on employment of union
members, because jobs are eliminated, but that also involve a fundamental change in the scope
and direction of the business, Id. These latter decisions must be evaluated in light of the particular
circumstances of the case to determine if they are subject to or exempt from mandatory collective
bargaining under the Act. See id.
2° See id. at 677, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
21 See First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 677, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
22 See id. at 679, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2710. The Court reasoned that because Congress did not
explicitly define those areas excluded from mandatory bargaining, the need for unencumbered
decision making and the degree of certainty required by employers in the management of
ordinary business affairs necessitated the adoption of a balancing test. See id.
23 Id. The Court's balancing test serves the fundamental Impose of the Act by preventing
all management decisions from being subjected to mandatory bargaining, an extreme act that
"could afford the union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart
management's intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might pro-
pose." See id. at 683, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2711.
24 See id. at 678-79, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2710.
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Applying its balancing test to the facts at issue, the First National
Court noted that the employer had no intention of replacing the
discharged employees or moving that operation elsewhere. 25 Moreover,
the dispute with the nursing home centered on the size of the man-
agement fee, an issue over which the union had no control. 26 Thus,
the Court concluded that the costs associated with denying the em-
ployer the right to freely terminate its profitless contract with the
nursing home and effect a significant change in its operations clearly
outweighed any incremental benefits that might be gained through the
union's participation in the decision-making process. 27 Consequently,
the Court refused to impose a mandatory duty to bargain. 28 The Court
did not, however, discuss the probable effects of its ruling on other
areas of managerial discretion, indicating that future cases must be
decided on the balance of their particular facts. 29
During the Survey year, in United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union Local 150-A v. NLRB [herinafter Dubuque Packing
NJ, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld an NLRB decision requiring an employer to bargain collec-
tively with union representatives over its decision to relocate a segment
of its factory operations. 3° As part of its decision, the court evaluated
and endorsed the Board's newly crafted test for determining whether
the relocation of specific unit work is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.s' The court found the standard promulgated by the Board
consistent with the principles set forth by United States Supreme Court
precedent and adequately protective of the employer's "prerogative to
manage its business." 32 Thus, the court upheld the Board's decision to
subject the relocation decision to mandatory bargaining."
The dispute in Dubuque Packing IV arose in 1981 when the
Dubuque Packaging Company ("Dubuque"), a processor and packager
of beef and pork, notified union management of its plans to perma-
25 /d at 687, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713.
211 First Nan, 452 U.S. at 687, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713,
27 Id. at 686, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713. The fact that the management fee with the nursing home
was the prime focus of the dispute was of particular importance in the court's analysis. See id. at
587, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713. Neither the union nor the employer had the power to force the third
party nursing home to make concessions; thus negotiations with the union would have been
futile. See id.
28 Id at 686, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713.
211 Id. at 686 n.22, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2713 n.22.
3 Dubuque Packing IV, I F.3d 24, 25, 143 L.R.R.M. 3001, 3002 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31 Id
92 See id. at 31, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
" See id. at 25, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3002.
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nently shut down the unprofitable hog kill and cut operations at its
home plant in Dubuque, Iowa, 34
 In subsequent negotiations aimed at
sustaining the Dubuque factory operations, Dubuque requested con-
cessions in the form of a wage freeze. 33
 This wage-freeze proposal
violated Dubuque's previous 1980 agreement where it promised to seek
no further concessions for the remainder of the union contract's term
in exchange for concessions from the union totalling approximately
$5 million per annum." Following the union's initial rejection of the
wage-freeze proposal, Dubuque announced that it was considering
relocating, rather than closing, the factory operations. 37
 Ignoring the
union's repeated requests for bargaining meetings and detailed com-
pany financial data substantiating the need for concessions, Dubuque
opened a new hog kill and cut operation in Rochelle, Illinois, simulta-
neously eliminating the approximately 530 similar jobs at the Dubuque
plant.38
In response to these actions, the union filed unfair labor practice
complaints with the NLRB claiming that Dubuque had failed to bar-
gain in good faith." An Administrative Law judge (AU) ruled, and the
Board affirmed, that Dubuque had no duty to bargain over its decision
to relocate operations. 4° On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals re-
manded the case, stating that insufficient reasoning in the Board's
opinion and conflicting standards articulated in previous Board deci-
sions precluded the court from ascertaining the precise rule of law
applied by the Board. 4 ' In its instructions, the D.C. Circuit strongly
encouraged the Board to adopt a single, majority-supported standard
34 Id. at 26, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3003.





44) Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 27, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3003.
4t United Food and Commercial Workers Intl Union Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2c1 1422,
1423, 132 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2105-06 (1).C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Dubuque Packing II]. The
Dubuque Packing II court noted that the Board had no single standard !Or determining whether
an employer had breached its duty to bargain with union representatives over a plant relocation.
See id. at 1431, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2111-12. Rather, the Board in most cases relied primarily on three
separate minority-supported tests promulgated in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 115
L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984). See Dubuque Packing II, 880 F.2d at 1431, 132 L.R.R.M. at. 2111-12. Even
though the court held that each of die three Otis Elevator tests were reasonably defensible tests
for determining whether plant relocations are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, the
court. was critical of the Board's simple acceptance of ALI ridings based on its assertion that the
ruling was legally SUlliCiClit "under-any-[minority]-view" expressed in Otis Elevator See id. at 1434,
1437, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2114, 2116.
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for determining whether a particular employer's decision is a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining."
On remand, the Board formulated and unanimously approved a
single test for determining whether an employer has a duty to bargain
with union representatives over plant relocations." Cognizant of the
varied circumstances surrounding relocation decisions, the Board re-
fused to categorize all such decisions as either mandatory or permissive
subjects of collective bargaining." Accordingly, the Board directed its
inquiry to whether bargaining over a particular relocation decision will
advance the neutral purpose of the Act." Under the Board's test, the
initial burden is on the General Counsel of the NLRB to establish that
the employer's relocation of unit work was unattended by a basic
change in the nature of the employer's operation." If this initial bur-
den is successfully met, the General Counsel will have established a
prima facie case that the employer's relocation decision is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. 47
 An employer may rebut the General
Counsel's prima facie case by producing evidence demonstrating that
the work performed at the new location varies significantly from the
work performed at the former plant, that the work performed at the
former plant is to be discontinued entirely and not moved to the new
location, or that the employer's decision involves a change in the scope
or direction of the company." Alternatively, an employer may defend
itself by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that its decision
to relocate unit work is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining
because (1) labor costs (direct and/or indirect) were not a factor in
the decision or (2) even if labor costs were a factor in the decision, the
union could not have offered labor cost concessions that could have
changed the employer's decision to relocate." Applying this new test,
42
 Dubuque Packing II, 880 F.2d at 1436-37, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2116.
43 Dulnique Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 391, 137 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1192 (1991) [hereinafter
Dubuque Packing III], enforced, United Food and Commercial Workers Intl Union Local 150-A
v. NLRB, 1 E3r.1 24, 143 L.R.R.M. 3001 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
44 Dubuque Packing III, 303 N.L.R.B. at 390, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
49 Id.
46 Id. at 391, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1192.
47 Id.
95 1d. at 391, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1192.
49 Dubuque Packing III, 303 N.L.R.B. at 391, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1192. Direct labor costs are items
such as wages and fringe benefits, while indirect labor costs involve no-cost items with a potential
economic impact, such as seniority or manning requirements. Decision Bargaining After First
National Maintenance, Prac L. Inst., Aug. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File.
Under the Board's test, if labor costs are an irrelevant factor in the relocation decision, bargaining
will not be required because union involvement in the decision process provides little, if ally,
benefit. See Dubuque Packing III, 303 N.L.R.B. at 391, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1192. Likewise, if the union
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the Board found that Dubuque breached its statutory duty to bargain
over the relocation of its factory operations."
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the Board's deter-
mination that Dubuque's relocation decision was properly subject to
mandatory bargaining. 5 ' Specifically, the court found that the Board's
newly-crafted standard represented a permissible reading of the NLRA
and Supreme Court precedent." Additionally, it dismissed Dubuque's
claim that the standard was improperly applied to the facts of the
case."
The court began its opinion by evaluating the legality of the
Board's newly promulgated standard. 54 The court was primarily con-
cerned with whether the Board could legally impose a duty to bargain
on an employer when all elements of the test are proved in favor of
the union. i 5 The court approached this task by dissecting the Board's
standard into three distinct layers of analysis. 56
The court determined that the first layer of the Board's analysis
appropriately concentrated on the objective differences between the
old and new operations." Under the Board's test, after the General
Counsel has established its prima facie case, an employer can exempt
itself from the statutory duty to negotiate and may take unilateral
action if it demonstrates that the proposed relocation involves a fun-
damental change in the scope or direction of the business. 58 Such
fundamental alterations in the scope or direction of an employer's
business, the court reasoned, are objective manifestations of core
managerial decisions and permit an employer to relocate without ne-
gotiating." Accordingly, the court held that the Board's objective evalu-
ation of the evidence preserves an employer's right to unfettered
entrepreneurial control.6°
The second layer, observed the court, focused on the employer's
first potential affirmative defense.61 The court stated that this layer is
is unable or unwilling to offer concessions sufficient to offset the relocation, the decision is not
amenable to the bargaining process. Id.
50 Dubuque Packing III, 303 N.L.H.B. at 396-97, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
51 Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d 24, 25-26, 143 L.R.R.M. 3001, 3002 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
52 1d.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006-07.
55 Id. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
56 Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 80, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 29, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
5° M. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. al 3006.
6° See id.
CI See Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
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a subjective inquiry into the employer's underlying motivations for the
relocation decision. 62 Under the Board's test, an employer relocating
its business without any objective differences in the operations may
defend its decision by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that labor costs were not a consideration." The court indicated
that this prong of the analysis is a useful discretionary tool for distin-
guishing relocation decisions induced largely by labor cost savings
from those motivated by other perceived advantages of the new loca-
tion." The former category of decisions is suitable for mandatory
bargaining, while the latter category is not."
The final layer of the Board's analysis, as identified by the court,
involved the applicability of the test's second affirmative defense,
which the court labeled a "futility" provision. 66 Under this provision,
an employer can relocate without prior negotiations if it can show that,
although labor costs were a consideration in the decision, the union
was unable, or unwilling, to offer financial concessions sufficient to
offset the expected savings of the relocation. 67
 Thus, the court implic-
itly acknowledged that the Board's test comports with the Act's central
purpose of promoting collective bargaining only when an employer's
decision is amenable to resolution by that process and is potentially
beneficial to the labor-management relationship.m The court also
agreed with the Board's declaration that, when circumstances demand
62 Id.
66 Id. at 29-30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
64 See id. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006. Compare Reece Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 448, 131 L.R.R.M.
1413 (1989) (decision to relocate unit work motivated by employer's failure to obtain economic
relief from union and inability to persuade union to accept labor cost reductions after contract
went into effect) and Pertec Computer Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 810, 126 L.R.R.M. 1134 (1987),
supplemental decision sub nom., Triumph-Adler-Royal, 298 N.L.R.B. 609, 134 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1990)
(decision to transfer work based on consultants' cost study showing potential savings of $2.6
million, $2 million of which was attributed to labor costs) with Metropolitan Teletronics, 279
N.L.R.B. 957, 122 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1986) (decision to relocate motivated by foreclosure on former
facility, lower mortgage interest rate and more spacious quarters at the new facility, and the
prospect of government assistance) and Inland Steel Container Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 929, 119
L.R.R.M. 1293 (1985) (decision to relocate unit work motivated by outdated facility, limited space
for growth and flooding in facility) pet. for review denied sub nom., Steelworkers Local 2179 v.
NLRB, 822 F.2d 559, 125 L.R.R.M. 3313 (5th Cir. 1987).
66 See Dubuque Packing /V, 1 F.3d at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
66 /d. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
'7 Id. at 29-30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006. The court's analysis of this prong was premised on its
belief that the Board intended this defense to encompass not only those situations where it was
impossible for the union to make concessions equal to the potential savings, but also those
situations where the employer could reasonably establish, by precedent or other evidentiary
methods, that the union would refuse to make concessions. See id. at 30-31, 143 L.R.R.M. at
3006-07.
68 See id. at 28-32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3005-07.
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a relocation decision be implemented expeditiously, the Board may
liberally define when a mandatory negotiation session has reached a
bona-fide impasse, thereby permitting an employer to act unilaterally.°
The court concluded its analysis by declaring that the Board may
reasonably impose a duty to bargain when all layers of the test are
resolved in favor of the union. 7° According to the court, the exemp-
tions in the test still afford the employer significant authority over the
conduct of its own business.'" Specifically, when facing a relocation
decision, only those relocations that leave the firm occupying the same
entrepreneurial position, that were taken because of the cost of labor
and that offer a realistic hope for a negotiated settlement are manda-
tory subjects of collective bargaining.72
 The court agreed with the
Board's determination that the benefits to be gained from bargaining
over these particular relocation decisions outweighed the burdens
placed on the employer's managerial discretion. 73
After considering the legality of the Board's test, the court consid-
ered whether the Board's test was a permissible reading of Supreme
Court precedent. 74 The court affirmed the Board's determination that
a plant relocation decision is more closely analogous to the subcon-
tracting decision found mandatory in Fibreboard, than to the partial
business closure in First National, where the employer had no duty to
bargain. 7" A relocation decision subject to mandatory bargaining un-
der the Board's test does not involve objective differences in the scope
"9 Id. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006. The First National Court observed that, in a plant closure
situation, management may have to move swiftly and secretly in order to take advantage of
significant tax or securities benefits. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682-83,
107 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2711 (1981). These benefits may be affected by publicity, or the timing of the
plant closing and reorganization of the corporate structure. Id.
7" Dubuque Packing IV, 1 Elid at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
71 M. at. 31, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
72 1d. at 31-32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
75 Id. at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
74 id .
75 Dubuque Packing IV, I F.3d at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007-08, In crafting its test, the Board
extracted and was particularly solicitous of what it considered to be the three critical factors
underlying the Fibreboard and First National decisions. Dubuque Packing III, 303 N.L.R.B. 386,
390-91, 137 L.R.R.M, 1185, 1191 (1991). First, the Board recognized that in First National, the
employer did not intend to replace the discharged employees or move the operation to another
site, while the employer in Fibreboard merely substituted one group of employees for another. Id.
at 390, 137 L.R.R.M. at 1192. Second, the Board pointed to the significant business alteration
confronting the employer in First National. Id. With the employer in Fibreboard, there was no
major shift in the business strategy or product base where the employer merely dismissed union
employees and replaced them with an independent contractor. Id. Third, the employer's decision
in First National was based on the size of the management fee the nursing home was willing to
pay, a matter over which the union had no control. Id. at 391, 157 L.R.R.M. at 1192. In contrast,
the employer's decision in Fibreboard was motivated largely by labor-cost savings. Id.
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or direction of the employer's basic operations such that the employer
can claim a core entrepreneurial decision was made." Additionally,
under the subjective inquiry, the reduction of labor costs is the em-
ployer's primary motivation for the relocation." Lastly, the union main-
tains control over the basis for the employer's decision to relocate,
thereby making the dispute amenable to the collective-bargaining
process."'
In upholding the Board's test, the court first rejected Dubuque's
contention that the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
both Fibreboard and First National implicitly exempt relocation deci-
sions from bargaining. 79
 Dubuque argued that because of the large
expenditure of capital incurred, relocation decisions should be within
the exclusive province of management.8° The court concluded, how-
ever, that while both First National and Fibreboard clearly advocate
limited restrictions on management's investment of capital, they do
not unambiguously exempt all such decisions from the collective-bar-
gaining process. 8 ' Absent any strict prohibitions by the Supreme Court
in this area, the court was compelled to respect the policy choices
reflected in the Board's formulation of the test, particularly because it
viewed those choices as reasonable. 82
 The court found the Board's
explicit exemptions and potential defenses sufficiently protective of
management's capital investment decisions." The court also recog-
nized the Board's understanding that many bargaining decisions af-
fecting terms and conditions of employment are tied to investment of
capital.84
 The court reasoned that excluding these decisions from the
protections afforded labor unions under the Act, merely because they
infringe on corporate control of capital expenditures, would be incon-
sistent with the fundamental purposes of the NLRA. 85
76 Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3007.
77 Id. at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. This argument refers to Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard. Id. Justice
Stewart stated "subcontracting falls short of such larger entrepreneurial questions as what shall
be produced, [and.) how capital shall be invested in fixed assets .. ." Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 225, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2618 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
81
 Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 32, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
82 See id.
83
 Id. The court viewed the exemptions as relatively broad and, therefore, constituting a
sufficient panoply for the employer. See id. The court did concede that large scale shifts in capital
are unlikely candidates for mandatory bargaining. Id. The court cited as an example any shift
from a labor-intensive production line to a fully automated factory. Id.
sa Id.
as See id.
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The court next dismissed Dubuque's argument that the Board's
standard failed to provide the degree of certainty necessary for an
employer to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct as an unfair labor practice. 86 The court acknowledged that
the Board's test undoubtedly leaves areas of uncertainty between those
decisions subject to mandatory bargaining and those that are exempt. 87
Nevertheless, the court stated that this "ambiguity at the margins" does
not invalidate the test and that the contours of these boundaries will
be more clearly defined in future adjudications."
The Duktque Packing IV court then affirmed the Board's applica-
tion of its new test to the facts, and held that Dubuque indeed
breached its statutory duty to bargain collectively over the relocation
of its hog kill and cut operations." In so holding, the court discarded
Dubuque's assertion that because the Rochelle plant was a more mod-
ern and efficient facility, the decision to relocate the operations con-
stituted a fundamental change in the scope and direction of the busi-
ness." The court noted that its decision was buttressed by the ALJ's
findings, which determined that the operations of the two plants were
essentially identical. 91
Moreover, the court disagreed with Dubuque's claim that the
union's repeated rejections of its wage-freeze proposal allowed it to
invoke the futility provision of the Board's test as an affirmative defense
to the union's unfair labor practice claim. 92 Dubuque argued that the
union conduct manifested an inability or unwillingness to offer
sufficient concessions to sustain the Dubuque factory operations."
Thus, Dubuque saw no lawful obligation to bargain with union repre-
sentatives over its relocation decision." The court, however, noted that
past negotiations with the union had been productive and nothing in
the record indicated a different result in this particular instance. 95 The
court found that the union's overwhelming rejection of Dubuque's
initial wage-freeze proposal was not an indication of intransigence, but
"Dubuque Parking IV, I F.3d at 32-33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
"7 Id.
"8 Id, at 33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
" Id. at 33-34, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009.
90 Id. at 33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009,
91 See Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009, The primary purpose of both
plants was to "slaughter hogs, dress carcasses, and to process pork into hams, bacon and sausage."
Id.
92 Id. at 33-34, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009.
93 Id. at 34, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009.
94 See id,
95 See id.
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mere union posturing and an insistence that Dubuque agree to bar-
gain in good faith by providing the relevant financial data." The court
held, therefore, that the Board's decision that Dubuque had breached
its duty to bargain was substantially supported by the facts. 97
The court's affirmation of the Board's test in Dubuque Packing IV
provides an analytical framework for evaluating whether an employer's
decision to relocate part of its business operations constitutes a term
or condition of employment." The test requires an essentially factual
inquiry into three separate areas: the objective differences in the na-
ture and scope of the current and former operations, the influence of
labor costs savings in the decision process, and the impossibility or
unwillingness of union representatives to offer labor concessions
sufficient to offset the potential benefits of a relocation." The results
of this analysis, as the court warned, will not always be predictable in
the early stages of the application of the testi" The test should, how-
ever, provide a reasonable guide until the policy and approach of the
Board becomes apparent in subsequent adjudications.m
Although the Board's test certainly attempts to provide more
guidance and predictability for employers deciding to relocate their
plant operations, the test appears susceptible to subjective decision-
making by the Board in the determination of the reasons underlying
the employer's relocation decision. This subjective analysis could un-
reasonably harm the interests of the union should the employer claim
as an affirmative defense that labor costs were not a factor in the
decision process. As a prophylactic measure, the Board's post-hoc
examination of the justifications for an employer's relocation should
clearly focus on the actual motivations at the time of the decision, not
the potential justifications conceived by the employer after an unfair
labor practice suit is initiated. 102
 This will ensure that the fundamental
purpose of the Act is not subverted by the creative skills of the em-
ployer or the employer's lawyer. Such a focus does not preclude the
Board from considering post-relocation events in evaluating an em-
ployer's motivation. Rather, it simply limits the analysis primarily to
factual data existing prior to or contemporaneously with the relocation
decision.
"Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 34, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3009.
97 id.
98 Id. at 30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
99
 Id.
' See id. at 33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
m Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3d at 33, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
142 See Dubuque Packing IA 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 392 n.14, 137 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1192 n. l4 (1991).
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Along the same lines, the Board's evaluation of the relocation
decision should not consider merely those issues susceptible to mone-
tary calculations. Other, less tangible factors, such as moving to a
"potentially" more profitable region of the country, should be consid-
ered in the analysis if they are logically supported. The test, however,
does not clearly allow an employer to ascertain whether the Board will
accord any weight to these factors.
Lastly, the Board's test is limited solely to relocation decisions.
Much like the decision in First National, the decision does not articu-
late a standard for resolving other labor-management disputes falling
outside the clearly defined boundaries of core managerial decisions
or pure employer-employee relationship matters. Thus, while an em-
ployer might be able to reasonably anticipate the consequences of a
relocation after this case, the legality of its conduct in other areas of
similar importance remains uncertain.
In summary, in Dubuque Packing N, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia approved the test promulgated by
the National Labor Relations Board for determining whether an em-
ployer's decision to relocate unit work will be subject to mandatory
collective bargaining.'" The employer must submit the decision to the
collective bargaining process unless the relocation constitutes a funda-
mental change to the business, or, alternatively, the employer proves
that the relocation was initiated for reasons other than potential labor
cost savings, or the union was unable or unwilling to offer sufficient
concessions to offset the potential savings. 104 The court held that the
test is consistent with and does not depart from previous Supreme
Court decisions interpreting an employer's duty to bargain collectively
with union representatives over terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 105 In fact, the test employs a more concrete, fact-oriented version
of the balancing test proposed by the First National Court which an
employer may find useful in planning its business affairs.
D. * Good Faith Bargaining and Employers' Obligation to Substantiate
Collective Bargaining Claims: United Steelworkers of America, Local
14534 v. NLRB'
Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
obligates employers to bargain in good faith with their employees'
1 °3 Dubuque Packing IV, 1 F.3c1 at 25, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3002.
104 Id. at 29-30, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3006.
1115 1d. at 25, 143 L.R.R.M. at 3002.
* By Daniel E. Will, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW RIlviEw,
1 983 F.2d 240, 142 L.R.R.M. 2177 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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representatives. 2 In addition, section 8(d) of the NLRA extends the
good faith obligation to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment.' Claims with respect to such highly relevant issues must
be honest, and in some cases may require substantiation.' Generally,
when an employer alleges a financial inability to meet a union's de-
mands, the employer must substantiate that claim by disclosing its
financial records to the union.' Other employer allegations, such as
competitive disadvantage, may not require substantiation.'
In 1956, in NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that an employer's refusal to substantiate a claim
of inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of a failure
to bargain in good faith.? Truitt Manufacturing Co. ("Truitt") denied
the union's wage increase request of ten cents per hour.' Truitt as-
serted that it was undercapitalized, had never paid dividends, and
would be put out of business by any increase above two and a half cents
per hour.' Truitt then refused to substantiate its claims through disclo-
sure of financial information to the union.'"
The Court observed that section 8 good faith bargaining requires
claims made during negotiations to be honest." According to the
Court, an argument important enough for parties to raise during
negotiations requires some proof of accuracy. 12 The Court added that
the parties treated the company's ability to pay increased wages as
highly relevant.' 3 Thus, the Truitt Court concluded, the NLRB could
reasonably determine that an employer who mechanically repeated a
claim of inability to pay without making any effort to substantiate that
claim failed to bargain in good faith."
The Court noted, however, that its holding did not automatically
extend to every situation in which an employer alleged an inability to
pay.' 5 The Court explained that the NLRB must evaluate the particular
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
4 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53, 38 L.R.R.M. 2042, 2043 (1956).
5 See, e.g., id. at 153, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2044; NLRB v. Harvstone Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 575,
121 L.R.R.M. 3371, 3375 (7th Cir. 1986).
6 See, e.g., Facet Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 980, 134 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2621 (10th Cir.
1990); Dallas Gen. Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845, 61 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2067 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
7 Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2044.
8 Id. at 150, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2042.
9 Id.
'° Id. at 150, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
11 Id. at 152, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
12
 Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152-53, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
15 M. at 152, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
14 See id. at 153, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
1.5
	 id. at 153, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2044.
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facts of each case to determine whether the parties have met their
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. 16 The Truitt Court thus
set forth a universal standard of inquiry to be applied in each disclo-
sure case, rather than a universal obligation to substantiate all claims
made during negotiations.' 7
The Federal Courts of Appeals are divided over the extent to
which Truitt requires employers to disclose financial information to
union bargaining representatives."' In 1966, in NLRB v. Western Wire-
bound Box Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the Truitt disclosure rule is not limited to cases in which the
employer alleges a financial inability to pay increased wages)' Western
Wirebound Box Co. ("Western Wirebound") sought a wage reduction
to remain competitive in its industry. 20 Western Wirebound specifically
denied an inability to pay and refused to provide the union with
financial information.21 The Ninth Circuit indicated that good faith
bargaining requires employers to substantiate relevant claims, those
important enough to be presented during negotiations. 22 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that claims of competitive disadvantage and claims
of financial inability merit the same analysis, 2S The court concluded,
therefore, that Western Wirebound's competitive disadvantage claim
required substantiation. 24
Similarly, in 1966, in NLRB v. Celotex Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Truitt could require
substantiation of competitive disadvantage claims.° Celotex Corpora-
tion ("Celotex") sought relief from certain restrictions in the collective
bargaining agreement to remain competitive.° Celotex specifically de-
nied an inability to pay, insisting that it could pay what it deemed
appropriate to pay. 27 Therefore, Celotex asserted, the financial data
IL' See id. at 153-54, 38 L.R,R.M. at 2044.
17 See Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153-54, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2044.
is See, e.g., Facet Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 980, 134 L.R.R.M, 2609, 2621 (10th Cir.
1990); NLRB v. Harvstone, 785 F.2d 570, 575-76, 121 L.R.R.M. 3371, 3375-76 (7th Cir, 1986);
Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338, 123 L.R.R.M. 2774, 2778 (4th Cir. 1986);
NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 497 F.2d 747, 751, 86 L.R.R.M. '2763, 2766 (6th Cir, 1974);
NLRB v. Celotex Corp., 364 F.2d 552, 554, 62 L.R.R.M. 2475, 2477 (5th Cir. 1956); NLRB v.
Western Wirehound, Box Co., 356 F.2d 88, 90, 61 L.R.R.M. 2218, 2220 (9th Cir, 1966); Dallas Gen.
Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845, 61 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2067 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19 Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d at 90, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2220.
'201d. at 89, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2219.
21 Id.
22 See Id. at 90-91, 61 L,R.R.M. at 2220.
23 See id.
24 See Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d at 91, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2220.
25 See Celotex, 364 F.2d at 554, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
2® Id. at 553, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
27 Id. at 553, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
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sought by the union was irrelevant.28 The court analogized the Truitt
disclosure rule to the rule governing discovery: information must be
disclosed unless it plainly appears irrelevant. 29 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
did not distinguish between claims of inability to pay and claims of
competitive disadvantage, but sought to determine whether or not the
information requested by the union was plainly irrelevant." Accord-
ingly, the court upheld the NLRB finding that Celotex violated its
obligation to bargain in good faith by refusing to substantiate its
competitive disadvantage claims. 3'
Conversely, in 1966, in United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
an employer had no obligation to disclose financial information to
substantiate a claim of competitive disadvantage. 32 Four companies in
a multi-employer bargaining unit claimed that non-union competitors
in the industry operated at lower costs than their own." The companies
asserted that financial information would not substantiate competi-
tive disadvantage claims. 34 The Seventh Circuit distinguished between
claims of inability to pay and claims of unwillingness to meet union
demands." The court reasoned that when an employer is unwilling to
meet union demands, disclosure of financial information will not pro-
vide the union with insight into that employer's resolve." The Seventh
Circuit categorized the companies' competitive disadvantage assertions
as claims of unwillingness to pay, and therefore held that the employers
had no obligation to disclose financial information."
Similarly, in 1988, in Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, the Sev-
enth Circuit vacated an NLRB finding that an employer must sub-
stantiate its competitive disadvantage claims by disclosing financial
information to the union. 38 The Nielsen Lithographing Company
("Nielsen") demanded wage cuts to remain competitive in its indus-
try." The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Nielsen stated a subjective
28 See id. at 554, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
29 Id.
31) See Celotex, 364 F.2d at 554, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
51 id.
32 See United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 498, 61 L.R.R.M. 2315, 2318
(7th Cir. 1966).
33 Id. at 495, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2315.
34 See id. at 496, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2316.
35 See id. at 498, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2318.
38 See id.
37 See United Fire Proof Warehouse, 356 F.2d at 498, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2318.
mi See Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1067, 129 L.R.R.M. 2367, 2370 (7th
Cir. 1988).
39 Id. at 1065, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2368.
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desire, not an objective need.'" Thus, the court reasoned, no existing
data could substantiate Nielsen's subjective desire to reduce wages.'"
The Nielsen court then remanded the case to the NLRB for a decision
consistent with Seventh Circuit authority. 42
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has varied in its interpretations of Truitt." In 1966, in Dallas General
Drivers v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit upheld an NLRB finding that good
faith bargaining did not obligate an employer to substantiate a com-
petitive disadvantage claim." Empire Terminal Warehouse Co. ("Em-
pire") alleged competitive disadvantage in response to the union's
request for a wage increase.45 Empire admitted financial health, but
averred a loss of accounts due to an inflated wage scale. 46 The D.C.
Circuit noted that Empire claimed competitive disadvantage and not
financial inability."' The court concluded, therefore, that Empire need
not disclose financial information to the union. 48
In marked contrast, in 1968, in United Steelworkers of America, Local
5571 v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit held that a company must substantiate
claims important enough to raise during collective bargaining." Stan-
ley-Artex Windows, Division of the Stanley Works ("Stanley") claimed
that it could not grant a wage increase and remain competitive." The
D.C. Circuit reasoned that claims of competitive disadvantage are
merely the explanation of claims of inability to pay, and are not ana-
lytically distinct.'' The D.C. Circuit stressed that any claim important
40 See
4l See id.
42 Id. at 1067, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2370. On remand, the NLRB thund that Nielsen alleged
competitive disadvantage, and therefore did not fail to bargain in good faith by rethsing to
substantiate its claim. See Graphic Communications Inel Union, Local 508 v. NLRB and Nielsen
Lithographing Co., 977 E2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992). The Union then filed a petition for
review. See id at 1168. In denying the petition for review, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
requested information would not substantiate Nielsen's competitive disadvantage claim. See id at
1170. Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit, the Company had no obligation to disclose.
See id. at 1170-71.
43 See United Steelworkers of Am., Local 5571 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 434, 436, 69 L.R.R.M. 2196,
2198 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dallas Gen. Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845, 61 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2067
(D.C. Cir, 1966).
44 See Dallas Gen. Drivers, 355 17.2(1 at 845, 61 L.R.R.M, at 2067.
45 See id. at 844, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2066.
"See Empire Terminal Warehouse Co. and Dallas Gen, Drivers, Local Union 745, 151
N.L.R.B. 1359, 1367, 58 L.R.R.M. 1589, 1589-90 (1965).
47 See Dallas Gen. Drivers, 355 E2d at 845, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2067.
48 See id.
49 Local 5571, 401 F.2cl at 436, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2197.
5° Id,
51 See id. at 436, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
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enough to be raised during collective bargaining must be substanti-
ated." Thus, the court upheld the NLRB finding that Stanley must
disclose financial data to the union.°
During the Survey year, in United Steelworkers of America, Local
14534 v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit upheld an NLRB finding that an
employer's claim of competitive disadvantage did not require substan-
tiation.54
 Concrete Pipe and Products Corp.—Syracuse Division ("Con-
crete Pipe" or "the Company") sought wage and benefit concessions
to be competitive in its market. The court recognized that the NLRB
finding contradicted previous Board decisions that the court had en-
forced. 56
 The court determined, however, that the NLRB may alter its
interpretation of substantive law, provided that the new interpretation
does not conflict with the NLRA and is accompanied by reasoned
analysis.57
 Satisfied with the NLRB's new interpretation and explana-
tion, the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's shift in position regarding
the scope of the Truitt disclosure rules.
Until 1987, Concrete Pipe enjoyed a thirty-year collective bargain-
ing relationship with its maintenance and productions employees un-
ion ("Union"). 59
 During the first negotiation session of 1987, the Com-
pany president announced that to be competitive, the Company must
lower wage rates and benefits. 6° Concrete Pipe then proposed a 30%
reduction in wages."' The Union representative responded that the
Union would make concessions if the Company's books showed a
need." Concrete Pipe denied the Union's request, citing a Company
policy against disclosing financial data. 65 Throughout subsequent ne-
gotiations, Concrete Pipe steadfastly refused to disclose financial infor-
mation to the Union.64
The Union filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging that Concrete
Pipe had failed to bargain in good faith by refusing to disclose its
52 See id. at 436, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2197. The D.C. Circuit also noted that the Company put
ability to pay at issue, which triggered an obligation to disclose. Id.
53 See id. at 436, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2197-98.
54
 United Steelworkers of Ain., Local 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 245, 142 L.R.R.M. 2177,
2180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
55 Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 242, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2178.
56
 Id. at 244, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
67 1d.
55 Id. at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
59 1d. at 242, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2178.
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financial information to the Union. 65 The Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") found that Concrete Pipe had failed to bargain in good faith.°
The AL] reasoned that the Company's bargaining claims were central
to the parties' negotiations and, thus, highly relevant. 67 The ALJ con-
cluded that the Company's refusal to substantiate its claim of competi-
tive disadvantage preordained the failure of the negotiations. 68
Concrete Pipe filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the
NLRB.° Reversing the ALJ in part, the NLRB held that Concrete Pipe
had no obligation to provide financial data." The majority, however,
did not base its holding on Truitt. 7 ' Instead, the majority reasoned that
an employer's desire to bring its wages in line with competitors is
simply a legitimate bargaining goal:72 Thus, the majority concluded,
the ALJ could not reasonably view Concrete Pipe's desire to reduce its
wages as a deliberate attempt to frustrate negotiations."
In a concurring opinion, however, NLRB Chairman Stephens
emphasized that, under Truitt, Concrete Pipe had no obligation to
disclose financial information to the Union. 74 Stephens reasoned that
Concrete Pipe's claim did not raise the issue of the Company's finan-
cial health." Therefore, Stephens concluded, the Company never
made a claim that financial records could verify." According to
68 See id. at 243, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2178. The Union subsequently filed an additional charge,
alleging that Concrete Pipe and Products unlawfully refused to allow its striking employees to
return to work after they had made an unconditional offer to return, in violation of § 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA. id. The NLRB ruled in favor of the Union on this charge. Id. at 243, 142 L.R.R.M. at
2179.
66 See Concrete Pipe and Prod. Corp.—Syracuse Div. and United Steelworkers of Am., Local
14534, 305 N.L.R.B. 152, 171, 138 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1185 (1991). In addition, the AU found that
Concrete Pipe's unfair labor practices had caused the strike, and that it had discriminated against
its employees on the basis of Union membership by refusing to reinstate them after they uncon-
ditionally offered to return to work. Id.
07 See id. at 153, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1186.
68 See id.
68 See id. at 152, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1185.
"See id. at 152, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1186. The NLRB also reversed the ALJ on the nature of
the strike which followed negotiations breakdown, holding that it was an economic strike, and
not an unfair labor practice strike, since the Company did not engage in any unfair labor practice.
See id. After several months, the strikers unconditionally offered to return to work. See id The
NLRB upheld the ALJ finding that returning economic strikers arc generally entitled to full
reinstatement, and thus that Concrete Pipe was obligated to rehire the strikers after their
unconditional offer. See id. at 154, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1187.
71 See Concrete Pipe, 305 N.L.R.B. at 153, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1186.
72 Id.
79
	 id. at 153, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1186-87.
74 1d. at 155, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1187.
7r.
	 at 155, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1188.
76 See id. at 155, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1187.
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Stephens, Concrete Pipe's allegations made relevant nothing more
than the factual issue of the Company's competitive disadvantage."
Thus, Stephens concluded that, under Truitt, Concrete Pipe's financial
records were irrelevant to the negotiations. 78
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the NLRB decision, holding, under
Truitt, that substantial evidence could support the NLRB finding that
the Company had no obligation to disclose financial information to
the Union. 79 First, the court recognized that good faith bargaining
requires employers to provide union representatives with information
relevant to the proper performance of representatives' duties. 8° Ac-
cording to the court, however, Truitt indicates that financial informa-
tion is not presumed relevant to the performance of bargaining rep-
resentatives' duties. 8 ' Instead, the court continued, Truitt requires
courts to determine the relevancy of financial information on a case
by case basis. 82 The court indicated that the NLRB must determine
whether the employer has claimed financial inability or a competitive
disadvantage in each case. 83 According to the court, a company must
disclose financial information only when it asserts financial inability. 84
The court then noted that in prior decisions enforced by the D.C.
Circuit, the NLRB required employers to substantiate claims of com-
petitive disadvantage under Truitt. 85 According to the court, however,
circuit courts generally defer to the NLRB due to its expertise. 88 Thus,
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the NLRB may alter its interpretation
of substantive law provided that: (1) the new interpretation does not
conflict with the NLRA, and (2) the NLRB supplies a reasoned analysis
for its new interpretation. 87
The D.C. Circuit then determined that the Board's new interpre-
tation of the Truitt disclosure rules met that two part standard. 88 With-
out explanation, the court concluded that the new interpretation did
not conflict with the broad terms of the NLRA. 89 The court then noted
77 Concrete Pipe, 305 N.L.R.B. at 155, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1188.
78 See id. at 155, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1187-88.
76 See United Steelworkers of Ana., Local 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 245, 142 L.R.R.M.
2177, 2180 (1).C. Cir. 1993).
80 Id. at 243, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2179.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 243-44, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2179.
Id.
84
 Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 243-44, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2179.
86 Id. at 244, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
86 See id. at 244, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2179.
87 See id. at 244, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
88 See id. at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
8 •`' See. Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
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that the NLRB, in Local 14534, supplied no reasoned analysis for its
change in opinion. 90 The court recognized, however, that, in Nielsen
Lithographing, the NLRB had supplied the requisite detailed explana-
tion for its new analysis of competitive disadvantage claims 9' The D.C.
Circuit concluded that the NLRB's Nielsen Lithographing decision pro-
vided the required detailed explanation. 92 Accordingly, the court up-
held the NLRB decision in favor of Concrete Pipe."
The D.C. Circuit's holding in Local 14534, that a claim of com-
petitive disadvantage did not trigger an employer obligation to substan-
tiate, follows a recent judicial trend holding that Truitt does not re-
quire substantiation of competitive disadvantage claims." The D.C.
Circuit, however, has not affirmatively approved this narrow interpre-
tation of Truitt. 95
 The decision in Local 14534 speaks more about
deference to reasonable administrative agency findings than about the
proper interpretation of Truitt. 96
 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit, irrespec-
tive of its own opinion, upheld the NLRB decision on the technical
grounds that the NLRA could be read to allow the NLRB's shift in
position, and that substantial evidence supported that shift. 97
Thus, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Local 14534 could apply
equally had the NLRB found that competitive disadvantage claims were
equivalent to financial inability claims. Under Local 14534, the NLRB
may come to any decision as long as the decision comports with the
NLRA and the NLRB provides a reasoned explanation. 98
 Implicitly,
however, the D.C. Circuit did approve of the NLRB's new approach to
financial disclosure obligations. Rather than apply its own standard
rigidly, the court read the NLRA broadly to accommodate the NLRB's
new position, and waived the requirement of a reasoned explanation. 99
90 1d.
91 See id. (thing Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1067, 129 L.R.R.M. 2367,
2370 (7th Cir. 1988)). The ALJ's Nielsen Lithographing decision adopted by the NLRB, states that
common sense dictates that when an employer does not claim financial inability, and simply
chooses not to pay more, further financial data is irrelevant. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. and
Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508, 279 N.L.R.B. 877, 878 (1986). Absent a claim
of financial inability, the union has no right to inspect the employer's books. See id.
92 See Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., Facet Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 980, 134 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2621 (10th Cir.
1990); Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d. 1063, 1065, 129 L.R.R.M. 2367, 2368 (7th
Cir. 1988); Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338, 123 L.R.R.M. 2774, 2778
(4th Cir, 1986); NLRB v. Harvstone, 785 F.2d 570, 576, 121 L.R.R.M. 3371, 3375 (7th Cir. 1986).
•5 See Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 244, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2179-80.
!Hi Id .
•7 See id. at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
"See id.
99 See id.
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For practical purposes, the decision in Local 14534 has major
significance for parties in collective bargaining. First, the D.C. Circuit
indicated that it was joining with other circuits that have found the
NLRB's new interpretation of Truitt permissible, implicitly approving
of the NLRB shift,'" Second, the D.C. Circuit remains highly influen-
tial among the circuits, particularly in labor law.'°' Thus, Local 14534
will likely persuade other circuits, and perhaps the Supreme Court, to
uphold the NLRB's restrictive interpretation of the Truitt rule. Even
though the D.C. Circuit did not independently endorse the new NLRB
reading of Truitt, Local 14534 tips the scales strongly in favor of a
general trend toward restrictive disclosure rules.'"
Furthermore, the Local 14534 decision may also affect the balance
of power between employers and unions in collective bargaining ne-
gotiations. The strength of the D.C. Circuit's authority may dissuade
unions from challenging employers who refuse to substantiate any
claim that is not clearly one of financial inability. Further, alert employ-
ers will avoid financial inability claims when refusing to meet union
demands. Thus, Local 14534 further enhances employers' collective
bargaining positions because the NLRB and circuit courts will not
require substantiation of most claims.
Finally, the restrictive financial information disclosure rule ap-
plied in Local 14534 derives directly from the Truitt reasoning, and is
thus preferable to the prior, less restrictive application. The Truitt
Court emphasized that claims both parties consider highly relevant
to collective bargaining require some substantiation.'" Yet the Truitt
Court refused to require disclosure in all cases involving financial
inability.'°4 Thus, the Truitt Court gave future triers of fact discretion
in requiring employers to substantiate claims made during collective
bargaining.'"
By claiming financial inability, an employer states an objective fact
a union representative can verify by examining the employer's finan-
cial records.'" The financial information, therefore, is highly relevant
MG See Local 14534, 983 F.2d at 245, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2180.
1 ° 1 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988) (NLRA grants D.C. Circuit jurisdiction to review all
N.L.R.B. decisions); see also, F.T.C. v, Stanley H. Kaplan Educ. Ctr. Ltd., 433 F. Stipp. 989, 993 (D.
Mass. 1977) (court notes that views of the D.C. Circuit regarding administrative matters carry
great weight).
“r2 See, e.g., Facet Enter, 907 F.2d at 980, 134 L.R.R.M. at 2621; Nielsen Lithographing, 854 F.2d
at 1065, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2368; Washington Materials, 803 F.2d at 1338, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2778;
Harustone, 785 F.2d at 576, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3376.
I U3 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53, 38 L.R.R.M. 2042, 2043 (1956).
114 See id. at 153, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2044.
105 See id.
106 See Concrete Pipe and Prod. Corp.—Syracuse Div. and United Steelworkers of Am., Local
14534, 305 N.L,R.B, 152, 155, 138 L.R.R.M. 1185, 1187-88 (1991).
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to the negotiations. Conversely, by claiming unwillingness to pay, an
employer merely states a subjective resolve.' 07 Although the union may
find additional financial data informative and useful, that information
cannot verify an employer's subjective state of mind, and is thus irrele-
vant to the negotiations.i° 8
 A claim of competitive disadvantage repre-
sents an employer's subjective perception of its position in an industry,
and, therefore, should be analyzed as an unwillingness rather than an
inability to meet union demands. While external information, such as
competitors' wages or benefits levels may verify a claim of competitive
disadvantage, internal financial information will not.'°° Thus, the D.C.
Circuit's holding in Local 14534 allows the NLRB to supplant its prior
interpretation of Truitt with a new, restrictive approach that is consis-
tent with the Truitt reasoning.
In conclusion, in Local 14534, the D.C. Circuit approved an NLRB
holding that section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA does not require employers
to substantiate their claims of competitive disadvantage. Concrete Pipe
and Products did not fail to bargain in good faith by refusing to
substantiate its claim of competitive disadvantage in response to union
demands for wage increases. Although the NLRB adopted a position
on financial disclosure inconsistent with prior NLRB decisions, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the decision because it comported with the NLRA
and was accompanied by a reasoned explanation. The D.C. Circuit
joined other circuits which do not require the substantiation of com-
petitive disadvantage claims under Truitt. Although this case is primar-
ily about deference to NLRB findings, it ultimately has a significant
impact on future labor—management collective bargaining negotia-
tions.
E. *Rights of Employee Members of Outside Political Groups to Distribute
Literature on the Employer's. Property: NLRB v. Motorola'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act")
provides that employees have the right to engage in concerted activities
for the purposes of mutual aid or protection.' Section 8(a) (1) of the
107 See, e.g., United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 498, 61 L.R.R.M. 2315,
2318 (7th Cir. 1966); The Nielsen Lithographing Cu. and Graphic Communications lin't Union,
Local 508, 279 N.L.R.B. 877, 879 (1986).
108 See United Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 498, 61. L.R.R.M. 2315, 2318
(7th Cir. 1966).
102
 See Concrete Pipe and Prod., 305 N.L.R.B. at 155, 138 L.R.R.M, at 1187-88.
*Joseph P. rvlingulla, Staff Writer, BosroN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 991 F.2d 278, 143 L.R.R.M. 2369 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part: 'Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
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Act implements these rights by providing that an employer's interfer-
ence with employees' section 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tices Over time, courts have held that section 7 protects certain em-
ployee activities, such as the right of employees to form independent
groups or associations for mutual aid 4 and the right to appeal to
legislators to protect employees' interests. 5 The degree of section 7
protection for employee distribution of political literature on an em-
ployer's premises, however, is less certain.6
In 1975, in Ford Motor Co., the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") ruled that Ford's refusal to allow its employees
to distribute a newsletter urging workers to reject Democratic and
Republican candidates in the 1974 congressional elections did not
infringe upon the worker's section 7 rights.' The Board reasoned that
the newsletter was "wholly political propaganda" and did not relate to
employees' interests and problems as employees. 8 Thus, the Board
concluded that the "mutual aid or protection" clause of the NLRA did
not protect the employees' distribution of these leaflets on company
property.'
The company refused to permit an employee member of the
union's militant subgroup to distribute a newsletter on company prop-
erty during nonwork time. 1 ° The newsletter urged employees not to
support the traditional parties and candidates in the 1974 congres-
sional elections, but instead to help create an independent workers'
party." The employee filed a complaint with the Board, alleging that
the company's enforcement of a no-distribution rule violated section
8(a) (1) of the NLRA by unlawfully limiting employees' exercise of
their section 7 rights.' 2
The NLRB affirmed the Administrative Law judge's ("ALj") ruling
that the company's refusal to permit distribution of this edition of the
lively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . 	 ." Id.
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1988). Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA provides that it is an unfair
labor practice fbr an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise"
of the rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act. Id.
4 See Republic Aviation Corp. V. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 623 (1945).
5 See, e.g., Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385, 92 L.R.R.M. 3153, 3157 (9th Cir.
1976).
6 See, e.g., Motorola, 991 F.2d at 278, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2369.
7 See 221 N.L.R.B. 663, 663, 666 (1975), enforced, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1976).
8 Id. at 666.
9 Id.
to Id.
11 Id. at 664, 666,
12 Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. at 663.
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newsletter on its premises did not violate the NLRA.'s The Aq rea-
soned that this particular newsletter did not involve employees' prob-
lems and concerns as employees, and thus the distribution of this
political tract fell outside of the protection of section 7. 14 While recog-
nizing that the election of any political candidate could ultimately
affect the workers' employment conditions, the ALJ determined that
this concern was sufficiently removed from the employees' interests to
permit the employer's distribution ban on company property.'' Thus,
the Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that the newsletter fell outside
of the protection afforded by section 7. 16
In 1978, in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States Supreme Court
held that the section 7 "mutual aid or protection" clause protected
employee distribution of a newsletter containing sections which could
be viewed as "political." 17 Eastex refused to permit employee union
members to distribute, on company property during nonworking time,
a newsletter containing sections that criticized both a proposed "right-
to-work" provision for the Texas constitution and a Presidential veto of
an increase in the federal minimum wage.' 8 The Court reasoned that
these sections of the newsletter bore a sufficient relation to the work-
ers' interests as employees as to fall within the guarantee of section 7) 9
Thus, the Court concluded that the ban on distribution of the litera-
ture interfered with employee rights guaranteed by section 7 of the
NLRA."
In Eastex, employee union officials sought to increase employee
support for the union and to recruit new members prior to the up-
coming contract negotiations with the company by distributing a news-
letter to the workers. 2 ' The newsletter contained four sections, the first
and last of which generally urged employee support and participation
" Id. at 663, 666.
14 See id. at 666.
15 id.
16 See id. at 663, 666. IL should be noted that this case also involved a newsletter entitled "The
Militant Autoworker," dated September 13, 1974. Id, at 666. The main topic or the newsletter was
the issue of forced overtime at the employer's plant. Id. Once again, company officials refused
to give the employee permission to distribute the letter on the employer's premises. Id. The Board
affirmed the ALJ's findings that this September 13 newsletter was protected under § 7 of the
NLRA. Id. The Ali reasoned that the issue of forced overtime at the plant was certainly a matter
which fell within the range of § 7 protection. Id. The company's ban on the literature's distribu-
tion thus constituted a violation of § 8(a) (1) of the NLRA. Id.
17 437 U.S. 556, 570 & n.20, 98 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2722 & n.20 (1978).
' 8 1d. at 559-61, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
18 See id. at 569, 98 L.R,R,M. at 2721.
20 See id. at 570, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
21 Id. at 559, 98 L.R.R.M, at 2718.
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in the union. 22 The newsletter's second section discussed the possible
incorporation of a "right-to-work" provision into a revised Texas con-
stitution and how this would weaken unions and provide management
with bargaining advantages, and encouraged employees to write to
their legislator to oppose this measure.° The newsletter's third section
criticized a recent Presidential veto of a bill to increase the federal
minimum wage, and urged readers to register to vote in order to elect
politicians supporting policies favorable to labor. 24 On two different
occasions, the employer refused to give employees permission to dis-
tribute the newsletter on company property.°
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
alleging that the company's two refusals interfered with the employees'
exercise of section 7 rights, and, thus, violated section 8(a) (1) of the
NLRA.26 An ALJ ruled that, even though all four of the newsletter's
sections did not directly bear on the relationship between the union
and the company, distribution of the material constituted protected
activity under section 7. 27 The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's ruling, find-
ings, and conclusions. 28 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order, reasoning that section 7
protected literature that discusses subjects reasonably related to the
workers' jobs or to their condition as employees.°
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding
that section 7 protected the distribution of both the second and third
sections of the newsletter.s° The Court rejected the company's argu-
ments that the distribution received no section 7 protection simply
because the employees' activity did not relate to a specific dispute
between themselves and the company over an issue which the ern-
22 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 559, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
22 Id.
24 See id. at 559-60, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
25 Id. at 560-61, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2718. As a justification for its decision, the company told the
employees that the union had other ways to communicate with the workers. See id. at 561, 98
L.R.R.M. at 2718.
26 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 561, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
27 Id.
28 2 1 5 N.L.R.B. 271, 271, 88 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1475 (1974).
29 See Eastex, 550 E2d 198, 199, 203, 94 L.R.R.M. 3201, 3201, 3204 (5th Cir. 1977).
3° Eastex, 437 U.S. at 570, 576, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2722, 2724. The Court noted that this case
involved two distinct questions. Id. at 563, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2719. First, the Court had to determine
whether or not the newsletter was the kind of concerted activity which §§ 7 and 8(a) (1) of the
NLRA protected from employer interference. Id. Because the Court answered this question
affirmatively, it then proceeded to consider the second question; namely, whether the fact that
the distribution takes place on company property gives rise to a countervailing interest which
outweighs the exercise of § 7 rights in that location. See id. at 563, 570, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2719, 2722.
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ployer had the right or power to affect. 31 The Court observed that the
company had misconceived the reach of the term "employee" in sec-
tion 7 to refer only to employees of a particular employer." Instead,
the Court noted that section 2(3) did not limit, in this way, those
"employees" who may engage in concerted activities for "mutual aid or
protection."" The Court also observed that this broader definition of
the term "employees" fulfilled the Act's intent by protecting employees
who engaged in activities supporting other employers' workers."
The Court also rejected Eastex's contention that workers lose their
section 7 protection when they turn to channels outside the immediate
employer-employee relationship to improve their conditions of em-
ployment." The Court reasoned that Congress' inclusion in section 7
of the broader "mutual aid or protection" language, in addition to the
narrower purposes of "self-organization" and "collective bargaining,"
indicated the legislature's awareness that labor's cause often is fur-
thered outside of the immediate employer-employee context." Fur-
thermore, the Court observed that section 7 protected employees who
turn to administrative and judicial forums or appeal to legislators to
protect their interests as employees." The Court also noted that leaving
these kinds of legitimate activities entirely unprotected would frustrate
the policy underlying the NLRA because employees' ability to work
together to improve employment conditions would be severely ham-
pered,"
The Eastex Court did assume, however, that at some point, the
relationship of some forms of concerted activity to employees' interests
as employees becomes so attenuated that an activity could not fairly be
deemed to fall within the protective ambit of the "mutual aid or
protection" clause." The Court emphasized that the Board had the
responsibility of demarcating the boundaries of this clause on a case-
by-case basis.'" Thus, the Court assumed the existence of a "point of
si Id. at 563-64, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2719-20,
92 /d. at 564, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2719-20.
" Id. at 564, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2720.
34 See id.
38 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565, 98 L.R.R.M. at 27'20.
39 See id.
37 Id. at 565-66, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2720.
88 See id. at 566-67, 98 L. R.R.M. at 2720.
99 Id. at 567-68, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2721,
Eastex, 437 U.S. at 568, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2721. The Court stated that in order to decide this
particular case, "it is enough to determine whether the Board erred in holding that distribution
of the second and third sections of the newsletter is for the purpose of 'mutual aid or protection.'"
Id.
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attenuation" beyond which activity bearing a less immediate relation-
ship to employees' interests as employees would remain unprotected
by section 7.4 '
Finally, the Court rejected the company's contention that section
7 did not afford protection to the advancement of the union's "politi-
cal" views on the right-to-work and minimum wage issues. 42 Noting that
one could view almost any issue as political, the Court reasoned that
removing conduct or speech from the Act's protection simply by label-
ling it "political" renders the "mutual aid or protection" clause impo-
tent.43 The Court posited, however, that some types of activity could be
so completely political, or so remotely connected to employees' con-
cerns as workers, that such activity would remain unprotected under
section 7.44 The Court stressed that this determination more properly
deserved case-by-case consideration. 45 Thus, the Court held that sec-
tion 7 protected the employees' distribution of the newsletter. 46
In 1981, in Local 174, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v NLRB, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
The Supreme Court determined that the Board had not erred in its finding that the
-right-to-work" section of the newsletter bore such a relationship to the employees' interests as
to fall within the "mutual aid or protection" clause. Id. at 569, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2721. The Court
accepted the Board's reasoning that this issue could affect employees by weakening unions and
improving the position of management in contract negotiations. See id. The Court also ruled that
the Board had acted within the proper range of its discretion in its ruling that the minimum
wage section of the newsletter was protected, for the general wage level is an issue of immediate
concern to all employees. See id. at 569-70, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2721-22. Thus, the Court did not
reverse the Board's conclusion that the newsletter's call for workers to register to vote to elect
persons friendly to labor could be fairly described as falling within § 7 as a protected activity. See
Eastex, 437 U.S. at 570, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2722. Thus, the Court ruled that § 7 protected the
distribution of the second and third sections of the newsletter. Id.
Because the Court found that employee distribution of this newsletter was protected activity
under § 7, it proceeded to the question of whether the Board erred in its holding that Eastex
employees may distribute the letter in nonworking areas of the plant during nonworking time.
See id. The Court held that the NLRB did not err in applying the rule of Republic Aviation to this
case, which prohibits an employer from preventing employees from distributing union organiza-
tional material in nonworking time, unless the employer can demonstrate that the ban is neces-
sary in order to maintain plant production or discipline. See id. at 570-71, 575, 576, 98 L.R.R.M.
at 2722, 2724. See generally Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B„ 324 U.S. 793, 16 L.R.R.M. 620
(1945). The Supreme Court confined its holding to the facts of this case, however, and in dicta
it stated that it need not go so far as to hold that the Republic Aviation rule is properly applied
to every distribution on company grounds. See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 574-75, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2723-24.
The Court reasoned that this area of law was new territory for the Board, one not in need of a
hastily-adopted, categorical formula. Id.
41 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567-68, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2721.




46 Id. at 570, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
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utilized this "point of attenuation" when it held that an employer did
not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to permit employee
union members to distribute pre-election leaflets on company
grounds.47
 The employees sought to hand out a leaflet urging workers
to protect their collective-bargaining rights by voting for union-en-
dorsed candidates for various statewide offices. 48
 The D.C. Circuit rea-
soned that the leaflet did not educate the employees about political
conditions relevant to their working conditions, but instead merely
encouraged workers to vote for specific candidates. 4° Thus, the court
held the link between the leaflet's distribution and the employees'
interests to be sufficiently attenuated that section 7 did not protect the
activity."
Employees at the company sought to distribute leaflets which
identified and endorsed, by name and photograph, those candidates
for Governor, U.S. Senator, and State Supreme Court Justice whom the
union believed to be familiar with and committed to workers' needs. 51
When the company refused to give employee union representatives
permission to distribute the leaflet in nonworking areas of the plant
during nonworking time, the union filed a complaint with the Board,
alleging that the company had committed an unfair labor practice by
interfering with the employees' right under section 7 of the NLRA. 52
The NLRB held that the leaflets the workers sought to distribute were
purely political tracts, and hence the company's refusal to allow their
distribution on its premises did not constitute a violation of the Act."
In its reasoning, the Board stressed the Eastex Court's observation that
the "mutual aid or protection" clause should be interpreted with re-
gard to the relationship between the workers' concerted activity and
the improvement of their working conditions." The NLRB concluded,
therefore, that because the leaflet did not relate sufficiently to the
workers' concerns as employees, the company had not committed an
unfair labor practice."
In its review of the Board's decision, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that this case reached the "point of attenuation" posited in Eastex, and,
thus, section 7 did not protect the employees' distribution of the
47 See 645 F.2(1 1151, 1152, 1154, 106 L.R.R.M. 2561, 2561, 2563 (D.C. Gic 1981).
4 B Id. at 1152, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2561.
49
 Id. at 1154, 106 L.R.R.M. al 2563.
"See id, at 1152, 1154, 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2561, 2563.
51 Id. at 1152, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2561.
52 See Firestone Steel Prod, Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 826, 826, 102 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1172 (1979).
53 Id. at 826-27, 102 LRAM. at 1172.
54 See id. at 826, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1172.
55 Id. at 827, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1172.
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leaflets on company property. 56
 The court noted that, unlike the news-
letter in Eastex, which the employees sought to distribute even though
no election was imminent, the leaflet in Local 174 merely encouraged
workers to vote for the four candidates endorsed by the union." More-
over, the court observed that, unlike the Eastex newsletter's discussions
of issues of immediate concern to the workers, Local 1 74's pamphlet
did not aim to educate the employees on issues relevant to their
working conditions." Accordingly, the court agreed with the Board
that the relationship between the distribution and the workers' inter-
ests as employees was sufficiently attenuated to warrant a ruling that
section 7 did not protect that activity."
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Motorola, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that employees acting
as members of outside political organizations cannot demand the same
section 7 rights as workers engaged in self-organization, collective
bargaining, or in self-representation in disputes with their employer,
merely because the organization focused on a workplace issue. 6° Mem-
bers of an outside organization supporting a proposed anti-drug test-
ing ordinance sought permission from the company to distribute or-
ganizational literature on the employer's premises." Relying on Eastex,
the court emphasized that the members of the outside organization
neither represented the company's employees nor had the direct
goal of changing the company's policies." Thus, the court concluded
that employee members of outside political organizations do not enjoy
rights under section 7 to distribute their literature on employers'
premises. 63
56 See Local 174, 645 F.2d at 1154, 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2563.
57 See id. at 1154, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2563.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 1154, 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2563. Furthermore, the court of appeals rejected the
Union's argument that the Board's case-by-case approach amounted to a "we know it when we
see it" approach which would leave employers and employees without sufficient guidelines to
plan their future conduct. See id. The court noted, however, that the NLRB's brief to the court
indicated that the Board was attempting to place union "political" communications along a
continuum, with literature aimed primarily at inducing votes for particular candidates on one
end, and material aimed principally at educating employees on political issues which may affect
their working conditions on the other. Id. The court of appeals determined that this approach
was consistent with the Eastex Court's observation that § 7 protection "may depend upon the
object or context of the activity." Id.; see also Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 & n.18,
98 L.R.R.M. 2217, 2721 & n.18 (1978). While both the court of appeals and the Board realized
that cases which fall in the middle of this continuum would present close questions as to protected
status, the leaflet in Local 174 did not present such an instance. Local 174, 645 F.2d at 1155, 106
L.R.R.M. at 2563.
61) 991 F.2d 278, 285, 143 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2374. (5th Cir. 1993).
61 See id. at 279, 280-81, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2370-71.
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In early 1990, company officials at Motorola began to discuss
implementing a mandatory random drug testing policy at its Oak Hill
plant.° Upon learning of this possibility, Motorola workers opposed to
the plan discussed how to coordinate their opposition efforts.° Three
Motorola employees joined an organization called "Citizens Advocat-
ing the Protection of Privacy" ("CAPP"), a local non-profit association
which opposed mandatory drug testing by government or corporate
entities, and assumed positions on the organization's planning com-
mittee. 66
In May 1990, to protest the possible implementation of the drug
testing program, nearly 100 Motorola workers held a work slowdown
in the company cafeteria by prolonging their coffee break.° The com-
pany, however, took no disciplinary measures against these workers.°
Later that month, management met with certain employees, including
one who had recently joined LAPP, to inform them that the company
would indeed announce the adoption of a mandatory drug testing
policy. 69 The personnel manager also told the employees, however, that
workers opposed to the new policy could freely support the passage of
a city ordinance prohibiting employers from conducting such testing
on their employees." On June 1, 1990, the company officially an-
nounced that mandatory random drug testing would begin on January
1, 1991, and any worker who refused to submit to a test would be
subject to discharge."'
Days prior to the formal announcement of the policy, an employee
member of CAPP met with company officials to seek permission to post
notices on bulletin boards and to distribute literature on the prem-
ises." The employee then volunteered to give copies of the material to
management officials to ensure that it contained nothing objection-
able." On June 5, the worker submitted five documents for approval
prior to their distribution: a membership application to CAPP contain-
64 Id. at 280, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
66 Motorola, 991 F.2d at 280, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
w Id. CAPP focused its energies on securing the passage of a proposed local ordinance which
would restrict or prohibit employers from subjecting their workers to mandatory random drug
tests. Id. To effectuate this goal, CAPP members held press conferences, campaigned for city
council candidates who supported the ordinance, participated in radio call-in shows, and con-
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ing a group position statement and a request for a $15 membership
fee; a three-page "fact sheet" describing problems with drug testing; a
document containing suggested postcard messages for workers to send
to the city council; a two-page article from Scientific American casting
doubts on drug testing's accuracy; and a handwritten request urging
Motorola employees to "join us" and to write to the city council. 74
After allowing his superiors to review the materials, the company
official informed the employee member of CAPP that he could not
distribute any of the literature on company property. 75 The company
compared CAPP to a political party and told the employee that if
Motorola permitted CAPP to hand out its material on the premises,
then the company would have to grant the same right to other political
groups. 76
In July 1990, CAPP filed a complaint against Motorola with the
Board, alleging that the company's actions toward the employee mem-
bers of CAPP violated section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA by interfering with
the workers' section 7 rights." The Board affirmed the Ails ruling
that Motorola's refusal to permit distribution of literature on its prem-
ises by employee members of CAPP constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice. 78
 The Board then applied to the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of
its order. 79
74 1d. at 280-81, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2370-71.
75 Motorola, 991 F,2d at 281, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
76 Id.
77 See Motorola, Inc., 305 N.L.R.15. 580, 580, 139 L.R.R.M. 1002 (1991).
79 See id. at 580, 586, 588. Specifically, the ALI concluded that Motorola committed four
separate unfair labor practices: its refusal to allow the distribution of literature on its premises
by employee members of CAPP; its temporary prohibition of employees from wearing T-shirts
bearing the slogan lust Say No to Drug Testing"; and two instances where company officials
threatened an employee member of CAPP that his open opposition to the drug testing was
disruptive and could have negative consequences, including the possible loss of his job. See
Motorola, 991 F.2d at 282, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
The T-shirt incident occurred when two employee members of CAPP ware T-shirts which
said "Just Say No to Drug Testing" to the plant. Id. at 281, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371. A security guard
at the plant informed the employees that, pursuant to orders from management, the shirts were
not allowed on company property. Id. Later, however, a company official informed the employees
that a mistake had been made by the security personnel, who had misunderstood the T-shirt
prohibition (they had actually been ordered not to allow T-shirts reading "Just Say No to
Management" on the premises). Id. The workers subsequently wore these shirts on company
grounds without incident. Id.
The other incidents which the ALJ and Board held were unfair labor practices occurred
soon after the company had announced the mandatory drug testing policy. See Motorola, 991 F.2d
at 281, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371. Two different company officials told an employee member of CAPP
that his open opposition to the company's drug testing policy was disruptive and could negatively
affect his career, including the possible loss of his job. See id. at 281-82, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
79 Id. at 282, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2371-72.
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The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of that part of the Board's
order which dealt with Motorola's ban of literature distribution on its
premises by employee members of CAPP." Although the Board argued
that, like the Eastex newsletter, the CAPP literature simply urged work-
ers to contact elected officials about an issue which directly affected
employees' working conditions, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
facts in this case reached the "point of attenuation" posited by the
Eastex Court." The court noted that CAPP members had repeatedly
stated that they neither represented Motorola workers nor had a direct
goal of changing the company's policy, and furthermore, CAPP itself
had initiated and orchestrated the attempted distribution by the em-
ployee member of CAPP." Also, the court dismissed the Board's argu-
ment that the removal of section 7 protection from the workers' dis-
tribution, solely because of the literature's political nature, would
frustrate the very purpose of the "mutual aid or protection" clause. 83
Instead, the Motorola court agreed with the company's contention that
what was "political" was the purpose for which the material was to be
distributed—the advancement of CAPP's political agenda—and not
the material's content." The court also agreed with the company's
88 Id. at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374-75. The court also refused to enforce the part or the
Board's order resulting form the company's temporary prohibition of the T-shirts bearing an
anti-drug testing message. Id. at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374. The court reasoned that Motorola's
temporary interference with the wearing of the T-shirts was "too insignificant" to violate the ACL
See Motorola, 991 F.2d at 283, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2372-73. The court observed that not every
interference with workers' § 7 rights rises to the level of an unfair labor practice, and moreover,
federal courts had consistently found that merely marginal infringements do not constitute a
violation of the NLRA. Id. at 283, 143 L.R.R.M, at 2372. The Motorola court found that viewed
in context, the incident surrounding the T-shirt ban neither required any remedy nor called for
the imposition of penalties; the workers suffered little inconvenience; the mistake was corrected
within one day; the employees later wore the shirts to work with no adverse consequences, and
one of the employees involved described the incident as "trivial," See id. at 283 & n.2, 143 L.R.R.M.
at 2372-73 & n.2.
On the other hand, the court of appeals did grant the part of the Board's petition to enffirce
the order regarding the company official's comments to the employee member of LAPP that the
latter's opposition to the drug testing policy could have a negative impact on his career. See id.
at 283-84, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2373. The court of appeals rejected both the company's arguments
that the ALJ failed to articulate reasons for his credibility choices in favor of the employee, and
that the records as a whole supported the company's version of what happened. See id. The court
observed that no interference with the ALys credibility determinations was called for in this case,
for the AIJ had provided clear explanations for his credibility choices, which were neither
"inherently unreasonable" nor "self-contradictory." See Motorola, 991 F.2d at 283-84, 143 L.R.R.M.
at 2373.
81 See. Motorola, 991 F.2d at 284, 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2373, 2374.
82 Id. at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
88 See id. at 284, 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
84 See id. at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
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argument that the context of union activity in Easter, and the union's
specific workplace goals, distinguished that case from the present
one." The court thus concluded that the employee members of CAPP
had no rights to distribute the literature under section 7, for the NLRA
did not intend to protect entities so far removed from the normal
employer-employee relationship."
The court observed that its holding would prevent a situation in
which employers would be forced to allow political fringe groups
having employee members to distribute literature on company prop-
erty so long as that splinter group's agenda included some issue which
impacted that workplace. 87
 The court noted that such groups fre-
quently involve themselves with highly controversial issues which can
create an atmosphere of animosity and hostility among employees,
something which employers seek to minimize." Thus, the court held
that employees acting as members of these outside political organiza-
tions could not demand the same section 7 rights as workers engaged
in activities for "mutual aid or protection" merely because that outside
group focuses on a workplace issue."
Read together, Local 174 and Motorola demonstrate the difficulty
employees encounter when they seek to distribute, on their employer's
property, materials dealing with "political" issues which affect their
livelihood as employees. Local 174 demonstrates this difficulty in the
context of union-initiated distribution of political literature, where the
determination of whether section 7 protects the activity depends upon
whether the material's content falls on the "protected" side of the
continuum created by the Board. 9° On one end of this continuum is
literature aimed at encouraging votes for specific candidates, while on
the other is material aimed principally at educating employees on
political issues that may affect their working conditions. 9 ' This stand-
ard, however, does little to guide employees and unions in their calcu-
85 See Motorola, 991 F.2d at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
86 Id. The court of appeals further observed that the Eastex Court had assumed that at some
point, "employees' interest in distributing literature that deals with matters affecting then; as
employees, but not with self-organization or collective bargaining, [may be] so removed from the
central concerns of the Act as to justify application of a different rule than in Republic Aviation."
Id.; see aLso Eastex, 437 U.S. 556, 573, 98 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2723 (1978).
87 See Motorola, 991 F.2d at 285, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9° See Local 174, 645 F.2d 1151, 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. 2561, 2563 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra
note 59.
91 Local 179, 645 F.2d at 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2563.
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lations of whether the protective ambit of section 7 will extend to the
distribution of literature they seek to hand out on company property.
Protection under section 7 is even more difficult to claim outside
of the union context. In Motorola, the Fifth Circuit's use of the "point
of attenuation" prevented employee CAPP members from distributing
literature discussing an issue and a proposed statute which, arguably,
had more of a direct impact on the workplace than the issues discussed
in the Eastex newsletter did. Thus, the context of union activity sur-
rounding an attempted distribution plays a critical role in determining
whether section 7 will protect a given distribution of literature by
employees.92
 Even in a union context, however, section 7 protection
depends upon the material's content." Such an approach surely will
provide both employers and employees with little guidance in the
future.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held in Motorola that employees
acting as members of outside political organizations which focus on a
workplace issue cannot demand the same right under section 7 as
workers engaged in activities for "mutual aid or protection." In so
holding, the court agreed with Motorola that the "point of attenuation"
posited in Eastex had been reached in this case, for an outside political
group was seeking to use the workplace to advance its own political
agenda. 95
 Thus, the court reasoned that the NLRA's "mutual aid or
protection" clause does not protect groups that are so far removed
from the ordinary employer-employee relationship."
F. *Employer's Duty to Continue Discretionary Pay Raises: Daily News
of Los Angeles v. NLRB'
Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relation Act' ("NLRA")
prohibits employers from refusing to bargain collectively with their
employees' representatives. 5
 The statute requires employers to bargain
in good faith. 4
 Employers may not unilaterally institute changes regard-
92 See Motorola, 991 F.2d at 285, 143 L.R.R,M. at 2374.
"See Local 174, 645 E2d at 1155, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2563.
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 979 F.2d 1571, ]42 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D,C. Cir. 1992).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
3
 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737, 50 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2178 (1962).
4 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1573, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
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ing matters which are subject to mandatory bargaining under § 8(d)
and which are in fact under discussion with a unions
In 1962, in National Labor Relations Board v. Katz, the United
States Supreme Court held that under the NLRA, § 8(a) (5), an em-
ployer may not unilaterally institute merit increases unless such in-
creases are fixed or established, i.e. part of a long-standing practice of
the employer. 6
 The Court reasoned that such increases are effectively
a refusal to negotiate and prevent the members of a newly formed
union from judging whether the new raises are a departure from past
practice.' The Court did not address the question of whether § 8(a) (5)
prevents employers from discontinuing discretionary merit increases. 8
Subsequent to Katz, the National Labor Relations Board
("Board"), in a series of cases, held that employers may not unilaterally
continue discretionary raises and may not unilaterally discontinue
established and non-discretionary raises. 9 In 1972, in Southeastern
Michigan Gas Company, the Board held that the employer violated
§ 8(a) (5) by unilaterally discontinuing non-discretionary wage in-
creases. 1 ° The Board reasoned that standard wage increases which were
given out annually and which had never been denied to an employee
were not truly discretionary." Thus, the Board concluded that the wage
increases were an established condition of employment as contem-
plated in Katz.' 2
In 1973, in Oneita Knitting Mills, the Board held that an employer
violated § 8(a) (5) by granting discretionary merit increases.' 3 Focusing
on the discretionary aspect of the raise, the Board observed that
management awarded different amounts to different employees and
did not use any standard evaluation system." The Board concluded,
therefore, that the wage increases could not be considered a fixed
condition of employment.' 5 Relying on Katz, the Board reasoned that
5 Katz, 369 U.S. at 737, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2178.
6 Id. at 747, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2182.
7 See id. at 746, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2182; Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1573, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
" See Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 50 L.R.R.M. 2177.
9 Anaconda Ericcson Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 831, 835, 110 L.R.R.M. 1 134 (1982) (full opinion not
provided in L.R.R.M.); Oneita Knitting Mills, 205 N.L.R.B. 500, 503, 83 L.R.R.M. 1670 (1973)(full
opinion not provided in L.R.R.M.); Southeastern Michigan Gas Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222, 81
L.R.R.M. 1350 (1972)(11111 opinion not provided in L.R.R.M.).
1 ° Southeastern Michigan, 198 N.L.R.B. at 1222.
II Id.
12 See id.
15 205 N.L.R.B. at 503.
14 Id. at 502.
" Id.
March 1994]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 415
the unilateral implementation of merit increases undercut the union's
ability to negotiate with management and violated § 8(a) (5). 16
In 1982, in Anaconda Ericcson Inc., the Board upheld the em-
ployer's decision, six months after the formation of the union, to
discontinue a wage increase that it had awarded the previous five
years. 17 The Board conceded that it lacked information as to the
amounts of the past wage increases, but concluded they were appar-
ently discretionary."' The Board emphasized that the duty of the em-
ployer under § 8(a) (5) is to maintain the status quo and suggested that
awarding the merit increase might have constituted a violation.' Fi-
nally, the Board noted that the raises, although presented to the union,
had not been unconditionally accepted."
During the Survey year, in Daily News of Los Angeles v. National
Labor Relations Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit remanded for reconsideration a Board
ruling that the employer had violated § 8(a) (5) by discontinuing merit
pay increases, which were awarded annually but varied in amount, after
the formation of a union. 2 ' The court concluded that the Board's
decision was inconsistent with the Board's own case law and was not
compelled by Katz.22 Thus, if the Board adopts the court's analysis, then
discontinuation of a pay increase which is fixed as to timing but
discretionary as to amount may not be a violation of § 8(a) (5)."
In 1986, The Daily News of Los Angeles ("The Daily News") began
awarding merit pay increases which varied in amount, based on the
individual employee's performance review, but were awarded annually
on the date of the employee's anniversary of joining the newspaper. 24
Between 80 and 85 percent of the employees received raises in 1986
and 1987. 25 The raises that were awarded ranged between 2% and
40%. 26
In May 1989, the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, ("The
Guild") was certified as the collective bargaining agent for certain
18 Id. at 502-03.
17 261 N.L.R.R. 831, 835 (1982).
18 Id. at 834.
lu Id. at 835.
2° Id.
21 979 F.2d 1571, 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2005 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 1572, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2001. Employees were given one of four ratings: fails to meet
standards, needs improvement to meet standards, meets standards, and exceeds standards. Id. at
1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
25 Id. at 1572, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
26 Dully News, 979 F.2(1 at 1572, 192 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
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editorial employees.27
 In June 1989, The Daily News informed The
Guild that it was considering discontinuing the merit increases and
sought The Guild's opinion. 28
 The Guild informed the newspaper that
it would view such an action as an unfair labor practice. 29 While The
Daily News continued to perform annual reviews, it discontinued the
wage increases despite The Guild's warning." The Guild responded by
filing a complaint with the Board, alleging that the discontinuation of
the wage increases was a violation of § 8(a) (5) because the action was
unilateral. 91
In a split decision, the Board ruled that the unilateral discontinu-
ance of the merit pay increases was a violation of § 8(a) (5) and ordered
The Daily News to give its employees the raises they would have re-
ceived." The Board reasoned that § 8(a) (5) requires employers to
maintain existing terms and conditions of employment until there are
negotiated changes or an impasse in bargaining." The Board empha-
sized that although the amount of the raises was discretionary, the
timing was not, and thus it viewed the raises as an established term of
employment." In its decision, the Board relied on a footnote in Oneita
which stated that employers with a prior established merit increase
program may neither unilaterally continue nor discontinue that pro-
gram once an exclusive bargaining agent is selected." The Board
listed, but did not explain, three reasons why Anaconda was distinguish-
able: I) the wage increases were discretionary in amount, 2) the parties
during negotiations had begun bargaining over wages, and 3) the
union had not unconditionally agreed to the wage increase." The Daily
News petitioned the court for review of the Board's decision."
In a unanimous decision, the court remanded the case to the






 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1572, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
"Daily News, 304 N.L.R.B. 511, 512, 138 L.R.R.M. 1132, 1133 (1991).
" Id. at 511, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
3.4 Id.
35 1d. The Board also cited several prior cases in which it found employers unlawfully dis-
continued merit wage programs during negotiations with newly certified unions. Id. (citing
Central Maine Morning Sentinel, 295 N.L.R.B. 376, 131 L.R.R.M. 1554 (1989); Rochester Inst.
of Technology, 264 N.L.R.B. 1020, 111 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1982), en' denied, 724 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.
1983); Allied Prod. Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 1246, 89 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1975); General Motor Accep-
tance Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 137, 79 L.R.R.M. 1662 (1972)).
"Daily News, 304 N.L.R.B. at 512, 138 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
37 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1572, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
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its own precedents." Pointing to what it perceived to be an inconsis-
tency between this decision and previous Board decisions, the court
described the Board's ruling as either a switch in course without "rea-
soned analysis" or .evidence of "hopping at random from one view to
another."" In its analysis the court focused on the Board's failure to
sufficiently distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary
raises." The court concluded that the Board's case law indicated that
employers could discontinue discretionary merit pay increases.'"
First the court noted that in none of the Board's previous cases
had it justified an extension of Katz to discontinuance of merit in-
creases.42 The court stated that Katz simply did not address discretion-
ary wage increases." Noting that the Board in this case did not ex-
pressly indicate it was extending Katz, the court concluded that the
Board's decision must be based on its own precedents."
The court also reasoned that the Board's reliance on a footnote
in Oneita was misplaced." The court noted that Oneita involved the
granting of wage increases, not decreases, and thus was not directly on
point." The Oneita footnote indicated that the Board in Southeastern
Michigan had ruled that employers could not unilaterally discontinue
merit decreases under § 8(a) (5).47 The court, however, noted that the
discontinued pay increase in Southeastern Michigan was an automatic
increase of five percent which no employee had ever been denied."
Thus, it concluded that Oneita, at most, stood for the proposition that
employers may not discontinue non-discretionary, fixed pay raises. 49 The
court concluded that neither Southeastern Michigan nor Oneita in-
ird. at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at '1005.
s•
4° See id. at 1573-74, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
41 Id. at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
42 Daily News, 979 17.2d at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003,
45 Id. at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2002. The court discussed at some length how it had inter-
preted Katz in NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 107 L.R.R.M. 3108 (D,C. Cir, 1981).
Id. at 1574-75, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003-04. The court concluded that while Blevins at first blush
seemed to support the Board, in the end it proved to be ambiguous, which the court suggested
might be why it was not cited by the Board. Id. It stated that Blevins appeared to mean that a
wage increase can be considered non-discretionary even though it has some discretionary aspects,
Id. Thus, the court concluded dial Blevins simply brought the issue back to Board precedents on
how automatic a pay raise can be before it is no longer considered discretionary. Id. at 1575, 142
L.R.R.M. at 2003.




 Daily News, 304 N.L.R.B. at 511, 138 L.R.R.M. at 132.
"Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1573-74, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
49 Id.
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dicated that an employer cannot discontinue discretionary pay in-
creases. 5°
The court also distinguished NLRB cases in which the Board
found that the discontinuance of merit pay raises violated § 8(a) (5)
even though the raises were partly discretionary. 5 ' The court concluded
that the raises in those cases were less discretionary than the raises in
the instant case. 52 Specifically referring to one case in which the em-
ployer unilaterally discontinued raises which ranged between ten and
twenty-five cents per hour based on performance, the court concluded
that the discretion in this group of cases was sufficiently narrow to
distinguish them from the instant case. 55
The court concluded that the only precedent directly on point,
Anaconda, should have led the Board to validate The Daily News'
decision to discontinue the wage increase, not invalidate it. 54 The court
summarily dismissed the Board's analysis of Anaconda, concluding that
none of the three distinguishing factors provided by the Board were,
in fact, true distinctions. 55 It noted that the first distinction, that the
wage increases were discretionary in amount, was equally applicable to
The Daily News, and thus was not a basis for distinguishing Anaconda.56
The court dismissed The Guild's argument that because The Daily
News used a standardized rating system the amounts were not discre-
tionary." The court reasoned that a rating system would only render
raises non-discretionary if the rating system itself was "substantially free
of subjectivity" and "specific ratings corresponded systematically with
specific percentage increases."58 The court described The Daily News'
rankings as "vague" and noted that not even The Guild had suggested
that each of the four categories led to a fixed percentage increase. 59
The court concluded, therefore, that the amounts were discretionary
in both Anaconda and the instant case. 60
56 Id. at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
52 Id.
53 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003 (citing Rochester Inst. of Technology,
264 N.L.R.B. 1020, II 1 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1982)).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
56 Id. The court noted that the pay increases in both cases were discretionary as to amount
but not as to regularity. Id.
57 Id,
53 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
55 Id.
60 Id.
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The court concluded that the Board's second reason for distin-
guishing Anaconda, the beginning of negotiation over wages, also col-
lapsedP The court noted that in both cases negotiation over the
discretionary increases had begun but in neither case had the parties
reached an impasse which would have ended the employer's duty to
maintain existing conditions. 62
 The court expressed doubt that a dif-
ference in the amount of wage bargaining would even be relevant. 63
Finally, the court dismissed the Board's third reason for distin-
guishing Anaconda that the union had not unconditionally agreed to
the wage increase.64
 Based on its reading of the factual record, the
court observed that The Guild had not waived its right to bargain over
the increase.° Thus it concluded that in both cases the unions had not
unconditionally agreed to the wage increase."
In remanding the case, the court invited the Board to consider
two additional issues which had not been previously raised, but accord-
ing to the court, had an obvious bearing on the logic of the Board's
policy.° First, the court questioned how the Board could enforce its
order that The Daily News pay the employees the additional amount
they would have received from the discretionary raises." The court
reasoned that the amount was "unascertainable" by virtue of being
discretionary." Second, the court highlighted the Board's lack of
power, under its general authority to enforce good-faith bargaining, to
regulate what economic weapons parties may use." The court sug-
gested that because lockouts are not a per se violation of § 8(a) (5) it
would be counter-intuitive to have a per se ban on decreasing wages or
benefits, economic weapons it described as less drastic. 7 '
The court's decision to remand the case to the Board for recon-
sideration might pave the way for allowing employers to unilaterally
discontinue wages which were awarded on a regular basis but were
discretionary as to amount." Not only was this an option which em-
61 Id.
62 1d. at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05.
63
 See Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05.




66 Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1577, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
00 id.
" Id. at 1577, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06 (citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,
AFL-C10, 361 U.S. 477, 490, 45 L.R.R.M. 2704, 2709 (1960); American Ship Bldg. Co. v, NLRB,
380 U.S. 300, 317-18, 58 L.R.R.M. 2672, 2679 (1965)).
71
 Id. at 1577, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
72 See id. at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
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ployers seemingly had prior to the Board's decision in Daily News," but
the court made it very clear that the Board, in order to depart from
its prior precedent, will have to provide a well-reasoned justification
for such a departure:74 Were the Board to be persuaded by the court's
analysis and reverse its decision, employers would not lose their ability
to discontinue discretionary raises simply because they awarded those
raises on a regular basis. 75
The court's decision, however, leaves the Board room to support
the position it took initially.76
 Under the court's analysis, Katz neither
compels nor precludes the result at which the Board arrived. 77 Thus,
should the Board, which was divided when it first decided the case, be
inclined to defend its previous decision, it would have to provide the
"reasoned analysis" for reversing its position in Anaconda which was
missing in its decision in Daily News."
While the law concerning discretionary pay increases is still un-
clear pending the Board's reconsideration, the court more specifically
spelled out what constitutes a discretionary pay increase and what does
not. 79
 To fall under the category of non-discretionary, the increases
must be based on non-subjective standards and the raises must strictly
correlate to the evaluations under those standards." A system of award-
ing merit pay increases which does not rise to that level will be consid-
ered discretionary and the employer will retain his ability to discon-
tinue the wage increases even after its employees have formed a
union. 8 ' Moreover, a series of raises in which there is a great degree of
variance is more likely to be considered discretionary than a series of
pay increases in which there is little variance."
In conclusion, the court's decision in Daily News of Los Angeles v.
NLRB still leaves unresolved what an employer's rights are when it has
regularly awarded past merit pay increases but has used discretion in
determining the amount. The court signalled its belief that under the
Board's precedents, employers indeed have the right to unilaterally
73 See Anaconda, 261 N.L.R.B. 831, 835, 110 L.R.R.M. 1134 (1982).
Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005. Presumably, the court's message will
extend beyond this case; the Board is certainly on notice that it cannot lightly dismiss its own
precedents which call for a different decision than the one the Board is inclined to make.
75 See id. at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
76 1d. at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
77 1d. at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
78 Id. at 1576, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
79 See Daily News, 979 F.2d at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
8° See id.
81 See irl.
" See id. at 1574, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
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discontinue those pay increases even after the formation of a union."
But because the remand leaves the Board room to reverse its previous
holdings, it is probably too early for employers to take too much
comfort from the decision.
II. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
A. *Board's Power to Issue Broad Remedial Measures Directed at Labor
Consultants Who Have Not Been Officially Named in Previous Cases:
Blankenship and Associates v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), passed by Congress
in 1935, regulates the conduct of employers with respect to their union
counterparts. 2 The purpose of the NLRA is to facilitate the practice of
collective bargaining and to protect employees' right of self-organiza-
tion by a representative of their own choosing. 3 The NLRA provides
the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") with the statutory
authority to order employers or their agents found to have violated any
provision , of the NLRA to cease and desist from this unlawful conduct,'
When furnishing remedies, the Board is fully empowered by the NLRA
to examine prior bad acts by employers and their agents.' This practice
of reviewing prior bad acts allows the Board to issue appropriate
remedial measures in cases involving employers or agents who have
repeatedly violated the NLRA and thus frustrated the collective bar-
gaining process. 6
In 1972, in Chalk Metal Company, the Board held that a labor
consultant's prior bad acts could be used to justify broad remedial
measures despite the fact that the consultant had only been officially
named as a respondent in one previous case.' The Board noted, how-
ever, that the consultant had repeatedly violated the NLRA in the past
by failing to bargain in good faith while acting as an agent for various
employers. 8 Citing these prior bad acts, the Chat Board issued a cease
83 Id. at 1575, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
* By Douglas J. McDermott, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
999 F.2d 248, 143 L.R.R.M. 2817 (7th Cir. 1993).
2 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). The NLRA also regulates the
conduct of unions with respect to employees. Id.
See 29 U.S.C.§ 151.
4 29 U.S.C: § 160(c). § 152(2) of the NLRA defines the term employer to include any agent
acting on behalf of the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
See Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
6 SeeChalk Metal Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1133, 1133, 80 L.R.R.M. 1516, 1519 (1972).
7 See id.
See West Coast Gasket Co., 469 E2d 871, 874-75, 81 L.R.R.M. 2857, 2860 (9th Or.
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and desist order which prevented the consultant from engaging in
unlawful activities not only under the facts in that case, but also in all
future agency relationships as well.'
In justifying the broad cease and desist order against the consult-
ant, the Chalk Board first explained that jurisdiction over the consult-
ant was based on the interstate commerce of the employer.'° According
to the Board, once the employer satisfied the Board's self-imposed
jurisdictional limits, any agent violating the NLRA on that employer's
behalf falls within the Board's jurisdictional reach." The Board rea-
soned that an employer's duty to bargain in good faith applies to all
agents acting on its behalf.' 2
Next, the Chalk Board determined that the broad cease and desist
order was an appropriate remedy because of the consultant's propen-
1972) (consultant and employer ordered to cease and desist from failing to bargain in good faith).
The consultant in West Coast Gasket was Gladys Selvin, the same consultant that was involved in
Chalk Metal Co. See id. In addition, Selvin was also involved in a number of other cases as the
instigator of various unfair labor practices on behalf of the employer. See, e.g., Inter-Polymer
Indus., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 729, 742-58, 80 L.R.R.M. 1509, 1510-15 (1972)(employer violated
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") by failing to bargain in good faith due to strategies
of Selvin which were designed to prevent meaningful bargaining); KFXM Broadcasting Co., 183
N.L.R.B. 1187, 1193-96, 76 L.R.R.M. 1852, 1853 (1970) (employer violated LMRA by refusing to
bargain in good faith when Selvin refused to schedule meetings, unilaterally cancelled meetings,
and came to meetings unprepared); Sir James Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 256, 260, 74 L.R.R.M. 1511,
1512 (1970) (employer violated duty to bargain in good faith where Selvin actively worked to
destroy the union's designation as bargaining representative); Architectural Fiberglass, 165
N.L.R.B, 238, 239, 65 L.R.R.M. 1331, 133'2 (1967) (employer violated duty to bargain in good faith
when Selvin insisted on the use of a tape recorder during negotiations against union objections);
Tak-Trak, Inc,, 145 N.L.R.B. 1511, 1519, 55 L.R.R.M. 1205, 1205 (1964) (union forced to stop
pressuring employer to dismiss Selvin even though she had proven unwilling, in this case and
past cases, to bargain in good faith); Duro Fittings Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 653, 657-58, 47 L.R.R.M.
1363, 1364-65 (1961)(employer violated LMRA duty to bargain in good faith when Selvin
attempted to unilaterally control mandatory bargaining topics); California Girls, Inc., 129
N.L.R.B. 209, 213, 46 L.R.R.M. 1533, 1533-34 (1960) (employer failed to bargain in good faith as
Selvin's position was predetermined and inflexibly geared towards rejecting all union proposals).
9 197 N.L.R.B. at 1133, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1519.
1 ° Id. at 1152, 80 L.R.R.M, at 1518. See also National Lime & Stone Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 282, 308,
16 L.R.R.M. 188, 190-91 (1945) (court explained that a labor relations organization employed by
a manufacturing company is an employer under NLRA definition since it was acting as an agent
for the company).
11 See Chalk, 197 N.L.R.B. at 1152, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1518, The Board's relevant self-imposed
jurisdictional limits require that an employer have more than $50,000 in interstate commerce for
the Board to exercise jurisdiction over them under the NLRA. See NLRB v. Mars Sales and Equip.
Co., 626 F.2d 567, 575, 105 L.R.R.M. 2138, 2144 (7th Cir. 1980)(court explained that the Board
has jurisdiction over an employer whose out of state purchases exceeded the $50,000 self-imposed
jurisdictional minimum).
12 See Chalk, 197 N.L.R.B. at 1152, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1518. But cf. St. Francis Fed' n of Nurses v.
N.L.R.B., 729 F.2d 844, 857, 115 L.R.R.M. 3352, 3363 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court focused on the
agent's commerce to see Wit satisfied the Board's thresholds for jurisdiction unlike in Chalk where
the Board focused on the employer's commerce).
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sity to violate the NLRA.' 3 The Chalk Board established the consultant's
propensity to engage in unfair labor practices by examining past cases
involving the consultant." The consultant, however, had only officially
been named as a respondent in one of the previous cases." The Board
reasoned that the one case in which the consultant was officially named
as a respondent, when viewed in conjunction with the numerous cases
where the consultant was not named but obviously directly involved in
NLRA violations, was sufficient to establish the consultant's tendency
to commit unfair labor practices.'" To effectuate the intentions of the
NLRA and to prevent the consultant from frustrating meaningful bar-
gaining in future cases, the Board ordered the consultant to cease and
desist from the practice of bad faith bargaining while acting on behalf
of any employer.' 7
In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals fbr the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed the Board's Chalk analysis in NLRB v. Selvin by upholding
the Board's right to use a consultant's prior bad acts to justify broad
remedial measures.'" The consultant in Selvin had been officially
named as a respondent in two previous cases and, according to the
court, was undoubtedly involved in numerous other NLRA violations.'"
In supporting the Board's finding and broad cease and desist order,
the Selvin court held that the Board had the power and discretion to
issue broad remedial measures as it saw fit once the consultant's pro-
pensity to violate the NLRA had been established. 2" To demonstrate
and establish the consultant's propensity to engage in unfair labor
practices, the court stated that it was proper for the Board to consider
the consultant's previous labor relations record." This record, accord-
ing to the court, included not only the cases in which the consultant
was formally named as a party, but also cases where the agent was not
named but was indisputably involved in NLRA violations. 22 The court
explained that the combination of the two cases in which the consult-
ant was named and the numerous instances where the consultant was
involved in NLRA violations yet not charged clearly demonstrated the





15 See N,L.R.B. v. Selvin, 527 F.2d 1273, 1277, 90 L.R.R.M. 2829, 2832 (9th Cir. 1975).
19 See id, at 1275 11.1, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2830 a.l.
29 See id. at 1277, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2832.
21 Id, at 1277, 90 L.R.R.M, at 2831.
22 SPe id, at 1277, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2832.
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consultant's propensity to violate the NLRA and accordingly allowed
the Board to furnish the necessary remedy. 23 Thus, the Selvin court
upheld the Board's use of a consultant's prior bad acts, not only in
cases where the consultant was named as a respondent, but also in
cases in which the consultant was not officially named, in order to
justify a broad cease and desist order. 24
During the Survey year, in Blankenship & Associates v. NLRB, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
Board was authorized to issue broad remedial measures against a labor
consultant who was involved, but had not been formally named as a
party in any previous cases." The court enforced the Board's broad
cease and desist order against the consultant because of the consult-
ant's egregious behavior, the need for an effective remedy, and the
discretion afforded the Board in formulating remedial measures." The
court, nonetheless, rebuked the Board for its casual use of question-
able evidence and its failure to deal with the issue of jurisdiction. 27 In
affirming the Board's broad remedial measure, the Blankenship court
supported the Board's power to use, in limited circumstances, a con-
sultant's prior record which consisted entirely of cases where the con-
sultant was not named as a party."
In Blankenship, Gress Poultry ("Gress"), a Pennsylvania poultry
processor, hired an Indiana based labor consultant, Rayford Blanken-
ship, to help Gress defeat a union campaign designed to organize
Gress' workers." To achieve this goal, Blankenship used a variety of
coercive tactics." He told the employees that if the union won the
election, Gress' processing plant would be closed.'" Blankenship men-
tioned to the employees an instance where this had occurred." To
23 See Selvin, 527 F.2d at 1277, 90 L.R,R.M. at 2831-32.
21 Id.
23 See Blankenship and Associates v. NLRB., 999 F.2d 248, 251-52, 143 L.R.R.M. 2817,
2819-20. The consultant had not been a respondent in the previous cases, but had been identified
in each of the cases as the instigator of various unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Coronet Foods,
305 N.L.R.B, 79, 79, 138 L.R.R.M. 1209, 1209 (1991) (employer committed unfair labor practice
when Blankenship, serving as the employer's consultant, showed slides at a mandatory employee
meeting of companies who leased out work when union won certification); Truck & Dock Serv.,
272 N.L.R.B. 592, 592-93, 117 L.R.R.M. 1327, 1327-28 (1984)(employer for whom Blankenship
was serving as a consultant violated the NLRA by unilaterally changing overtime provisions
without notifying the union).
se Blankenship, 999 F.2d at '251-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
28 Id. at 249, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2817.
50 See id. at 249, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
31 See Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 249, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
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emphasize his point, Blankenship displayed a large padlock which he
stated would be used to lock the doors to Gress if the union won."
Blankenship also directed some of his efforts at the union organ-
izers, publicly chiding them with verbal insults and physical threats. 34
The court noted that on the day of the union election, Blankenship
continued and intensified his actions." He directly questioned the
union organizers as to how they would find work for all the employees
since they would all lose their jobs if the union won." In addition, he
exhibited a picture of a lock and told the union organizers, in the
presence of the employees, that he was given a similar lock to place on
Gress' doors when he closed the plant."
According to the court, Blankenship's efforts proved successful as
the union lost the election." The Board's General Counsel then com-
menced unfair labor practice proceedings against both Gress and
Blankenship. 39 Gress promptly settled the case. 4" A hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to determine if Blanken-
ship had engaged in unfair labor practices.' The Am found that
Blankenship had unlawfully interfered with the union election and had
thus violated the NLRA. 42 This decision, according to the ALJ, was
based entirely on Blankenship's conduct in the present case." Al-
though the ALJ mentioned seven previous decisions where Blanken-
ship had clearly violated the NLRA on behalf of Gress but was never
formally named as a respondent, these prior bad acts were not used to
infer a proclivity to commit unfair labor practices. 44 The ALJ thus
recommended that a cease and desist order be issued to enjoin
Blankenship from violating the NLRA while acting on behalf of Gress. 43
Accepting the basic finding of the ALJ, the Board chose to increase
33 Id.
34 See id. In one instance, Blankenship told a union representative he was fat due to the
money he made from the union. Id. Blankenship also told another union organizer that although
he (Blankenship) was an old man, he was going to "kick the shit" out of him. Id.
33 See id. On the day of the election, Blankenship took pictures of the employees with the
union organizers. Id. In addition, he destroyed a "Vote Yes" union sign in the presence of the
employees. Id.
" Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 249, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
37
 Id.
38 See id. at 249, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2817.
39 Id. Proceedings were also instituted against Blankenship's company. Id.
40 Id
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the scope of the cease and desist order to prevent Blankenship from
committing unfair labor practices while acting as an agent for any
employer within the Board's jurisdiction. 46 In support of this decision,
the Board considered the facts of the previous cases in which Blanken-
ship was involved yet not named, and used them to justify this broad
remedial measure.47
In upholding and enforcing the Board's order, the Blankenship
court divided its analysis into two sections. 48 The first part focused on
the jurisdiction issue, because Blankenship claimed that he could not
be reached under the Board's domain. 49 The court explained that the
Board had jurisdiction over Blankenship under the theory advanced
in Chalk. 5° Under this approach, the court held that because Gress
satisfied the statutory requirements of an employer and thus fell within
the Board's jurisdiction, any agent acting on behalf of Gress was also
subject to the Board's reach.51 The court further explained that the
Board's jurisdiction should be based on the employer's, not the
agent's, involvement in interstate commerce. 52 According to the court,
basing jurisdiction on the employer's commerce is the correct reading
of the NLRA's definition of employer.° The court reasoned that an
alternate reading of the definition which focused on the agent's com-
merce would serve to exclude most unfair labor practices from the
Board's jurisdiction. 51
Second, the court addressed whether the Board was correct in
reviewing Blankenship's prior bad acts." The court held that the use
of the facts from these previous cases in which Blankenship was not
officially named was acceptable, and provided three reasons for their
decision." First, the court indicated that the decision by the Board to
take notice of these facts from the previous cases complied with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 57 Rule 201(b) mandates that any judicially
46 Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
47 See Id.
48 See id. at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818-20.
49 See id. at 250, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
59 See id.
51 Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 250, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 Id. The court states that most unfair labor practices are actually commited by individuals
not engaged in interstate commerce. See id.
55 See id. at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
56 Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
57 See id. at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
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noticed facts must not be subject to reasonable dispute." While the
court noted that the use of these facts was questionable, it reasoned
that Blankenship would have objected if these facts were inaccurate."
Because Blankenship presented no evidence contradicting the facts of
these previous cases to the Board or the Court of Appeals, the court
assumed that the findings in the previous cases were on point and
consequently not subject to reasonable dispute.
Next, the court justified the Board's use of the prior bad acts due
to the need for an effective remedy under the circumstances." The
court explained that issuing a cease and desist order that was narrower
in scope would serve no function under the present facts."' Because
Gress had already terminated its relationship with Blankenship, the
court noted that a limited cease and desist order would have had no
practical effect." 2 The end result, according to the court, would have
been that Blankenship was free to engage in unfair labor practices on
behalf of other employers." This fact, combined with the flagrant
nature of Blankenship's conduct would have caused the Board to issue
a broad cease and desist order even without consideration of the
previous cases."4
Finally, the court explained that the Board was not barred from
using these prior bad acts from cases where the consultant was involved
yet not named simply because the Board had not done so in the past." 5
The court reasoned that the Board was empowered to depart from
precedent if it did so cautiously and with reason."" The court noted
that while the Board has less freedom than courts to depart from
precedent, it still maintained the discretion to change course.° The
court emphasized that such freedom is necessary for a successful ad-
56 FED. R. Evil). 201(1)). Rule 201(h) provides:
A judiciailly noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accu-
racy cannot reasonably be questioned.
Id.
511 Blankenship, 999 F.2(1 at 251, 143 I...R.R.M. at 2819. Blankenship did contend that the
employer party in these previous cases may have blamed him for the unfair labor practices, leaving





134 Blankenship, 999 F.2t1 at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
65 1d. at 251-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
66 See id.
67 See id.
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ministrative process. 68 The court refuted the idea that by proceeding
carefully in the past, the Board had created a rule in which each
consultant was entitled one free violation before being subject to broad
remedial action." The fact that the Board has not done something
before, explained the court, does not limit the Board's future right to
engage in that practice."
Although the Blankenship court was not complementary of the
Board's procedural posture, the court held that the combination of
factors, including the compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the egregious nature of Blankenship's conduct, and the Board's power
as an administrative agency, justified enforcement of the order, 7 ' Thus,
the Blankenship court affirmed the Board's power to review prior bad
acts when furnishing remedial measures." The court concluded that
even if the Board had strictly adhered to proper procedure, the result
would have been the same."
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Blankenship represents a moder-
ate step towards a stricter application of the NLRA. Blankenship's
flagrant conduct diametrically contravened the important policy con-
cerns behind the NLRA; consequently, the resulting penalty was broad.
The court justified exercising greater control over labor consultants to
further the purposes of the NLRA to prevent employers from unlaw-
fully interfering in union activity." The Blankenship court specifically
noted, however, that such control must comply with the established
rules of evidence."
In choosing to accept the Chalk approach regarding jurisdiction,
the court opted to validate the Board's power because Blankenship's
role as an agent placed him within the statutory definition of an
employer." In doing so, the court was not formulating a new, more
encompassing approach for establishing jurisdiction. Instead, it was
simply demonstrating its preference for an approach previously em-
ployed by the Board and courts. The Blankenship court's approach for
establishing jurisdiction will gain in significance if other circuits which
currently base jurisdiction on the agent's commerce decide to follow
suit and implicate consultants as agents of the employers.
See id.
°° See Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 252, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2820.
7° See id.




 See id. at 252, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2820.
74 See Blankenship, 999 E2d at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
75
 See id.
7° Id. at 250, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
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While the court's holding maintains the status quo concerning
jurisdiction, it cautiously breaks new ground with respect to a consult-
ant's prior bad acts. By allowing the Board to examine prior cases in
which the consultant was not a party but intimately linked to NLRA
violations, the court strengthens the Board's power to combat the
repeated unfair labor practices of employers' agents. This progress,
however, may be tempered by the Blankenship court's insistence that
evidentiary integrity be maintained." The court indicates that the
decision in Blankenship may have turned out differently if Blankenship
disputed the reliability of the facts of the previous cases. 78 Likewise, the
court appeared to be significantly influenced by Blankenship's gross
conduct. 79
Thus, the Blankenship court fell short of issuing a per-se rule
validating the use of all prior bad acts when the consultant has not
been named in any of the previous cases. While the Board's power to
regulate labor consultants' conduct has been enhanced, this increased
discretion appears limited to certain situations. The facts of the pre-
vious cases, where the consultant has been involved but not named,
must be undisputed, and the conduct of the consultant must be egre-
gious." When these conditions are satisfied, however, the court has
demonstrated its willingness to afford the Board broad discretion in
examining prior bad acts and furnishing effective remedies.
In sum, in Blankenship & Associates v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit
addressed issues concerning the Board's jurisdiction over employees
and the use of an agent's prior bad acts to justify broad remedial
measures.8 t The court indicated that jurisdiction under the NLRA
should be based on the employer's involvement in interstate com-
merce, thus placing Blankenship within the Board's reach. 82 The court
also held that Blankenship's prior bad acts were admissible to help
determine his propensity to violate the NLRA, even though he had not
been an official party in any of the previous cases." Due to his flagrant
conduct, the need for remedy, and the Board's discretion, the court
validated the use of the facts of previous cases. 84 Whether other circuits
will follow the Blankenship court's reasoning remains to be seen.
"See id. at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
28 See id.
"See Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 251, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M at 2818-20.
82 See id. at 250, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
"See id. at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at 2819-20.
84 See Blankenship, 999 F.2d at 250-52, 143 L.R.R.M. at '2819-20.
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III. ARBITRATION
A. *Ninth Circuit Vacates Arbitrator's Remedy for Violation of Essence of
Agreement and Public Policy: Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix
Mailers Union Local 752 1
In a series of 1960 cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
United States Supreme Court adopted the standard for judicial review
of arbitrators' awards and remedies under collective bargaining agree-
ments. 2 The Steelworkers Trilogy Court stated that courts must generally
defer to arbitrators' decisions.' A court, however, may not enforce an
arbitration award that does not "draw its essence" from the collective
bargaining agreement.' Nor may a court enforce an arbitration award
that derives from an agreement that, as interpreted by the arbitrator,
violates public policy.'
In 1982, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las
Vegas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined
the "essence of the agreement" standard originally set out in the
Steelworkers Trilogy. 6 The Desert Palace court held that the "essence of
the agreement" test asks whether the arbitrator's interpretation can be
rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement, viewed in
light of its language, content, and any other indicia of the parties'
intention.? Desert Palace involved a dispute between union cocktail
servers and their employer over the employer's implementation of a
computerized ticketing system that resulted in a sharp decrease in the
cocktail servers' gratuities.' The union sought arbitration, and the
* Shaun B. Spencer, Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 989 F.2d 1077, 142 L.R.R.M. 2819 (9th Cir. 1993).
2
 United Steelworkers V. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 46 L.R.R.M. '2423,
2425 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 46
L.R.R.M. 2416, 2419-20 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68,
46 L.R.R.M. '2414, 2415 (1960).
3 See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U,S. at 596, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2425.
4 Id. at 597, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2425 ("[arbitrator's] award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement").
5 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645 (1983).
6 See 679 F.2d 789, 791-92, 110 L.R.R.M. 2811, 2812-13 (9th Cir. 1982).
7 Id. at 792, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13.
8 Id. at 790-91, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2811-12. Union cocktail servers at "special events' . as defined
in the collective bargaining agreement were guaranteed a minimum gratuity of fifteen percent
of the ticket price. Id. at 790-91, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2812. The employer adopted a computerized
ticketing system for some shows in which patrons paid for tickets in advance, paying cocktail
servers only for the cost of their drinks. M at 791, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2812. Under the previous
system, patrons paid the entire bill to the cocktail server, including the ticket price. M. The
computerized system reduced the cocktail servers' tips dramatically.
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arbitrator found for the union.° The employer sued to vacate the
arbitrator's award.'" The Desert Palace court held that a court cannot
vacate an arbitrator's award merely because the court disagrees with
the arbitrator's interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement." By referring to the agreement itself, past practice, and
the parties' bargaining history, the Desert Palace court reasoned that
the arbitrator's interpretation, while not the only possible one, was
plausible. 12 The Desert Palace court held, therefore, that a court must
uphold an arbitrator's award when the arbitrator's interpretation of
the agreement is a rational one, based on the collective bargaining
agreement and on any other indicia of the parties' intention."
In 1987, in United Paperworks International Union v. Misco, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court further developed the "essence of
the agreement" standard and upheld an arbitrator's award as consis-
tent with the collective bargaining agreement." The Misco Court up-
held the arbitrator's award, despite the arbitrator's refusal to consider
evidence of a dismissed employee's marijuana possession on company
property." The Court determined that the collective bargaining agree-
ment left construction of evidentiary issues to the arbitrator." Thus,
the Misco Court held that where the arbitrator's award represents an
arguable construction or application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the award "draws its essence" from the agreement, and a court
may not substitute its judgment for the arbitrator's."
The Misco Court held, however, that a court may overturn an
arbitration award as a violation of public policy." An overturning court
9 Id. at 791, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
19 Id
11 Desert Palace, 679 F.2d at 793, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2813-14.
12 See id. at 792-93, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2813-14.
13 See id. at 793, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
14 See United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 39, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113,
3117 (1987). Misco involved an employee who was fired after his arrest 14 possession of mari-
juana. Id. at 33, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115. Only after his termination did the company learn he had
possessed marijuana on company property, a violation of the company's drug policy. Id The
arbitrator refused to consider the evidence discovered after the termination. /d at 34, 126
L.R.R.M. at 3115. The arbitrator then found fin' the employee, ordering the company to reinstate
the employee with back pay. Id
15 1d. at 39, 126 L.R.R,M. at 3117.
15 See id. Since the company did not rely on the evidence of marijuana possession on company
property as justification for the discharge, the arbitrator refused to admit such evidence. Id. at
34, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115. The Court noted that refusal to consider evidence that the employer
did not rely on at the time of the discharge is a common practice among arbitrators. Id. at 39-40
& n.8, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117 & n.8.
17 See id. at 38, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
19 1d. at 43, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119,
432	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:349
must determine that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement violates a public policy which is (1) explicit, (2)
well-defined and dominant and (3) found in the laws and legal prece-
dents rather than in general considerations of supposed public inter-
ests.'9 The Misco Court held that a public policy against the operation
of dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs was in-
sufficient to overturn an arbitration award. 2° Conceding that the policy
was grounded in common sense, the Court noted that the policy did
not stem from review of existing laws and legal precedents. 2 ' Under
Misco, therefore, a court may overturn an arbitration award as a viola-
tion of public policy only if the public policy is explicit, well-defined
and dominant, and stems from laws and legal precedents. 22
During the Survey year, in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix
Mailers Union Local 752, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit overturned an arbitrator's order that the parties negoti-
ate a higher wage, holding that the remedy violated the collective
bargaining agreement and a clearly expressed public policy. 23 The
Phoenix Newspapers court determined that the remedy did not "draw
its essence" from the agreement because the remedy was both contrary
to the intent of the parties and in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's zipper clause." The Phoenix Newspapers court also con-
cluded that, because the arbitrator directed the parties to negotiate a
higher wage, the remedy violated a clearly expressed public policy
against affirmative bargaining found in the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA" ). 25
 Under Phoenix Newspapers, therefore, a court will
19 Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.1n 1987, in W.R. Grace E..9' Co. v. Rubber Workers
Local 759, the United States Supreme Court recognized the public policy exception. See 461 U.S.
757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645 (1983) (arbitrator's award did not violate public policy favoring
voluntary compliance with Title VII or obedience to judicial orders, where award required
employer to comply with collective bargaining agreement despite conflicting provisions in con-
ciliation agreement between employer and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC")).
20 484 U.S. at 44, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119. The Misco Court recognized a split in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals regarding the extent of courts' review power, noting that the First and Seventh
Circuits had taken a broader view, whereas the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits had taken
a narrower view. Id at 35 & 11.7, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116 & n.7. The Misco Court took a narrow view
of the courts' review power, emphasizing that when a court overturns an arbitrator's decision on
the grounds of public policy, the policy must be clearly expressed in laws and legal precedent.
See is at 35, 44, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116, 3119.
21 See id. at 44, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
22 See id.
23 989 F.2d 1077, 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. 2819, 2823 (9th Cir. 1993).
24 /d. The zipper clause stated that the parties had "fully bargained with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment .	 ." Id.
29 Id. at 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824-25 (citing NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)).
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overrule an arbitrator's remedy if it does not "draw its essence" from
the collective bargaining agreement, or if it violates a clearly expressed
public policy. 28
The dispute in Phoenix Newspapers involved a collective bargaining
agreement ("the agreement") negotiated by Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
("PNI") and Phoenix Mailers Union Local 752 ("the Union"). 27 The
agreement governed the rates, hours and working conditions of PNI's
mailroom employees. 28
 PNI unilaterally made manning changes with
regard to an inserting machine in the mailroom. 28
 The Union filed a
grievance, and the dispute advanced to arbitration."
The arbitrator found that the dispute was arbitrable, that PNI had
violated sections two and thirty-two of the agreement3 ' and that PNI
had violated sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) of the NLRA. 32 The arbitrator
ordered the parties to negotiate a higher wage rate to compensate the
employees for the additional work caused by PNI's manning changes. 33
The arbitrator further ordered that if the parties did not reach agree-
ment within sixty days, he would set the higher wage himself. 34
PNI sued to vacate the award." The United States District Court
for the District of Arizona found that the dispute was arbitrable, and
that the award and remedy "drew their essence" from the agreement."
26 See Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.




3 ' Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821. Sections two and thirty-two of
the agreement provide in relevant part:
Section 2: The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of all employees covered by this agreement ...
Section 32: . . . It is the intent of the [Elmployer not to undertake any activity
which will in any sense undermine or jeopardize [sic] the [U]nion's security or the
well being of its members .
Id. at 1081 n.4, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822 11,4.
52 1d. at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821. Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) of the NLRA provide in
relevant part:
§ 8(a)(5): It shall he an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
§ 8(d): For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is ... to ... confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
" Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821.
34 Id.
" Id. at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2820.
96 Id. at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821.
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The district court also ordered PNI to pay attorney's fees for bringing
the action in bad faith." PNI appealed the district court's decision.s 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
in part the decision of the district court." The Phoenix Newspapers court
affirmed the district court's decision that the dispute was arbitrable. 4°
The court further affirmed the district court's finding that the arbitra-
tor's award—a finding that the company had violated the collective
bargaining agreement—"drew its essence" from the agreement.'" The
Phoenix Newspapers court, nevertheless, reversed the district court's
decision that the arbitrator's remedy "drew its essence" from the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 42
 The court further held that the arbi-
trator's remedy violated a clearly expressed public policy.° Finally, the
Phoenix Newspapers court reversed the district court's award of attor-
ney's fees to the union."
The Phoenix Newspapers court began its discussion by examining
the standard for review of arbitrators' decisions.° The court observed
that judicial review of arbitrators' decisions merely involves determin-
ing whether the dispute was arbitrable and whether the arbitrator's
decision was within his authority.° The court noted that there is a
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability. 47
 The court held that the
broad language of the agreement supported the district court's finding
of arbitrability.° Applying this presumption to the facts, the court
rejected PN1's contention that the "management rights" doctrine ren-
dered this dispute inarbitrable, noting that the agreement did not
contain a "management rights" clause that explicitly granted PNI ex-
clusive powers to make manning changes.°
37
 Id at 1079, 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821.
as Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1079, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821, 2825.
99 Id. at 1085, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2825.
40 Id.
41 M. at 1081, 1085, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822-23, 2825.
42 See id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
48 Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1083, 1085, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824, 2825.
44 Id. at 1085, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2825.




 Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1080, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822.
49 1d. (citing Teamsters Union Local 287 v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 849 F.2d 1210, 1213, 128 L.R.R.M.
2759, 2762 (9th Cir. 1988) (even if collective bargaining agreement contains general "manage-
ment rights" clause, presumption of arbitrability may only be overcome by explicit provision in
agreement that issue falls within management rights clause, or by most forceful evidence" that
issue was right of management before agreement was signed)). The "management rights" doc-
trine stems from the common law view of the employer as property owner, entitling the employer
to operate the business as he or she chooses, subject to the limits of legislation or collective
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The appeals court next reviewed the district court's decision that
the arbitrator's award "drew its essence" from the agreement. 5° The
arbitrator ruled that sections two and thirty-two of the agreement
required PNI to bargain with the union over the effects of the manning
changes.'' The appeals court upheld the arbitrator's award as a plau-
sible interpretation which "drew its essence" from the agreement. 52
The Phoenix Newspapers court next considered the arbitrator's
remedy, the order that the parties negotiate a higher wage for the
mailroom workers." The court first considered whether the remedy
met the "essence of the agreement" test. 54 The court stated that the
"essence of the agreement" test required that the arbitrator's solution
be rationally derived from a plausible interpretation of the agreement,
viewed in light of the agreement itself and any other indicia of the
parties' intention. 55 The court examined the bargaining history of the
parties, which showed that the parties would not necessarily have
required manning changes to result in a new wage rate. 5" The court
stated that the arbitrator correctly ordered the parties to negotiate, but
should have allowed them to choose their own solution. 57
The Phoenix Newspapers court next considered the significance of
the agreement's zipper clause to the "essence of the agreement" test.•• 8
Because the clause stated that the parties had "fully bargained with
respect to wages ... and conditions of employment," the court deter-
mined that the arbitrator should not have established a new term—a
bargaining agreements. FRANK ELSOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS 457 (4th
ed. 1985). Management rights have been defined as "those rights, or that authority, which
management must have in order successfidly to carry out its function of managing the enterprise."
Id.
58 See Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1081, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822.
31 See id. at 1081, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822-23. Sec supra note 31 for text of sections two and
thirty two of the agreement.
52 1d. at 1081, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2822.
53 Id. at 1081-82, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
" See id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
55 Phoenix Newspapers, 989 E2d at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Local Joint. Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 679 E2d 789, 792-93, 110 L.R.R.M. 2811, 2812, 2814 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
56 Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1082,142 L.R.R.M. at '1823. The arbitrator found that PN1
had consistently opposed the Union's attempts to make existing manning practices binding. Id.
The Union had sought on three separate occasions to incorporate manning practices into the
collective bargaining agreement, and PNI refused on every occasion. Id. Furthermore, PN1 had
made previous manning changes for which the Union had not sought arbitration of a new wage.
Id. The court interpreted these Ihcts to suggest that the parties would not have agreed to a wage
hike as the sole remedy for manning changes. See id.
57 Id. at 1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
58 See id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
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higher wage rate—for which the parties did not bargain." The court
held that this remedy impermissibly altered the bargaining relation-
ship between the parties.° Thus, the Phoenix Newspapers court held
that the arbitrator's remedy failed to draw its essence from the agree-
ment because it was contrary to the intent of the parties as expressed
in the bargaining history, and because it violated the zipper clause
which precluded "interest" arbitration. 6'
The Phoenix Newspapers court further determined that the arbitra-
tor's remedy, ordering the parties to negotiate a higher wage, violated
a clearly expressed public policy found in the NLRA. 62 The Phoenix
59 id.
6° Id.
61 See Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824. The court noted that the
arbitrator's remedy comprised improper Interest" arbitration, rather than permissible "rights"
arbitration. Id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823. While a "rights" arbitrator merely resolves disputes
over interpretation of the agreement, an "interest" arbitrator supplements the agreement with
terms to which the parties did not agree. Id. In upholding the arbitrator's decision, the district
court sought to distinguish the instant case from several improper Interest" arbitration cases by
asserting that those cases included clauses that prohibited the arbitrator from altering the
agreement. Id. at 1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824. See Leed Architectural Prods. v. United Steelworkers,
Local 6674, 916 F.2(1, 63, 66, 135 L.R.R.M. 2766, 2769 (2d Cir. 1990)(zipper clause makes
agreement the exclusive statement of parties' rights and obligations); Lodge 802, Int'l Bhd. of
Boilermakers v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co., 835 F.2d 1045, 1047, 127 L.R.R.M. 2206, 2208 (3d
Cir. 1987) (zipper clause demonstrates that arbitrator may not create new terms or conditions not
provided for in agreement); Centralab, Inc. v. Local No. 816, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 827
F.2d 1210, 1216, 126 L.R.R.M. 2937, 2941-42 (8th Cir. 1987) (where unambiguous language in
agreement limits arbitrator's authority to alter agreement., arbitrator is bound by such language).
The Phoenix Newspapers court disagreed with the district court for two reasons. See 989 F.2d at
1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824. First, the district court had ignored the zipper clause in the agree-
ment. Id. Second, the Phoenix Newspapers court stated that the prior "interest" arbitration cases
were not premised on the existence of zipper clauses. Id.
The Phoenix Newspapers court rejected the district court's conclusion that Desert Palace
justified the arbitrator's order to negotiate a higher wage. Id. The Desert Palace court had upheld
an arbitrator's modification to an employee compensation method because the relevant contract
terms were ambiguous, and the arbitrator's construction of those terms was plausible. Id. (citing
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 792, 110 L.R.R.M.
2811, 2813 (9th Cir. 1982)). Pointing to the zipper clause and the parties' bargaining history, as
well as the absence of a wage reopener provision or an interest arbitration clause, the Phoenix
Newspapers court determined that there was no ambiguity in the agreement. 989 F.2d at 1083,
142 L.R.R.M. at 2824. The court further concluded that the arbitrator's construction was not
plausible. Id.
'2 989 F.2d at 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824-25. The court relied on the public policy test
established by Grace, which held that to invalidate an arbitrator's remedy, the public policy must
be (1) explicit, (2) well-defined and dominant and (3) demonstrated by reference to laws and
legal precedents, not by general public interest considerations, Id. at 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824;
see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2645
(1983). Note that in Grace and Miscothe United States Supreme Court discussed the public policy
exception in light of the collective bargaining agreement as interjneted by the arbitrator, rather
than the arbitrator's award itself. See United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
43, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113, 3119 (1987); Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
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Newspapers court reasoned that the NLRA requires good faith bargain-
ing, but does not require affirmative bargaining." The court observed
that the remedy ordering the parties to negotiate a higher wage rate
within sixty days, or the arbitrator would impose a higher wage himself,
exceeded mere "good faith" bargaining and constituted "affirmative
bargaining," which the NLRA does not require. 64 The court concluded,
therefore, that the arbitrator's order to negotiate and to agree on a
higher wage rate violated an explicit, well-defined and dominant public
policy codified in the NLRA. 65
In summary, the Phoenix Newspapers court held that a court may
not enforce an arbitrator's remedy which does not "draw its essence"
from the collective bargaining agreement. 66 The court reasoned that
the arbitrator's remedy contradicted the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in their bargaining history, and that the remedy violated the
agreement's zipper clause. 67 The court also held that the arbitrator's
remedy violated a public policy expressed in the NLRA."
The Phoenix Newspapers court's application of the "essence of the
agreement" test, though advocating broad deference to arbitrators,
restricts arbitrators' discretion more than the United States Supreme
Court's application of the test in Misco." The Misco Court stated that
the arbitrator could not ignore the plain language of the contract, but
as long as the arbitrator is "even arguably construing or applying the
contract" the arbitrator's decision must stand." The Ninth Circuit gave
a more specific definition in Phoenix Newspapers, requiring a rational
relationship between the remedy and the agreement; this relationship
"must" be viewed in light of the agreement and "any other indicia of
the parties' intention." With such mandatory language, the Ninth
Circuit prescribes the method of contractual interpretation which ar-
bitrators must use. An arbitrator who limits his or her interpretation
to the four corners of the agreement may be reversed under Phoenix
Newspapers if there are "any other indicia of the parties' intention" that
contradict the arbitrator's interpretation. 72 Under the Supreme Court's
Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1084, 142 L.R.R,M. at 2824.
64 See id. at 1084, 142 L.R.R.M, at 2825.
65 1d, at 1079, 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2821, 2824.
66 See id. at 1082, 142 L,R,R,M. at 2823.
67 1d.
° Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1084, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824-25.
66 See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3117; Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1082, 142
L.R.R.M. at 2823.
7° Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
71 See Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
72 See id.
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test in Misco, an arbitrator who limits his or her interpretation to the
four corners of the agreement is "arguably construing" the agreement,
albeit narrowly, and the arbitrator's interpretation must be upheld."
While it may be desirable to encourage arbitrators to consult all possi-
ble sources, mandating a particular method of interpretation is inap-
posite with the policy of deference to arbitrators' decisions. 74
Phoenix Newspapers may have several effects in practice. First, the
court's assertion that the arbitrator must consider "other indicia of the
parties' intention" when construing the agreement may encourage
parties to document their intentions at every step of the bargaining
process. This would allow them to shift the interpretation of the con-
tract in their favor, or at least prevent the other side from shifting the
interpretation in its favor. Second, this language may affect the arbi-
trators themselves. Though the court is unclear about whether an
arbitrator's failure to consider "other indicia of the parties' intention"
constitutes reversible error, such a suggestion should encourage arbi-
trators to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intention."
Because the Phoenix Newspapers court stated that the agreement
was unambiguous, the court's examination of extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intention was unnecessary." The arbitrator clearly disregarded
the zipper clause by imposing a new term for which the parties had
not bargained—the higher wage rate." Were the zipper clause ambigu-
ous, then resort to extrinsic evidence of intent would have been nec-
essary. Yet, there was no ambiguity." This may weaken the precedential
value of the court's requirement that the "essence of the agreement"
must refer in part to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intention."
Phoenix Newspapers represents a deviation from the general rule
of judicial deference to arbitration awards.R The United States Su-
preme Court has consistently emphasized the limited role of the courts
in reviewing arbitration decisions. 81 In 1987, the Court approvingly
73 See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
74 See Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116; Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2(1 at 1081-82,
142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
75 See Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
76 See id. at 1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
77 See id, at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
78 Id. at 1083, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
79 See id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
1141 See, e.g., Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber
Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764, 113 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2644 (1983); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414, 2415 (1960).
8L See Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116; Grace, 461 U.S. at 764, 113 L.R.R.M. at
2644; American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2415.
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noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—
the Phoenix Newspapers circuit—had adopted the narrower view of the
courts' power to set. aside arbitration awards. 82 The Phoenix Newspapers
opinion, however, should serve as a reminder to arbitrators that there
are limits to their authority, and that the courts will enforce these
limits.
Although it is unusual for a court to overturn an arbitrator's
decision, the Phoenix Newspapers court was correct in so doing. The
arbitrator clearly exceeded his authority by imposing a higher wage
rate on the parties." This new term violated the zipper clause, which
stated that the parties had fully bargained with respect to wages and
conditions of employment. 84
 The order to bargain affirmatively vio-
lated the public policy expressed in the NLRA, which does not require
parties to bargain to an agreement." Even in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which interprets the public policy
exception very narrowly, the NLRA is sufficiently specific to provide a
clearly expressed public policy.
In conclusion, the Phoenix Newspapers court held that a court may
not uphold an arbitrator's remedy which fails to "draw its essence"
from the agreement, or which violates a clearly expressed public policy.
The court's application of the "essence of the agreement" test makes
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intention an important consideration
for arbitrators construing collective bargaining agreements under
Phoenix Newspapers. Finally, the opinion reinforces prior holdings that
the public policy exception requires a public policy that is explicitly
defined in existing laws or legal precedent.
B. *Seventh Circuit Evaluates Employer Compliance with Employee
Reinstatement Award: Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union,
Allied Industrial Workers of America'
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act ("LMRA"), enacted by Congress in 1947, permits federal courts to
82 See MVO, 484 U.S. at 35 11.7, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116 ti.7.
83
 Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1083, 142 L.R,R,M. at 2824.
84 Id. at 1082, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
85 See 29 U.S.C, § 158(d) (1988).
**By Kim A. O'Connor, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE Law REVIEW.
L Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Intl Union, Allied Indus. Workers of Am., 2 F.3d 760, 62 Fair
Empl. Frac. Gas. (BNA) 1030 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Chrysler 111]. Chrysler III is the most
recent decision in a series of litigations stemming from Chrysler's discharge of an employee for
sexual harassment. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Intl Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 748 F. Stipp.
1352, 135 L.R.R.M. 2127 (E.D. Wis. 1990) [hereinafter ChrysierMotens); dismissal of appeal denied,
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enforce collective bargaining agreements between employers and la-
bor organizations.2 The LMRA seeks to promote peaceful private set-
tlement of disputes in part by providing for the enforceability in fed-
eral courts of arbitration awards rendered pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements. 3 The United States Supreme Court has long
held that unions may resort to the federal courts under section 301(a)
when an employer violates an arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement. 4 Unions have frequently sought federal court
enforcement of arbitrators' reinstatement awards when employers'
methods of compliance seemed to violate arbitration awards made
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. 5
In 1984, in Chicago Newspaper Guild v. Field Enterprises, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether an
employer's reinstatement letter constituted compliance with an arbi-
trator's award made pursuant to the collective bargaining agreements
The court held that an employer may not avoid complying with an
arbitration award by loosely conforming with the plain language of the
award nor by withholding information from arbitration proceedings.'
In Chicago Newspaper Guild, the court determined that the employer's
letter which retroactively reinstated the employee for one year and
retroactively laid him off did not comply with the arbitration award's
requirement of immediate reinstatement with backpay.s The court
909 F.2d 248, 135 L.R.R.M. 2137 (7th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Chrysler 1]; affd, 959 F.2d 685, 58
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 692 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Chrysler III; cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
304, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) 1536 (1992); denial of motion affil 2 F.3d 760, 02 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1030 (7th Cir. 1993) (denial of contempt motion for violation of district court
order).
2 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
3 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2115 (1957).
4 1d. at 456, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2116.
5 See, e.g., Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031; Chicago
Newspaper Guild v. Field Enter., 747 F.2d 1153, 1155, 117 L.R.R.M. 2937, 2938 (7th Cir. 1984);
Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union 100 v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 562 F. Supp.
825, 828, 116 L.R.R.M. 2184, 2186 (S.D. Ohio 1983)(employer's reinstatement of employee to
layoff status without pay complied with arbitration award).
6 Chicago Newspaper Guild, 747 F.2d at 1155, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2938.
7 See id. at 1156-57, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2939-40. The court also noted that reinstatement did
not shield an employee from future lawful disciplinary layoff. Id. at 1156, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2939.
Id. at 1156, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2939.
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concluded that the employer had misinterpreted the plain language
of the award. 9 The court further noted that the employer's failure to
present information regarding the impact of the layoffs on the em-
ployee's former job precluded subsequent use of that information to
avoid compliance with the arbitrator's reinstatement award." The court
based its holding on the well-established federal policy in favor of
arbitration of labor disputes which prevents disputing parties from first
withholding information from arbitrators and, subsequently, attempt-
ing to use that information to avoid full compliance with an adverse
award."
In 1987, in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court considered a related question regard-
ing the validity of an arbitration award in which the arbitrator inten-
tionally did not consider certain evidence presented by the employer.' 2
The Supreme Court held that information presented, but justifiably
deemed irrelevant, at arbitration may later be used by the employer to
justify a subsequent employee discharge action." In Misco, the em-
ployer discharged an employee for violating the illicit drug possession
policy included in the collective bargaining agreement.' 4 Days prior to
the arbitration hearing, the employer discovered evidence of further
drug policy violations which it presented at arbitration." The arbitra-
tor, however, refused to consider such evidence when determining
whether the employee was discharged for just cause.' He reasoned that
employers must have proof in hand prior to discharging employees
because it would be illogical to allow companies like Misco to discharge
g Id. The employer argued that the letter did comply with the award by retroactively reinstat-
ing the employee for the year between the original discharge and the time when the employee's
job was eliminated by layoffs, Id. The court rejected this argument and held that the plain
language of the award required the employer to return the employee to work at the beginning
of the next, post-award payroll period rather than merely reinstate him to his former job. Id.
15 1d. at 1157, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2940, The court further commented that future employment
decisions must be evaluated independently of the original discharge. Id. at 1156, 117 L.R.R.M.
at 2939.
11 See Chicago Newspaper Guild, 747 F.2d at 1157-58, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2940-41.
12 United Paperworkers Inel Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113, 8117
(1987).
13 1d. at 41, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3118; see Truck Drivers Local 705 v. Schneider Tank Lines, 958
F.2d 171, 174-75, 139 L.R.R.M. 2699, 2702 (7th Cir. 1992)(employer who reinstates employee
pursuant to collective bargaining agreement did not violate agreement where reinstated employee
is subsequently fired for "fresh reason").
14 Misco, 484 U.S. at 33, 126 L.R.R.M. at 8115.
15 1d.
18 1d. at 34, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
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employees and then spend months searching for evidence to justify its
action.' 7
The Court, in reviewing the arbitrator's decision to exclude that
evidence, noted that it is well established that federal courts may not
set aside arbitration awards absent an arbitrator's bad faith refusal to
consider evidence such that the refusal constitutes affirmative miscon-
duct.' 8
 The Court further reasoned that an arbitrator's refusal to con-
sider available evidence does not prevent the employer from using that
evidence as the basis for future discharge.' 9
 Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Court of Appeals could not set aside the reinstate-
ment award merely because it disagreed with the arbitrator's refusal to
consider evidence which was presented at arbitration but unknown by
the employer at the time of the employee discharge. 2"
During the Survey year, in Chrysler Motors Carp. v. International
Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America ("Chrysler III"), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employer's
letter, which simultaneously reinstated and discharged an employee,
did not violate the district court's enforcement of an arbitration award
which required the employer to reinstate the employee with back pay. 21
The line of Chrysler cases leading to Chrysler ///involved the reinstate-
ment of a Chrysler employee who had been discharged for sexually
harassing a female coworker. 22 The Chrysler III court ruled that the
arbitrator's refusal to consider evidence upon which Chrysler did not
rely when discharging the employee did not preclude Chrysler from
using that evidence in an immediate subsequent discharge action."
Rather, the Chrysler III court reasoned that information presented to,
but not considered by, the arbitrator in formulating the reinstatement
award constituted "fresh evidence" which Chrysler could use to jus-
tifiably discharge the same employee after complying with the rein-
statement order. 24
17 1d. at 34 n.6, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115 n.6.
18 Id. at 40, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3118.
MiSCO, 484 U.S. at 41, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3118.
20 1d. at 39, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
21 Chrysler III, 2 F.3d 760, 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir.
1993).
22
 Id. at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031.
23 Id. at 763, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032. The court also held that Chrysler's
argument that reinstatement violated public policy did not preclude it from claiming that it had,
in fact, complied with the reinstatement order. Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1033.
Furthermore, the court rejected the union's contention that Chrysler had intentionally pro-
longed litigation by withholding evidence about the employee's misconduct. Id. at 764, 62 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (11NA) at 1032-33.
24 Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
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On January 10, 1989, Chrysler discharged Ronald Gallenbeck, a
fork lift operator, for sexually harassing a female co-worker. 25 The
Union protested Gallenbeck's discharge by filing a grievance on his
behalf with Chrysler pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. 2°
Chrysler, in turn, denied the grievance, and the dispute proceeded to
arbitration.27
Following Gallenbeck's discharge but prior to the initial arbitra-
tion hearing, Chrysler accumulated evidence that Gallenbeck had sex-
ually harassed female co-workers on four separate occasions. 28 Chrysler
presented this additional information at arbitration to further support
its position that Gallenbeck was discharged for just cause. 29 The arbi-
trator refused to consider Chrysler's evidence of additional sexual
harassment incidents involving Gallenbeck. 5° The arbitrator reasoned
that evidence acquired after Gallenbeck's discharge could not have
served as a basis for Chrysler's decision.3 t The arbitrator thus decided
that the single incident which led Chrysler to discharge Gallenbeck
did not warrant such a severe sanction. 52 Accordingly, the arbitrator
reduced Gallenbeck's penalty to a 30-day suspension and ordered
Chrysler to reinstate Gallenbeck with back pay."
The arbitration award resulted in a series of federal district and
circuit court cases which examined the soundness of the award as well
as the validity of Chrysler's method of compliance." In the first of these
cases, Chrysler, pursuant to the LMRA, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to
have the arbitration award vacated as contrary to public policy. 85 The
district court rejected Chrysler's public policy arguments and affirmed
the arbitration ruling. 55 Specifically, the court held that Chrysler failed to
25 Chrysler Motors, 748 E Stipp. 1352, 1355, 135 L.R.R.M. 2127, 2129 (E.D. Wis, 1990). Five
days prior to being discharged, Gallenbeck approached a female co-worker from behind and
grabbed her breasts. Id. at 1355, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2128.
26 Id. at 1355, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2129.
27 Id.
23 Chrysler 111, 959 E2d 685, 686, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 692, 693 (7th Cir. 1992),





33 Chrysler II, 959 F.2d at 686, 58 Fair F.mpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 693.
34 See Chrysler HI, 2 F.3(1 at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1031.
35 Chrysler Motors, 748 E Stipp. at 1353, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2127. The Union also motioned for
dismissal and counterclaimed fin- enfOrcentent of the award, prejudgment interest on the back
pay and attorneys' fees. Id.
3° Id. at 1363, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2135.
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identify any well-defined, dominant and explicit public policy suf-
ficiently grounded in federal or state law which conflicted with the
reinstatement award," In reaching this conclusion, the court embraced
the Misco standard that federal courts may overturn arbitration awards
on public policy grounds only in those limited cases where the policy
at issue is clearly established at law and not merely a general consid-
eration of public welfare." The district court remanded the case to the
arbitrator to determine the amount of back pay."
Shortly after filing a notice of appeal with the Seventh Circuit,
Chrysler sent a letter to Gallenbeck which purported to reinstate him
in accordance with the district court order, yet also simultaneously
discharged him again. 40 Specifically, the letter advised Gallenbeck that
Chrysler would reinstate him for one day during which they would fire
him again based on the evidence of additional incidents of sexual
harassment discovered during preparation for the arbitration hear-
ing:" In response to the letter, the Union immediately requested that
the district court hold Chrysler in contempt for failure to comply with
the order for Gallenbeck's reinstatement. 42 The district court, however,
refused to hear the Union's contempt motion on the grounds that
Chrysler's appeal to the Seventh Circuit had divested the district court
of jurisdiction.43
The district court's enforcement of the award, Chrysler's letter
reinstating and discharging Gallenbeck and the Union's contempt
motion led to three separate appeals to the Seventh Circuit known as
Chrysler 1, Chrysler II and Chrysler HI." In Chrysler Motors Corp. v.
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers ("Chrysler I"), the Seventh
37 1d. The court noted Chrysler's failure to cite authority in support of the claim that it is
illegal to reinstate an employee who has sexually harassed a co-worker on only one occasion. Id.
38 Id. at 1359, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2132.
" Id. at 1365, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2137. The court also rejected the union's claims for prejudg-
ment interest and attorneys' fees, holding that Chrysler's suit was neither frivolous nor in bad
faith given the unsettled and evolving nature of the law. Id.
40
 Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031. The letter stated:
Pursuant to the evidence uncovered during preparation for the arbitration hearing
in this matter which revealed other acts of harassment on your part directed at
female coworkers, the decision has been made to terminate your employment
effective immediately. However, in lieu of returning you to work only to then effect
your discharge, enclosed is check 62306, in the amount of $47.20, less standard
deductions, representing compensation for reinstatement for one day.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Chrysler I, 909 F.2d 248, 249, 135 L.R.R.M. 2137, 2137 (7th Cir. 1990).
43 Id.
44 Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1031.
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Circuit denied the Union's request for dismissal of Chrysler's appeal
from the district court's enforcement of the arbitrator's award." The
Union, in a failed attempt to return jurisdiction over the contempt
motion to the district court, had based its request on the grounds that
the district court's order was not final pending the arbitrator's deter-
mination of the amount of back pay." In refusing to dismiss Chrysler's
appeal, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a mandatory injunction,
such as the order to reinstate Gallenbeck, is immediately appealable
without regard to finality. 47
 The court also noted that the interlocutory
appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to decide a
contempt motion." At the Seventh Circuit's request, however, the
district court deferred consideration of any contempt motion pending
the Seventh Circuit's decision of the Chrysler appeal in Chrysler H."
In Chrysler Motors col. v. International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers ("Chrysler II"), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's enforcement of the arbi-
tration award." It stated that the arbitrator's reinstatement remedy was
within the purview of the collective bargaining agreement and public
policy." The Seventh Circuit conducted a de nova review of the arbitra-
tion award 52
 and ultimately affirmed that Chrysler had failed to satisfy
its burden to provide any well-defined, dominant public policy that
precluded reinstatement of an employee who had committed a single
known act of sexual harassment." In the absence of any public policy
violation, arbitrator bad faith or misconduct, the court considered
itself bound to affirm the arbitration award reinstating Gallenbeck."
45 Chrysler I, 909 F.2d at 250, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
4° Id. at 249, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2137.
47 1d. at 249-50, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
4° Id. at 250, 135 1..R.R.M. at 2138.
4° Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1031.
5°
 Chrysler II, 959 F.2d 685, 689, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, I IS S. Ct. 304, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1536 (1992).
51 Id.
52
 Id. at 687, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 693. The court reasoned that because public
policy is independent of the collective bargaining agreement, the federal courts can properly
review whether the arbitration award violates public policy despite being a valid interpretation' of
a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
55 See id. at 688, 58 Fair Em p1. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 694. The court cited the well-recognized
public policy against sexual harassment in the work place, noting that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission requires employers to prevent such conduct at their place of business.
Id. at 687-88, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 693-94. The court did not accept, however,
Chrysler's argument that discharging Gallenbeck was necessary to comply with such public policy.
Id. at 688, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 694.
54 See id. at 688, 58 Fair Erupt. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 694.
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Following Chrysler 11, the Union filed another motion for con-
tempt in the district court claiming that Chrysler had failed to reinstate
Gallenbeck as required by the district court's order. 55
 The district court
denied the contempt motion, concluding that Chrysler's letter to Gal-
lenbeck constituted full compliance with the court's reinstatement
order. 56
 Moreover, the court explained that the letter's notice of dis-
charge fell beyond the scope of the court order because it was based
on evidence not considered by the arbitrator's award. 57
 The Union
appealed the court's denia1.58
On August 17, 1993, in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Un-
ion, Allied Industrial Workers of America ("Chrysler III"), the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Union's contempt
motion. 59
 The court held that Chrysler had not violated the district
court order enforcing the arbitration award because Chrysler's letter
followed the terms of the award by reinstating Gallenbeck, albeit for
one day.° Chrysler's simultaneous discharge of Gallenbeck did not
violate the arbitration award because it was based on evidence pre-
sented, but not considered, by the arbitrator's award!" The court noted
that district courts have the discretion to grant contempt motions when
a party violates a specific, direct command of the court. 62 The court
implicitly reasoned that the district court is best able to recognize a
failure to comply with one of its own commands. 65 Thus, because the
district court did not consider Chrysler's letter as contempt of court,
the Seventh Circuit considered itself bound to affirm the district
court's denial of the motion unless it could find a clear error by the
district court. 64
The Seventh Circuit systematically rejected the Union's two argu-
ments that the district court's denial of contempt was erroneous. 65
 The
Union first argued that the arbitrator did, in fact, consider the post-
discharge evidence of harassment.° Thus, the Union claimed that
Chrysler could not use such evidence to justify a subsequent dis-




59 Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1033.
613 Chrysler 111,2 F.3d at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1033.
61 Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1032.
62 Id. at 762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031.
" See Id.
64 See id. at 762-63, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031-32.
(15 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
"See id. at 763, 62 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
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charge.° Second, the Union contended that Chrysler had intentionally
withheld evidence to prolong litigation. 68
The Seventh Circuit's approach involved a three step analysis of
the Union's two arguments." First, the court found that evidence
presented to, but not considered by, the arbitrator could be used to
justify Chrysler's subsequent discharge action. 70 In developing this
"fresh evidence" rule, the court embraced a string of Supreme Court
and Seventh Circuit cases which held that when arbitrators refuse to
consider evidence acquired after an employee's discharge, the employ-
ers may in turn use that same evidence in a subsequent discharge
action.''
Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Union's claim that the
arbitrator considered all presented evidence when formulating his
award?' Instead, the court held that the precise language of the award
clearly indicated that the arbitrator did not consider the evidence
acquired by Chrysler after it discharged the employee." The court
further noted that Chrysler's presentation of all of its evidence to the
arbitrator did not necessarily mean that the arbitrator considered all
of it when he rendered the award. 74 Thus, according to the court, the
reinstatement order covered only the single incident for which Gallen-
beck had been originally fired."
Third, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Union's allegations that
Chrysler had improperly withheld evidence from the arbitrator as
wholly unsupported in the record." The court determined, by looking
at the language of the award, that the evidence Chrysler used to almost
simultaneously discharge Gallenbeck had, in fact, been introduced at
arbitration. 77 Thus, the court concluded that Chrysler's second dis-
charge of Gallenbeck was entirely appropriate because 1) Chrysler
" 7 See id.
"8 Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1032. The Union also argued that Chrysler's
long-held position that the reinstatement order was contrary to public policy estopped Chrysler
from arguing that it did reinstate Gallenbeck. Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1033.
69 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032-33.
70 See Chrysler III, 2 12.3d at 763, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
71 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032; see also Truck Drivers Local 705
v. Schneider Tank Lines, 958 F.2d 171, 174-75, 139 L.R.R.M. 2699, 2702 (7th Cir. 1992); Misr°,
484 U.S. 29, 41, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113, 3118 (1987); Chirzigo Newspaper Guild, 747 F.2(1 1153, 1156,
117 L.R.R.M, 2937, 2939 (7th Cir. 1984).
72
 Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1032.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 763, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1032.
75 id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1052.
7" Id. at 764, 62 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
77 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 1032-33.
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presented all of its evidence to the arbitrator; 2) the language of the
arbitrator's award indicated that some of that evidence was not consid-
ered in rendering the award; and 3) Chrysler subsequently discharged
Gallenbeck based only on evidence submitted, but not considered, at
arbitration.78
In Chrysler HI, the Seventh Circuit assimilated principles estab-
lished in Chicago Newspaper Guild and Misco.79 In Chicago Newspaper
Guild, the court established that employers cannot ignore the plain
meaning of an arbitration award nor use information known but with-
held from the arbitrator to subsequently discharge an employee." In
Misco, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitrators have the right to
exclude from their deliberations evidence presented at arbitration that
was acquired after the employee's discharge. 81 The Misco Court also
noted in dicta that such evidence could be used in a subsequent,
independent discharge action." In Chrysler III, the Seventh Circuit
gave substance to the Supreme Court's dicta by permitting Chrysler to
use the evidence not considered by the arbitrator to discharge Gallen-
beck simultaneously with reinstatement." The court thus expanded
Chicago Newspaper Guild and Misco to establish a more inclusive deter-
mination that information acquired after a discharge action, presented
at arbitration, but justifiably not considered by the arbitrator, may be
used by the employer in an immediate subsequent discharge action. 84
By permitting the immediate subsequent discharge of the rein-
stated employee, the Seventh Circuit undermined the impact of the
arbitrator's reinstatement award. 85 In Chrysler II, the court made clear
that it did not approve of Gallenbeck's behavior." It lacked, however,
any legitimate basis for vacating an arbitration award rendered pursu-
ant to the collective bargaining agreement and within the bounds of
public policy. 87 The court's Chrysler III decision that Chrysler's letter
78 See id. Also, in response to the Union's contention that Chrysler's public policy argument
barred it from claiming that it complied with the reinstatement order, the court ruled that the
law of judicial estoppel was inapplicable. Id. at 764, 62 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1033.
79 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032-33.
m° Chicago Newspaper Guild, 747 F.2c11153, 1156, 117 L.R.R.M. 2937, 2939-40 (7th Cir. 1984).
91 Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 41, 126 L.R.R.M. 3113, 3118 (1987).
82 Id.
83 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 764, 62 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
"4 See id.
85 See id.
86 Chrysler II, 959 F.2d 685, 689, 58 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1992),
ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1536 (1992).
87 See id.
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complied with the order, therefore, constructively vacated the arbitra-
tion award which called for Gallenbeck's reinstatement. 88
As objectionable as Gallenbeck's behavior was, the precedent es-
tablished by the Seventh Circuit in Chrysler III raises concern about the
use of evidence acquired after an employer wrongfully discharges an
employee. After Chrysler III, employers ordered to reinstate an em-
ployee can effectively avoid reinstatement by utilizing the Chrysler-style
simultaneous reinstatement/discharge letter. 89
 By allowing immediate
discharge simultaneously with reinstatement, the court has effectively
contradicted the Supreme Court's Misco principle that it is illogical to
allow employers to wrongfully discharge employees and then search
for evidence to justify their action." Where Miscowould permit the use
of such evidence in future independent discharge actions, Chrysler III
broadened the meaning of future independent discharge to include
discharges made immediately and simultaneously with reinstatement. 9 '
Thus, an arbitrator's decision to exclude from consideration evidence
acquired after the original discharge merely delays the employers use
of that same information until the moment the reinstatement award is
rendered.92
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's Chrysler III decision should
put arbitrators on notice that detailed awards are essential to deter-
mine properly what constitutes reinstatement." The precise language
of an arbitration award serves as the basis for determining what infor-
mation was presented to the arbitrator, what information was consid-
ered by the arbitrator, and what the arbitrator's award actually man-
dates." Without such detail, it is impossible to know whether evidence
known by a party during the arbitration process and used in a sub-
sequent discharge action had been properly disclosed during arbitra-
tion or duly considered in the award." The Chrysler III decision also
encourages arbitrators faced with evidence acquired after a discharge
action to state clearly in their awards whether that evidence was con-
sidered in the final arbitration award.96
 Most importantly, the Chrysler
III decision underscores that arbitrators must be explicit about the
88
 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
89
 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
"See id.; see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 34 aa.6, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115 n.6.
91
 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763, 62 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032; see also Misco, 484
U.S. at 41, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3118.
92 See Chrysler Ill, 2 F.3d at 764, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
99 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
94 See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032-33.
95 See id.
96
 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
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actual impact they intend their reinstatement order to have. 97 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit's Chrysler III three-step approach can work only
when the arbitrator clearly states the rationale behind its award."
In conclusion, Chrysler III establishes that evidence presented to,
but not considered by, the arbitrator constitutes fresh evidence which
an employer may use to discharge an employee immediately, even
simultaneously, with reinstatement." This outcome represents an ex-
trapolation of the Chicago Newspaper Guild and Misco holdings.'" The
Chrysler III decision should encourage arbitrators to describe in detail
the bases of their conclusions and the specific meaning of their
award)°' The courts need explicit language to be able to accurately
enforce the intended effect of the award.m'After Chrysler III, employers
may use evidence presented, but not considered, by the arbitrator to
simultaneously reinstate and discharge an employee where the arbitra-
tion award fails to define what constitutes reinstatement)"
IV. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr
A. *Local Government May Implement Compensatory Time Scheme
Under Fair Labor Standards Act Without Reaching Agreement with
Employees' Union: Moreau v. Klevenhagen 1
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or "Act") of 1938 requires
an employer to pay an employee who works more than forty hours in
any given week overtime pay at a rate at least one and one-half times
the rate at which that employee is regularly paid.' Public employers
were originally exempt from the Act.' Today, public employers are fully
97
 See id.; see also Chicago Newspaper Guild, 747 F.2d 1153, 1156, 117 L.R.R.M. 2937, 2939 (7th
Cir. 1984) (the court determined that the employer's letter simultaneously reinstating and laying
off the employee failed to comply with the arbitration award which clearly indicated that rein-
statement required the employer to return the employee to the payroll even if his former job no
longer existed).
98 See Chrysler III, '2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1032-33.
" See id. at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.




1 °3 See Chrysler III, 2 F.3d at 763-64, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1032.
* By Seema Nanda, Staff Member, BOSTON Cou,EGE Law REviEw.
1 113 S. CL 1905, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d 569 (1993).
2 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1) (1988).
3 Id. See Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 134, 29 Wage & Hour Gas. 609, 6)0
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1016 (1990). Section 207(a) (1)
as originally enacted applied to "any employees who in any workweek [are] engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce for a workweek ...." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
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subject to the Act with one special provision,` According to
207(o) (2) (A) (i) public employers may provide compensatory time
off or "comp" time in lieu of overtime pay if the employees agree to
the substitution according to specified provisions. 5
The FLSA as passed in 1938 did not cover employees of state and
local governments. 5
 In 1966, however, Congress amended the Act to
cover certain government employees, including certain school, hospi-
tal, and nursing home employees. 7
 In 1974, Congress again amended
the FLSA to extend its coverage to nearly all employees of state and
local governments, thus holding public employers to the same stand-
ards as private employers. 8
After limiting states' labor practice decision making with the 1966
and 1974 amendments, Congress changed course in 1985 by amending
the FLSA to enable states to provide comp time in lieu of overtime
4 29 U.S.C. § 207(0)(2) (A) (1988). Section 207(o) (2) (A) reads in pertinent part:
A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (I) only-
(A) pursuant to (i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement,
memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public
agency and representatives of such employees; or (ii) in the case of employees not
covered by subclause (i), an agreement or understanding arrived at between the
employer and employee before the performance of work
Id.
5 Id.
6 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); See Abbott, 879 F.2d at 134, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 610.
7
 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, § 102(a), (b), 80 Stat. 830, 831. The United
Stales Supreme Court upheld the expansion of the Act in Maryland v. Wirtz, where the State of
Maryland, joined by 27 other states brought action against the Secretary of Labor to enjoin the
enforcement of the Act as applied to school and hospital workers. 392 U.S. 183, 187, 198-99
(1968). The Court reasoned that Congress was acting under its Commerce Clause powers and,
thus, upheld the extension of § 207. Id. at 194, 198-90.
"Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, § 6(a) (1) & (6), Pub. L. No, 93-259, 88 Stat.
55, 58, 60. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the United States Supreme Court overturned
Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress authority to
prescribe the labor practices of it state's own government agencies. National League of Cities v.
Usury, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 855 (1976). See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194. In National League of Cities, a
number of cities and slates brought suit against the U.S. Secretary of Labor challenging the
validity of the 1974 Amendments. 426 U.S. at 839. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, reasoned that
the Tenth Amendment limits Congress's power to regulate a state's governing of traditional state
activities. Id. at 842, 845. Thus, the Court held ihat Congress's extension of the PISA to states
was unconstitutional. Id. at 852. In 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Supreme Court overturned National League of Cities and held that local transit municipal
employees are entitled to the protection of the ELSA. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 531, 555-56 (1985). See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. The Court
reasoned that drawing distinctions between purely local functions that should be left to states
and other functions subject to federal regulation conflicts with the ideals ofAmerican federalism.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-48. Thus, the Court concluded that requiring the transit authority to
comply with the FLSA does not violate either state sovereignty or the Constitution. Id. at 554.
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payments in certain situations.9
 Under § 207(o) (2) (A) of the Act,
public employers can provide comp time pursuant to one of two
provisions: subclause (i) enables employers to provide comp time pur-
suant to a collective bargaining agreement or any other agreement
between the employer and the representatives of the employees;"
subclause (ii), which can only be invoked when employees are not
covered by subclause (i), allows employers to provide comp time when
employees individually agree to such compensation before they begin
work."
The federal circuit courts soon disagreed about the scope of
subclause (i)'s coverage.' 2 Subclause (i) could be read as covering only
those employees who had reached an "agreement" with their em-
ployer." Thus, under the above interpretation, employees would not
be covered if they never had a representative, or if they had a legal
representative but that representative failed to reach agreement with
the employer. 14
 Alternatively, subclause (i) could be read as covering
all employees who have a representative, regardless of whether that
representative had reached an agreement or even whether or not the
representative has the legal authority to enter into agreements."
Attempting to interpret § 207(o) (2) (A), federal courts resorted to
the statute's legislative history." Senate Report 159 states that when
employees do not have a "recognized representative," the employer
can proceed directly to subclause (ii) and make individual agreements
with individual employees.' 7
 House Report 331, however, indicates that
the employees' representative "need not be a formal or recognized
collective bargaining agent" as long as the employees have selected that
9 `29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2)(A).
I° Id.
12
 See, e.g., Dillard v. Harris, 885 F.2d 1549, 1553, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1520, 1522-23 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1632 (1990); Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135,
29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 611; International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. West Adams City Fire
Protection Dist., 877 F.2d 814, 817-18, 29 Wage & Hour Gas. 542, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1989).




16 See, e.g., Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1553, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1522-23; Abbott, 879 F.2d at
135, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 611; International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 817-18, 29 Wage
& Hour Cas. at 544-45.
I 7 S. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 651, 658.
Senate Report 159 states in pertinent part, "where employees do not have a recognized repre-
sentative, the agreement of understanding must be between the employer and the individual
employee." M
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representative."' The Department of Labor regulation ("DOL Regula-
tion"), which implements § 207(o), adopted the position of House
Report 331, using nearly identical language."' On the other hand, in
the Discussion of Major Comment accompanying the regulation, the
Secretary of Labor recognized that different states would define an
employees' "representative" differently, and stated the Department's
intention to allow states to define "representative" for purposes of
§ 207(o) (2)(A)."
In June of 1989, in International Association of Fire Fighters, Local
2203 v. West Adams City Fire Protection District, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that an employer had to reach
agreement under subclause (i) or pay overtime because its employees
had designated a representative. 2 ' The court determined that the em-
ployer's refusal to recognize the representative did not permit the
employer to bypass subclause (i). 22 In International Association of Fire
Fighters, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2203
("Local 2203") represented a group of fire fighters who worked for the
West Adams County Fire Protection District ("District")." Local 2203
attempted to negotiate overtime pay with the District, but when the
parties did not reach an agreement, the District continued its practice
of providing comp time only. 24 The Tenth Circuit determined that the
language of § 207(o) (2) (A) (i) is ambiguous in that it is unclear
whether "employee not covered in subclause (i)" refers to employees
that do not have a representative or employees that do not have an
agreement with the employer." The court noted that Senate Report 159,
by describing a "recognized representative," contradicted House Re-
18 FIR Rio', No. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985). House Report 331 states in pertinent
part: 'Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal or recognized
collective bargaining agent. as long as it is a representative designated by the employees, the
agreement or understanding must be between the representative and the employer." Id.
19 29 C.F.R. 553.23(b) (1) (1093). The Department of Labor regulation, supporting the view
of the House, states, in pertinent part, "In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement
applicable to the employees, the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining
agent as long as the representative is designated by the employees." Id.
20 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments,
52 Fed. Reg. 2012, 2014-15 (1987). The Secretary of Labor states, in pertinent part: "The
Department recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be pertinent in this area.
It is the Department's intention that the question of whether employees have a representative
for purposes of FLSA section 1207(0)1 shall he determined in accordance with State or local law
and practices." Id.
21 International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 E2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 547.
22 Id,
23 Id, at 816, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 543.
24 Id .
25 Id. at 816-17, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 544. See 29	 § 207(o) (2) (A) (1988).
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port 331 and the DOL Regulation. 26 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that in light of the DOL Regulation and House Report 331, both
stating that the representative need not be formal or recognized,
employees are represented if they merely designate a representative,
even if the employer fails to recognize that person. 27 The court, there-
fore, held that the employer must bargain according to subclause (i)
or pay overtime pursuant to the Act. 28
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in July,
1989, reached a different conclusion in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach. 29
In Abbott, the court held that when state law prohibits a state agency
from collectively bargaining with the union, the agency may enter into
individual agreements with employees pursuant to subclause (ii), with-
out reaching an agreement with a labor union." In Abbott, police
officers in the City of Virginia Beach could choose either comp time
or monetary compensation for each overtime shift worked 3' The po-
lice officers alleged that this practice violated § 207(o) because the City
had not bargained with the officers' designated representative." The
Abbott court reasoned that because the statute did not define the term
"representative," the court was required to look to legislative history
and administrative commentary." Upon examination of the legislative
history, the court noted that the DOL Regulation and House Report
331 indicated that the employer need not recognize the designated
representative for employees to be covered under subclause (i). 84 The
Abbott court, however, found more persuasive Senate Report 159 indi-
cating the need for a "recognized representative," and the comment
by the Secretary of Labor expressing the intent of § 207(o) to respect
state law." The court concluded that allowing public employers to
enter into individual agreements pursuant to subclause (ii) fulfilled
26
 International Ass'n of Fire Fighters,  877 F.2d at 819, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546. See S. RE".
No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10; H.R. REP. No. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20; 29 C.F.R.
§ 553.23(b) (I ).
27 International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546-47. See
H.R. Rap. No. 331; 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(b)(1).
28
 International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 547.
29 Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 136, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 609, 611-12 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1016 (1990). See International A55'71
of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 547.
"Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136-37, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 612.
51 Id. at 133, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 609.
52 Id.
33 Id. at 135, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 610.
54 Id. at 135, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 611. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text.
"Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 611-12. See supra notes 17, 20 and
accompanying text.
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the policy of § 207(o) in light of the legislative history and the regula-
tion S. 36
Following the Abbott decision, in September, 1989, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Dillard v.
Harris that when state law prohibits collective bargaining, employees
are not covered by subclause (i). 37 The Dillard court agreed with the
reasoning of the Abbott decision, but provided an alternative analysis. 38
In Dillard, Georgia state hospital workers had designated a repre-
sentative, but state law prohibited the employer from entering in-
to agreements with the representative. 3" The court interpreted
§ 207(o) (2) (A) (i) as meaning that an agreement or understanding
between the representative and the employer was a prerequisite to
subclause (i) coverage.'" The court reasoned that without any stated
disagreement or consensus among the Houses of Congress, the plain
meaning of the statute controls.'" The court concluded that subclause
(i) unambiguously refers to "representative employees," and because
Georgia law prohibits collective bargaining, subclause (i) cannot ap-
ply." Thus, the Court held that the employer could enter into individ-
ual agreements with the hospital workers over comp time."'
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Moreau v. Klevenhagen, resolved the controversy among the federal
circuits over the scope of subclause (i)'s coverage."' The Supreme
Court unanimously held that subclause (i) covers employees with a
designated representative who has the legal authority to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement with the employer permitting the use
of comp time."' The Court reasoned that this interpretation accords
adequate significance to both the term "agreement" in subclause (i)
and "employee" in subclause (ii). 46 Under Moreau, therefore, the ern-
38 Abbott, 879 F.2d at 137, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 612.
37
 Dillard v. Harris, 885 E2c1 1549, 1556, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1632 (1990).
38 Id. at 1552, 29 Wage & Hour Gas. at 1522. See Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136, 29 Wage & Hour
Cas. at 612.
39 Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1551-52, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1521-22.
40 M. at 1552, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1522.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1554, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1524. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2)(A) (1988).
43 Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1556, 29 Wage & Flour Cas. at 1525.
44 Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905, 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d 569, 574 (1993).
See, e.g., Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1553, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1523; Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135, 29 Wage
& Hour Cas, at 611; International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. West Adams City Fire Protection Dist.,
877 F.2d 814, 817, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1989).
45 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Flour Cas. 2d at 574.
46 Id. at 1911, I Wage Sc Hour Cas. 2d at 573. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A).
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ployees' representative does not have to be recognized by the em-
ployer, but the representative must have the legal authority to enter
into an agreement over comp time.47
The plaintiff in Moreau represented approximately 400 deputy
sheriffs and served as president of the Harris County Deputy Sheriffs
Union ("Union"). 48
 For several years, the Union represented the sher-
iffs of Harris County, Texas, ("County") in matters such as processing
grievances and handling workers' compensation claims.° Texas law,
however, prohibited the Union from entering into collective bargain-
ing agreements with the County. 5° Each employee, therefore, signed
his own employment agreement.5 ' The agreements included a refer-
ence to the County regulation stating that the deputies would receive
one and one half hours of comp time for each hour of overtime
worked. 52
In 1986, the Union brought action against the County alleging
that the county had violated § 207(o) (2) (A) by paying comp time in
lieu of overtime pay without an agreement with the Union.° The
Union claimed to be the sheriffs' designated representative under
subclause (i), and thus, maintained that the County was precluded
from entering into individual agreements with its employees pursuant
to subclause (ii). 54
 The County contended that the Act unambiguously
permitted individual agreements pursuant to subclause (ii) whenever
47
 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 574.
45 1d. at 1909, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 571.
99 Id.
Sold.  See Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c § 1 (West 1947). Section I of the Texas law
reads, in pertinent part:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State of Texas for any official or
group of officials ... of the State, to enter into a collective bargaining contract with
a labor organization respecting the wages, hours, or conditions of employment of
public employees, and any such contracts entered into after the effective date of
this Act shall be null and void.
Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c.
51
 Moreau, 113 S. CL at 1909, I Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 571.
52 Id. at 1909, 1 Wage & Flour Cas. 2d at 571-72.
53 1d. at 1909, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572. The Union also alleged that the County had
wrongly failed to include longevity pay and certain firearms qualifications in computing overtime
hours. Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 956 12.2d 516, 520-21, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. 1438, 1441-43 (5th
Cir. 1992), affil, 113 S. Ct. 1905 (1993). The District Court granted summary judgment for the
County on both claims. Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1909, n.12, 1 Wage Sc Hour Cas. 2d at 572, n.12.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect the longevity claim and remanded with respect to
the firearms claim. Moreau, 956 F.2d at 520-23, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1441-44. Neither claim
was at issue before the Supreme Court. Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1909, n.12, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
at 572, n.12.
Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1909, I Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572.
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public employees do not have a collective bargaining agreement with
their employer.•
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted summary judgment for the County. 56 The district court rea-
soned that normally, the designation of a union representative alone
would render subclause (i) applicable, even absent public employer
recognition of the representative; but the fact that Texas law prohibited
collective bargaining rendered subclause (i) inapplicable." Alterna-
tively, the district court reasoned that subclause (i) did not cover the
Union because it was not a "recognized" representative. 58 Accordingly,
the district court held that the employer did not have to bargain with
the representative of the employees pursuant to subclause (i)."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
relying largely on Abbott and Dillard. 6° The court reasoned that "em-
ployees not covered" in subclause (ii) referred to employees who did
not have an agreement with their employer as opposed to employees
who did not have a representative. 6' Therefore, because Texas law
prohibited the county from ever entering into a bilateral agreement,
whether the bargaining agent is a Union forming a collective bargain-
ing agreement or not, the court found that subclause (i) could not be
applicable. 62 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the County did not have
to bargain with the representative pursuant to subclause (i), and could
proceed directly to individual contracts under subclause (ii) . 6s
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because
the employees' representative did not have the legal authority to ne-
gotiate and agree with the employer on the use of comp time, the
employer did not have to bargain pursuant to subclause (i). 64 The
Court reasoned that such a reading accords adequate significance to
both the words "agreement" in subclause (i) and "employee" in sub-




Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1910, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572.
69
 Moreatt, 956 F.2d at 519-20, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1440-41. See Dillard v. Harris, 885
F.2d 1549, 1552, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989), cell. denied, 498 U.S. 878, 29
Wage & Hour Cas. 1632 (1990); Abbott v. City or Virginia Reach, 879 F.2d 132, 135, 29 Wage &
Hour Cas. 609, 610 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051, 29 Wage & Flour Cas. 1016 (1990).
6 / Moreau, 956 F.2d at 520, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. at. 1441. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A)
(1988).
62 Moreau, 956 F.2d at 520, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1441.
63 Id.
64 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
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clause (ii). 65 The Court further reasoned that such an interpretation
accords significance to the hierarchy of § 207(o), which favors sub-
clause (i) agreements over the individual agreements of subclause
00.66 Accordingly, the Court held that the employees' representative
need not be recognized by the employer as long as that person has the
legal authority to bargain with the employer. 67
The Supreme Court in Moreau began its discussion by pointing
out the one proposition that neither party disputed: subclause (ii)
authorizes individual agreements only when employees are not cov-
ered by subclause (i). 68 Thus, the Court attempted to identify the
employees that subclause (i) intended to cover. 69 The Court noted,
however, that this determination was problematic because subclause
(i) does not purport to define a category of employees, but a category
of agreements. 7°
The Court examined the County's argument that the shift in the
subject of the clauses must mean that "employees" in subclause (i)
refers only to those employees who are bound by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 71 The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. 72
First, citing International Association of Firefighters, the Court pointed
out that grammatically, the reference in subclause (ii) to "employees"
remained unmodified by subclause (i)'s focus on "agreement," and
thus, subclause (ii) could just as easily refer to employees with agree-
ments as employees with representatives." Second, the Court noted
that, under the County's argument, employees would have virtually no
power with regard to subclause (i) because the employer need only
reject any proposed "agreement" to reach subclause (5). 74 The Court
reasoned that if Congress had intended such an open-ended authori-
zation of comp time, it would have written the Act more simply, without
attempting to limit the use of individual agreements."
After rejecting the County's argument, the Court scrutinized the
Union's argument that "employees . . . covered by subclause (i)" re-




68 Id. at 1910, 1 Wage & Hour Cat. 2d at 572.
69 Moreau, 113 S. CL at 1910, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572.
70 Id. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas, 2d at 572.
71 Id. at 1910-11, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
7.2 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2)(A)
(1088).
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whether that representative had the authority to enter into any sort of
agreement.'" The Court rejected the Union's interpretation as implau-
sible.'" On the one hand, the employer could not make individual
agreements pursuant to subclause (ii) because the employee had des-
ignated a representative." On the other hand, the employer could not
bargain according to subclause (1) because bargaining with a Union is
prohibited by Texas law. 79
 Thus, under the Union's analysis, the em-
ployer would have to pay overtime because the employer could never
reach subclause (ii), and state law precluded the use of subclause (i). 80
The Moreau Court held that the phrase "employees ... covered
by subclause (i)" referred to employees with a designated represen-
tative who had the authority to negotiate, collectively bargain, and
reach agreement with the employer over comp time."' The Court
reasoned that this intermediate reading of the statute was consistent
with the most reasonable reading of the DOL Regulation." 2 While the
DOL Regulation statement that "the representative need not be a
formal or recognized bargaining agent" could support the Union's
argument, the Court found this interpretation implausible because
representatives without the authority to bargain could preclude states
from ever using comp time." The Court accorded greater weight to
the comment of the Secretary of Labor, which indicated that courts
should defer to state law on the issue of whether states have a repre-
sentative."
The Court reasoned that the Act and the DOL Regulation are
in harmony." Employees are covered under subclause (i) when they
designate a representative who has the authority to bargain."' Under
the statute, such authority is necessary to reach an agreement."' Under
the DOL Regulation, such authority is a condition of representative
status."" Thus, the Court held that the employees in Moreau did not
have a representative authorized to enter into an agreement with the
employer regarding the use of comp time, and, therefore, the cm-
7° Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A).




81 Id. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A).
82 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
" Id. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Gas. 2d at 573-74. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(b) (1) (1993).
84 Moreau, 1 13 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 574. See Application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments, 52 Fed. keg. 2012, 2014-15 (1987).
85
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ployer was entitled to go directly to subclause (ii) and come to agree-
ment with individual employees."
The Moreau Court concluded that in order for employees to
be covered under subclause (i), they must have a designated repre-
sentative who has the legal authority to enter into agreements with the
employer over the use of comp time." Even if the employer failed to
recognize the representative, the employees could still be covered. 9 '
The Court reasoned that because Texas law prohibited the employer
from collectively bargaining, however, the employees were not covered
under subclause (i) because the ability to enter into agreements is a
prerequisite to - being a representative.92
In Moreau, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved the
ambiguity over the coverage of § 207 (o) (2) (A)." The Moreau Court,
however, analyzed the problem differently than those federal circuits
that had previously addressed the issue." The Court found its reading
of the statute the only plausible one in light of the implications of
alternative readings. 95 The reading of the Tenth Circuit in International
Association of Firefighters, finding employees covered by subclause (i) if
they simply designated a representative, would enable a Union, by
virtue of its legal inability to enter into agreements with a State agency,
to circumscribe § 207(o) (2) (A) entirely." In effect, the Union would
be in a better position because of the state law prohibition. 97 On the
other hand, the interpretations of Abbott and Dillard, finding employ-
ees covered under subclause (i) only when their representative has
an agreement with the employer, would circumscribe any bargaining
power a Union may have." The employer could simply refuse to enter
into an "agreement" and thus, the employer could proceed to sub-
clause (ii) in all cases." The above interpretations would render
89 Id.
90 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
91
 Id. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
92 1d. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Gas. 2d at 574.
93 See id. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
94 Id. at 1910, 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 572-73; Dillard v. Harris, 885 F.2d 1549, 1553,
29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878, 29 Wage & Hour
Cas. 1632 (1990); Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 609,
611 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. 1016 (1990); International
Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. West Adams City Fire Protection Dist., 877 F.2d 814, 817, 29 Wage & Hour
Cas. 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1989).
95
 Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
96 See International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546-47.
97 See Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573; International Ass'n of Fire
Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546-47.
93 See Moreau, 113 S. CL at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573; Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1556,
29 Wage & Hour Gas. at 1525; Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 611.
"See Moreau, 113 S. CL at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 574.
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§ 207(o) (2) (A) moot.'" While the legislative history is ambiguous,
neither Congress nor the Secretary of Labor could have wanted to give
one party, either union or management, the exclusive power to deter-
mine when subclause (i) will be applicable.'"'
The balancing test used in Abbott and International Association of
Firefighters, weighing Senate Report 159 and the comment by the Sec-
retary of Labor on the one hand and House Report 331 and the DOL
Regulation on the other, inevitably led to divergent results among the
federal circuits. 1 °2 The Eleventh Circuit, in Dillard, attempted to allevi-
ate this problem by simply asserting that the Act unambiguously re-
quires an "agreement" when in reality, the Act lends itself to other
interpretations.'" The circuit courts failed to look beyond the facts
of their cases to the policy behind the Act.' 04 Congress created
§ 207(o) (2) (A) to provide states that could not necessarily afford to
pay overtime with limited flexibility in choosing an alternative, pro-
vided their employees agreed to it, either through a representative or,
alternatively, through individual employees.'" By looking at the impli-
cations of various interpretations, rather than attempting to draw con-
clusions from contradictory House and Senate Reports, the Supreme
Court has more thoroughly resolved the issue than previous courts. 116
While the Moreau decision turned on the fact that Texas law prohibited
the Union from ever legally entering into agreements with the County,
the Court's analysis prevents states without such laws from circumvent-
ing subclause (i) and going directly to subclause (ii) by simply never
reaching agreement with the Union.' 07 Moreau will likely prevent future
divergent results among the circuit courts.'"
The Moreau decision enables courts to consistently and logically
interpret § 207(o) (2) (A), but the decision also provides states with the
power to render § 207(o) (2) (A) practically moot.'" States can simply
pass laws making it illegal to bargain or reach agreement with the
Ici° See Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1556, 29 Wage & Hour Cas, at 1525; Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136, 29
Wage & Hour Cas. at 611; International Ass'n of Fire Fightem, 877 17.2r1 at 820, 29 Wage & Hour
Cas. at 546-47.
1 ° 1 See S. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 651,
658; H.R. REP. No. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985). 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(h)(1) (1993).
102 See Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 610; International Ass'n of Fire Fighters,
877 E2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546-47.
1 °3 See Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1552, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1522.
164 See id. at 1553, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1523; Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135, 29 Wage & Hour
Cas. at 610; International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 877 F.2d at 820, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 546-47.
1 °5 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A) (1988).
166 See Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
1 °7 See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (o) (2)(A); Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 574.
1 °2 See Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
1 °2 See id.
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employees' representative."° When states have such laws, public em-
ployers can proceed directly to subclause (ii), making agreements with
employees individually before the commencement of work. ] " Since an
unhired employee has virtually no bargaining power, an employee
would likely always agree to the comp time provision." 2 The practical
effect of Moreau leaves employees at the mercy of their state legisla-
tures."3 Although Moreau does not create new law, the decision does
point out that § 207(o) (2) (A) is a severe cutback on the 1966 and 1972
Amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act that made the Act appli-
cable to public employees. 114
The Supreme Court in Moreau resolved the ambiguity over the
scope of employees covered in § 207(o) (2) (A) (i) by holding that em-
ployees must have a designated representative, and that representative
must have the authority to negotiate and agree with the employer
on provisions of a collective bargaining agreement regarding comp
tirne. 115 The Court has left states the freedom to create law circumvent-
ing subclause (i). 115 States, however, without laws prohibiting public
employers from entering agreements cannot circumvent subclause (i)
by refusing to enter into agreements or refusing to recognize the
employees' representative." 7 The Supreme Court decision enables
courts to follow a consistent policy without attempting to interpret a
murky legislative history." 8
V. PREEN PTION
A. *NLRA Does Not Preempt an Otherwise Lawful Prehire Agreement
When the Stale Acts as Market Participant: Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors'
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") entrusting the nation's labor policy to a centralized federal
11 ° See, e.g., Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1553, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 15'23; Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135,
29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 610.
"'See, e.g., Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1552, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. at 1522.
112 See id.
113 See Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1911, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
116 see id.
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A) (1988).
113 See Moreau, 113 S. Ct. at 1912, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d at 573.
* By Brian P. Keane, Staff Member, BOSTON Co1.1.EcE LAw
1 113 S. Ct. 1190, 142 L.R.R.M. 2649 (1993),
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agency. 2 By acting in this area, Congress effectively preempted most
state regulation of industrial relations.' Since the NLRA's passage, the
United States Supreme Court has articulated two distinct preemption
principles.' The first of these principles, the Garmon rule, protects the
primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
by forbidding state regulation of any activities that are either expressly,
or even arguably, prohibited or protected by the NLRA.' The second
preemption principle put forth by the Court, the Machinists preemp-
tion, prohibits state regulation in any area(s) that Congress left to the
control of free market forces.'
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, a 1959 case, the
United States Supreme Court addressed whether the NLRA precluded
a state court from awarding damages to an employer for economic
injuries resulting from peaceful picketing by labor unions that had not
been selected by employees as their agents.' The Court, noting that its
decision was based on preventing conflict between federal and state
policy, stated that Congress specifically entrusted the administration of
labor policy to the NLRB.' Accordingly, the Court held that if a labor
issue even arguably falls under the auspices of the NLRA, the state is
preempted from acting.' Thus, the Garman Court concluded that it
was beyond the scope of the state court's jurisdiction to declare the
union's activities an unfair labor practice and award damages.'"
In 1976, in Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion, the United States Supreme Court articulated the second preemp-
tion principle, concluding that a state labor commission can not des-
ignate a concerted refusal by a union and its members to work
overtime as an unfair labor practice." The employer in Machinists filed
a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). See also Wisconsin Dep't of Indus.,
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289-90,12 I L.R.R.M. 2737, 2740 (1986).
3 Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
4 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 748, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569, 2579
(1985).
5
 hl. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 294-45, 246, 43
L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841, 2842 (1959). The NLRB is the federal agency charged by Congress with the
task of hearing, adjudicating and enforcing issues under the NLRA. See id. at 245, 119 L.R.R.M.
at 2842.
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 749-50, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2579-80. See alto Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883-84 (1976).
7
 359 U.S. at 237-38, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2838-39.
8 Id. at 242, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2890.
Id. at 245, 43 1...R.R.M. at 2842.
1 ° Id. at 246, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2842.
" 427 U.S. at 155, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2889.
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arguing that the union activity was an unfair labor practice." The
commission ruled that the union's refusal to work overtime constituted
an unfair labor practice.' 3 In response to the union's contention that
the commission lacked jurisdiction over the labor issue, the commis-
sion stated that a refusal to work overtime is not an activity that is
arguably protected by the NLRA, and thus, the commission was not
preempted from asserting its jurisdiction. 14 The United States Supreme
Court reversed this ruling, noting that even if an action does not
specifically fall under the regulatory auspices of the NLRA, states are
not necessarily free to regulate." The Machinists Court held that Con-
gress intended that some activities, such as the use of peaceful eco-
nomic weapons in bargaining, be free from both federal and state
regulation, and subject only to the free play of market forces."
Applying the Garman preemption principle in 1986, in Wisconsin
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court held that the NLRA preempted a Wis-
consin debarment statute.' 7 The statute in question forbade state
agents from purchasing any product from any person or firm that had
violated the NLRA three times within a five-year period." The state
argued that the statute escaped preemption because it was an exercise
of the state's spending, rather than regulatory, power.'9 Accordingly,
the state urged that the Court create a "market participant" exception
to NLRA preemption. 2° The Court, however, applying the Garman rule,
held that the statute served plainly as a means of enforcing the NLRA,
and thus conflicted directly with the NLRB's jurisdiction. 2 '
In dicta, the Gould Court stated that because Congress acted
through the NLRA to entrust the administration of labor policy to the
NLRB, the use of a market participant argument by a state in a labor
issue may be altogether precluded. 22 The Court noted that because of
Congress's direct action in the labor area, spending activities that may
have been allowed under a Commerce Clause analysis are preempted
by the NLRA. 23 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to
12 Id. at 135, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
19 Id.
14 Id,
15 Id. at 149, 155, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2887, 2889.
in Machinisls, 427 U.S. at 150, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2887-88.
17 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
113 Id. at 283-84, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
19 Id. at 287, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
20 Id. at 289, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
21 Id. at 288, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
22 See Gould, 475 U.S. at 289-90, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
23 1d. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
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allow states to interfere with the "interrelated federal scheme of law,
remedy and administration" under the NLRA by acting through their
spending power."
The Court also stated, however, that in some instances a state's
purchasing decisions can be influenced by labor considerations. 25 The
Court noted that some state spending powers may be of such a periph-
eral concern to the NLRA or so deeply rooted in local interest that
preemption should not be inferred. 26 In any event, the Gould Court
based its holding on the conclusion that the Wisconsin statute was a
remedial regulation that directly conflicted with the Gannon principle
protecting the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB over NLRA issues. 27
Thus, because the market participant discussion appeared only in
dicta, the issue was left unresolved. 28
During the Survey year, the market participant question was an-
swered by the United States Supreme Court in Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors [hereinafter
BCTC]. 29 The BCTC Court held that the NLRA did not preempt en-
forcement by a state authority acting as the owner of a construction
project of an otherwise lawful prehire bargaining agreement." The
Court reasoned that the state organization entered into the lawful
agreement as a private purchaser, not as a state entity attempting to
regulate within the realm of the NLRA.s' Accordingly, the Court deter-
mined that enforcement of the agreement was not preempted and
established a market participant exception to NLRA preemption analy-
sis. 32
The BCTC dispute arose following a 1985 ruling in the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts holding the Massachusetts
Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") responsible for failing to pre-
vent the pollution of Boston Harbor." The district court in that case
ordered the MWRA to clean the harbor "without interruption." 34 In
24 Id.
25 Id. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
26 Id.
27 Could, 475 U.S. at 288, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
28 See generally id. at 289-91, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740-41.
25 l13 S. Ct. 1190, 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2655 (1993) (hereinafter Bat].
3° Id. at 1192, 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2650, 2655.
31 Id. at 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2655.
32 See id.
"Id. at 1192, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2650. See also United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1362-63 (D. Mass. 1985). The Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority ("MWRA”) is a state organization empowered by the legislature to provide water-supply
and sewerage services to eastern Massachusetts. ECM 113 S. Ct. at. 1192, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
34 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1192, 192 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
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the spring of 1988, the MWRA hired Kaiser Engineers, Inc. as the
project manager of the cleanup effort. 35
 In order to allow the project
to proceed without interruption, Kaiser negotiated a prehire bargain-
ing agreement with the Building and Construction Trades Council
("BCTC") ,36
Through this prehire agreement the MWRA sought to assure
worksite harmony, labor/management peace and labor stability over
the ten-year life of the project." The negotiated agreement provided
in part that BCTC was to be the exclusive bargaining agent of all
employees, and that all employees would be subject to union security
provisions, including the requirement that they become union mem-
bers within seven days of employment.38
 The agreement also provided
that employees would not strike for at least ten years, and that all
contractors and subcontractors had to agree to be bound by the agree-
ment.39
Such prehire agreements are normally illegal under the NLRA. 4°
Due to certain conditions specific to the construction industry, how-
ever, Congress amended sections 8(e) and 8(f) of the NLRA in 1959
to allow these agreements.'" In enacting these amendments, Congress
35 M. at 1193, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
36 Id, at 1193, 142 L.R.R.M. at '1651.
/d, at 1193, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2650-51.
38 Id. at 1193, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2651.
39 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1193, 142 L.R.R.M. at '1651.
°National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1988).
41 Bc7
.1...,`" 113 S. Ct. at 1198, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(e) & (f) (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement
entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void: Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall apply
to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be clone at the site
of construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure or other work
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer engaged primarily in
the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees
engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and
construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction
employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice) because .. .
(2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such
labor organization ..., or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such
labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives
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focused on the short term nature of construction employment which
makes post-hire bargaining difficult, the main contractors' need for
predictable costs and a steady supply of skilled labor, and the long
standing custom of such conduct in the industry. 42
The MWRA approved and adopted the negotiated agreement in
1989 and incorporated it as a bid specification into its solicitation for
bids." In March of 1990, however, the Associated Builders and Con-
tractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island ("ABC"), an organization that
represents non-union construction workers, brought several state and
federal claims." Among these claims was the charge that the MWRA,
as a state organization, was preempted from acting within the federal
area of labor relations."
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected the
claims of ABC, and denied a preliminary injunction enjoining the
solicitation for bids." Addressing the NLRA claim of preemption the
district court found that the harbor cleanup was a construction project,
and concluded that the use of such prehire agreements in the con-
struction industry is permitted by sections 8(e) and 8(f) of the NLRA. 47
The district court added that any effect the agreement may have had
on NLRA bargaining conduct was outweighed by the local importance
of a smooth, efficient clean-up effort."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the
district court's decision." The First Circuit reasoned that the state's
intrusion into the labor arena was "all-pervasive," effectively eliminat-
ing the bargaining process altogether. 5° Accordingly, the First Circuit
concluded that the NLRA preempted the agreement. 5 t
such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such em-
ployment	 .
42 Bcrc, 113 S. Ct. at 1198, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
45 1d.
" Id. at 1193.-94, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2651. Other than preemption under the NLRA, the original
complaint by the Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island ("ABC")
also alleged preemption under § 514(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, conspiracy to reduce competition in violation of the Sherman Act and various state-law
claims, Id.
45 Id.
46 Associated Builders v. MWRA, 135 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2716 (1st. Cir. 1990) (hereinafter Asso-
dated Builders II. The district court rejected all of ABC's claims. Id. at 2721, The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in reversing, however, felt that. the NLRA preemption issue was dispositive.
Id. Thus, that decision and all subsequent decisions have dealt only with NLRA preemption, Id.




51 Associated Builders 1, 135 L.R.R.M at 2719.
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The BCTC petitioned for an en. banc rehearing, arguing that the
MWRA entered into the agreement as a market participant to further
proprietary, rather than regulatory, interests, and thus it fell within a
preemption exception articulated by the Supreme Court in Gould."
Although the petition was granted, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit again held that the agreement was preempted by the NLRA
under both the Garmon rule and the Machinists preemption.° Address-
ing the question of a proprietary interest exception to NLRA preemp-
tion, the court concluded that the Supreme Court merely alluded to
such an exception in Gould, but had never applied it to NLRA preemp-
tion."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
First Circuit's decision and held that the NLRA did not preempt the
MWRA from enforcing the prehire agreement. 55 The Court reasoned
that the MWRA entered into the lawful agreement as a market partici-
pant, with no regulatory intentions." Accordingly, the Court deter-
mined that the agreement did not infringe upon the NLRB's jurisdic-
tion. 57 The Court further concluded that the MWRA was not
attempting to regulate in an area that Congress left to the control of
market forces. 58 Thus, the Court held that the state action was preemp-
ted by neither the Garman rule nor the Machinists principle."
The Supreme Court began its discussion by examining what NLRA
preemption of state law actually means." The Court stated that such
52 Associated Builders v. MWRA, 935 F.2d 345, 349, 137 L.R.R.M. 2'249, 2252 (1st Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Associated Builders II).
53 Id. at 355, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2257.
54 Id. In a dissenting opinion, however, ChiefJudge Breyer, joined by Judge Campbell, argued
that the intent of Congress is the paramount focus of a preemption analysis, and Congress had
explicitly authorized prehire bargaining agreements between private parties in the construction
industry. Id. at 361, 137 L.R.R.M at 2261 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Because the MWRA was effectively
acting as a private purchaser of construction services, the dissent argued that the MWRA's actions
did not conflict with the NLRA. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Judge Breyer stressed that the Could
Court, when considering the state purchasing question, carefully considered the nature of the
action and emphasized the lack of any legitimate relation between the Wisconsin statute and the
state's proprietary interest. M. at 365, 137 L.R.R.M at 2264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In doing so,
the dissent concluded, the Court based its decision on the finding that the state was not
functioning as a private purchaser rather than on the basis that no market participant exception
exists at all for NLRA preemption. Id. at 365, 137 L.R.R.M at 2265 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55 Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113 S. Ct.
1190, 1194, 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2652, 2655 (1993).




111 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1196, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
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preemption means only that a state is prevented from "regulating"
within the NLRA protected zones of the Machinists and Garmon prin-
ciples." The Court maintained, however, that merely because a state
acts within one of these zones does not necessarily indicate that the
state has performed a regulatory function. 62
The Court rejected ABC's contention that Gould subjects a state
to NLRA preemption principles regardless of whether the state is
acting as a proprietor or a regulator.° The Court explained that the
Gould decision indicated only that the Wisconsin statute at issue, al-
though arguably proprietary in a sense, was not related to the contrac-
tual spending power of the state." Consequently, the state was not
functioning as a private purchaser.° The debarment statute in Gould,
the BCTC Court explained, was clearly an attempt by the state to
enforce the NLRA by remedial action, and thus, it was in direct conflict
with the Garman rule.66 The BCTC Court added that Gould emphasized
that in some circumstances state purchasing decisions could be in-
fluenced by labor considerations. 67
Finally, the BCTC Court concluded that its decision was consistent
not only with NLRA preemption principles but also with the legislative
goals of Congress in enacting the construction industry exceptions in
sections 8(e) and 8(f) of the NLRA, allowing such prehire agree-
ments.68
 The Court noted that Congress enacted sections 8(e) and 8(f)
in order to accommodate conditions specific to the construction in-
61 Id.
62 Id. The Court explained, "[w] hen a State owns and manages property, for example, it must
interact with private participants in the marketplace. In doing so, the State is not subject to
preemption by the NLRA... Id.
63 Id. at 1196-97, 142 L.R.R.M. at '1653. In support of their contention, ABC relied on the
fbllowing passage fi-otn Could
Nothing in the NLRA, of course, prevents private purchasers from boycotting labor
law violators. But government occupies a unique position of power in our society,
and its conduct, regardless of form, is rightly subject to special restraints. Outside
the area of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is far from unusual for federal law
to prohibit States from making spending decisions in ways that are permissible for
private parties.. . . The NLRA, moreover, has long been understood to protect a
range of conduct against state but not private interference.... The act treats stale
action differently from private action not merely because they frequently take
different forms, but also because in our system States simply arc different from
private parties and have a different role to play.
let at 1196, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653 (quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740-41).
64 /d. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
66 Balt, 113 S. Ct. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
66 Id. at 1196, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
57 1d. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653-54, See also Gould, 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
68 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654. See supra note 41.
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dustry.69
 The Court explained that there was no reason to expect that
such conditions would change depending upon the public or private
nature of the party doing the construction." Thus, the Court deter-
mined, the intent of Congress is realized by the decision.''
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court held in Building
& Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors that
the NLRA did not preempt the MWRA, acting as owner of a construc-
tion, project, from enforcing an otherwise lawful prehire bargaining
agreement." In establishing this market participant exception to
NLRA preemption, the Court emphasized the difference between a
state acting as a private purchaser and a state acting with the intent to
regulate through its spending power." The BCTC Court held that the
MWRA was acting as a private purchaser, with no intent to regulate,
and thus, the market participant exception precluded preemption of
the agreement."
It is difficult to discern the precedent that the BCTC Court relies
upon to support its holding. The BCTC Court purports to rely heavily
on Gould to support its conclusion that a proprietary market partici-
pant exception exists in NLRA preemption." The Gould Court, how-
ever, specifically stated, "we cannot believe that Congress intended to
allow [s] tales to interfere with the interrelated federal scheme of law,
remedy, and administration, under the NLRA as long as they [states]
did so through exercise of the spending power." 7° The Gould Court
stated that if a proprietary exception existed at all, it would exist only
for spending powers that are of such a peripheral concern to the
NLRA, or of such local interest, that preemption should not be in-
ferred." At no point in its opinion did the BCTC Court contend that
the MWRA's actions escaped preemption because they were of a pe-
ripheral concern to the NLRA or were of extreme local interest." How
the Court could purport to rely so much on the Gould opinion, yet
ignore these arguments is illogical.
69
 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1198, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
70 Id. at 1198, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654-55.
71
 Id. at 1197-98, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
72 1d. at 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2655.
78 Id. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
74 BCTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2655.
75 See id. at 1196-97, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2653-54.
76 Gould, 475 U.S. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
"Id. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
78 See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text. The district court, on the other hand, stated
that the local interest of a speedy and efficient cleanup of Boston Harbor outweighed any NLRA
preemption. Associated Builders I, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
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It is not contended that the conclusion reached by the Court is
erroneous, but rather that the justifications offered by the Court lack
precedential support. The BCTC Court emphasized that its holding
was consistent with the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the
construction industry exceptions in sections 8(e) and 8(0 of the
NLRA, but the Court does not base its holding on this fact. 72 Instead
the BCTC Court grounds its decision in its assertion that the MWRA
was not acting as a regulator." In order to rectify the BCTC opinion
with past Supreme Court precedent, however, the opinion should not
have been based on the premise that the MWRA was not regulating,
but on the fact that they were acting within an area that Congress
intended to treat differently than other areas of the NLRA.
Congress has seen fit to authorize exceptions to the NLRA for the
construction industry because of certain conditions that are specific to
that industry.'" These exceptions are evidence that such conditions
serve to create an area of labor regulation within the construction
industry that is of such a peripheral concern to the NLRA and/or so
deeply entrenched in local interest that preemption should not be
inferred. Accordingly, the BCTC Court should have followed Gould by
finding that a proprietary interest exception existed for the MWRA
because Congress intended such prehire agreements in the construc-
tion industry to be considered as peripheral to the NLRA or of deep
local interest.
As a practical matter, the BCTC decision now allows any state or
municipality to act within the federal arena of labor relations. 82 As long
as the state action is clearly proprietary and not regulatory in purpose,
the state is free to function as any private purchaser would in the labor
industry." This is surely an advantage to states that wish to have control
over the labor relations of projects in which they are involved. It is not
clear, however, that the BCTC Court's decision is consistent with Con-
gress's intent in passing the NLRA. Until Congress says something to
the contrary, however, states are now free to engage in labor conduct
from which they were previously preempted. 84
79 IJCI'C, 113 S. Ct. at 1197-98, 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654-55.
8° Id. at 1199, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2655.
81 Id. at 1198, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654,
W2 See id. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at '2654.
85 Id.
B4 See I3CTC, 113 S. Ct. at 1197, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
472	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:349
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. * The Burden of Proof in Title VII Disparate Treatment Actions:
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.' More specifically, Congress
made it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because
of the employee's race.2 The practice of treating some employees less
favorably than other employees on the basis of unlawful criteria is
known as "disparate treatment."`' In Title VII disparate treatment cases,
an important issue is whether the factfinder's rejection of the articu-
lated reasons proffered by the employer for its actions is sufficient to
compel a judgment for the plaintiff.'
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a Title VII case must be given
a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons articulated
by the employer for its failure to rehire the plaintiff were in fact
pretextual.6 In McDonnell Douglas, Percy Green, an African-American
mechanic, was rejected when he applied for re-employment with
McDonnell Douglas on the ground that he had engaged in certain
illegal conduct.? In arriving at its decision, the Court set forth a tripar-
* By Howard E. Berkenblit, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 113 S. Ct. 2742, 62 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 96 (1993).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c 2(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or




4 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1514, 1519 n.15 (1977).
5 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA)
96, 98 (1993).
6 411 U.S. 792, 804, 805, 5 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 965, 970 (1973).
7 Id. at 794-96, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966. Green had worked for McDonnell
Douglas for approximately eight years when he was laid off as part of a general reduction in the
company's workforce. Id. at 794, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966. Green and others protested
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tite standard for the allocation of the burden of proof in Title VII
cases.' The first part of the tripartite standard required the plaintiff,
Green, to satisfy his burden of establishing a prima facie case for
discrimination.' Then, in response to the plaintiffs prima facie case
for discrimination, the employer, McDonnell Douglas, satisfied the
second prong of the tripartite standard by articulating some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejectiond° Finally, the
Court established the third prong of the tripartite standard which
required the Court to provide the Title VII plaintiff with an opportu-
nity to show that the reasons proffered by the defendant for the
plaintiffs rejection, while facially valid, were in fact pretextual. 1 ' The
Supreme Court held that Green had not had this opportunity, and thus
remanded the case to the district court for this determination.' 2
Then, in 1978, in Furnco Construction Corp, v. Waters, the United
States Supreme Court held that to satisfy the second prong of the
McDonnell Douglas tripartite standard, the employer need only articu-
late some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the applicant's re-
jection in order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case for employment
discrimination.' 3 In Furnco, three African-American bricklayers sued an
his original discharge and what they perceived to be racially motivated general hiring procedures
by stalling their cars on roads leading to the McDonnell Douglas plant. Id. Green was arrested
and subsequently fined for his involvement in obstructing traffic. Id. at 795, 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Gas. (BNA) at 966. Other illegal activities took place in which Green may have been involved. See
Md)onnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 795, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 966. Following these events,
Green applied for re-employment in response to an advertisement by McDonnell Douglas. Id. at
796, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966. Following his rejection, Green filed a formal complaint
with the EEOC including the charge that McDonnell Douglas had failed to rehire him because
of his race. Id. When this was unsuccessful, Green brought an action under Tide VII. See id. at
797, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966-67.
g See id. at 802-04, 5 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 969-70.
9 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) al 969. To establish a
prima facie case For discrimination, the plaintiff must show that 1) the plaintiff belongs to a
racial minority; 2) the plaintiff applied for a job for which he or she was qualified; 3) the plaintiff
was rejected, despite his or her qualifications and 4) the employer continued seeking other
applicants for the job after the plaintiff's rejection. Id,
19 Id. at 802-03, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969. McDonnell Douglas cited Green's
participation in illegal conduct against it as the legitimate cause for his rejection. Id. at 803, 5
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969.
II Id. at 804, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970.
12 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S, at 807, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 971.
13 438 U.S. 567, 578, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 1062, 1066 (1978) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 Fair &tip], Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 969). The employer did not have to
show that it used a special hiring procedure to maximize the number of minority employees. Id.
at 577-78, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1066. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25, 18 Fair Emir!. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 520, 521 (1978) (per curiam)
(holding that to rebut a plaintiff's prima fitcie case for discrimination, and therefore satisfy the
second prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard, the employer need only articulate some
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employer who had allegedly discriminated against them by not hiring
them on the basis of their race." The Court reasoned that the prima
facie case creates an inference of discrimination because the alleged
acts, in the absence of any explanation, are more likely than not based
on impermissible factors.° According to the Court, the employer must
be allowed some latitude, however, to introduce evidence bearing on
its motive, because a prima facie case is not equivalent to a finding of
fact.' The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit erred in requiring an employer to do more than articulate
legitimate reason for the employer's actions in order to rebut the
prima facie case of the plaintiff.' 7
In 1981, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the
United States Supreme Court clarified further the standard of proof
for the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite analysis. 18 In
a unanimous decision, the Burdine Court held that the employer bears
only the burden of producing evidence which explains clearly the
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, in order to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case for discrimination.' The Court held that at the
second prong of the tripartite standard the employer bears no burden
of persuading the court by a preponderance of evidence that its action
was actually motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." In
Burdine, a woman claimed that her termination by the defendant
employer was based on gender discrimination, in violation of Title
VII. 2 ' The Court reasoned that establishment of a prima facie case in
effect created a presumption that the employer unlawfully discrimi-
nated against the employee. 22
 According to the Court, when a pre-
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejection). The Sweeney Court reasoned that if the
burden was on the defendant to prove the absence of discriminatory motive, the third prong of
the tripartite standard, giving the plaintiff the opportunity to show the defendant's reasons to be
pretextual, would be superfluous. See id. at 24 n.1, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 521 n.l.
14 See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 569, 17 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1063.
Id. at 577, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (11NA) at 1066.
16
 Id. at 579-80, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1067.
17 See id. at 577-78, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1066.
18 See 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 25 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 113, 116 (1981).
19 See id.
20 Id. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116. See also Joan K. Fine, Standard for
Rebutting a Prima Facie Title VII Violation: Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
1980
-81 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 268, 268, 270 (1981).
21 Id. at 251, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 114.
22
 Id. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116. Also, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide in pertinent part:
[Al presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
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sumption of discrimination has been created, the defendant's rebuttal
is sufficient if it raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defen-
dant discriminated against the plaintiff." The Court stated that the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff."
According to the Burdine Court, if the defendant is successful in
rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case, the factual inquiry as to
whether the defendant's articulated reasons for its actions are pretex-
tual proceeds to a new level of specificity.25
 The Court noted that at
the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite analysis, after the
employer's rebuttal, the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating the prof-
fered reasons to be pretextual "merges" with the plaintiffs ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination. 25 The Court concluded that the plaintiff may
succeed in persuading the court that she has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination either directly by showing that a discriminatory
reason motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered reason is not credible. 27
In 1983, in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
the United States Supreme Court held that the presumption of dis-
crimination drops from the case once the defendant has successfully
rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case for discrimination." According
to the Court, following the defendant's rebuttal, the factfinder must
then decide the ultimate question of whether the defendant intention-
ally discriminated against the plaintiff." In Aikens, an African-American
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast
Fun. R. Evtii. 301.
23 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 116.
24 Id. at 253, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115.
25 Id. at 255, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 116.
26 See id. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
27 Id, The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit,
which required proof of legitimate reasons by a preponderance of evidence at the second stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, requiring that the evidence produced by the defendant only
be clear and "reasonably specific." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 259-60, 25 Fair Empl. Prat:. Gas.
(BNA) at 117, 118. Requiring only the articulation of reasonably specific reasons, and not proof
by a preponderance of the evidence at this second prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, will
suffice to rebut the inferences created by the plaintiff's prima facie case for discrimination, as
well as afford the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. See id. at 258, 25
Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 117.
28 See 460 U.S. 711, 715, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 609, 611 (1983).
29 1d. at 715, 31 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 611.
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employee of the United States Postal Service sued under Title VII after
allegedly being turned down for a promotion on the basis of his race."
The Court reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas tripartite standard was
never intended to be rigid or mechanized. 31
 According to the Athens
Court, after the employer has rebutted .
 the plaintiff's prima facie case
for discrimination, under the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine, the factfinder must then determine whether the em-
ployer's action was discriminatory. 32 The Court held that after evidence
has been presented to satisfy the first two prongs of the tripartite
standard, the factfinder must determine which party's explanation of
the employer's motivation it believes." The Supreme Court held that
the district court erred in requiring direct evidence of discriminatory
intent from the plaintiff when determining whether the employer had
discriminated against the plaintiff. 34
During the Survey year, in St. Mary's.
 Honor Center v. Hicks, the
United States Supreme Court addressed whether a rejection of the
employer's proffered reason for its actions requires a judgment for the
plaintiff. 35
 The Court held that a trier of fact's rejection of an em-
ployer's asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its chal-
lenged actions does not compel, though it may permit, judgment for
the plaintiff." Consequently, after Hicks, it is more difficult for Title
VII plaintiffs to succeed in the absence of tangible evidence of discrimi-
nation. 37
Melvin Hicks ("Hicks"), an African-American man, was a shift
commander at St. Mary's Honor Center ("St. Mary's"), a halfway house
operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human
Resources ("MDCHR"). 38
 After Hicks had enjoyed a satisfactory em-
ployment record for several years, MDCHR assigned new supervisors
to oversee his work." Thereafter, he was repeatedly and severely disci-
" Id. at 712, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 610.
31 Id. at 715, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611 (citing Furrier), 438 U.S. at 577, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1066),
" Id. at 715, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611.
" Athens, 460 U.S. at 716, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611, The Aikens Court appears
to have dropped the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite standard, when it implied
that the factfinder must base its decision on the evidence presented in the first two prongs. See
id.
94 1d. at 717, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611.
"St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA)
96, 98 (1993).
36 Id. at 2748-49, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100-01.
"See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
38 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
" Id.
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plined for rule violations by his subordinates, for failing to adequately
investigate a brawl, and for failing to ensure that his subordinates
signed a log book when using St. Mary's vehicles.° These events re-
sulted in his demotion and, following a threat to his immediate super-
visor, his discharge.'" As a result of these events, Hicks brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
alleging that St. Mary's had unlawfully discriminated against him in
violation of Title VII. 42
The District Court found for St. Mary's." The court concluded
that Hicks had satisfied the minimal requirements of a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas." Under the McDonnell Douglas tripartite
standard, the burden then fell on St. Mary's to rebut the presumption
of discrimination.45 St. Mary's introduced evidence of legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely the severity and the
accumulation of rules violations committed by Hicks." Under the final
prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Hicks was able to prove that
the reasons given by St. Mary's were pretextual. 47 The district court
found that Hicks was the only person disciplined for violations com-
mitted by his subordinates, while other shift commanders went unpun-
ished.48 The district court noted, however, that even though the plain-
tiff proved pretext, he still bore the ultimate burden of proving that
race was the determining factor in his employer's decision.° Accord-
ingly, the court found that even though Hicks had demonstrated that
he was being disciplined more harshly than his co-workers, it was not
clear that his race, as opposed to personal animus, was the motivation
behind the discipline. 50 Thus, the district court held in favor of St.




43 1-licks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1253, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA)
131, 139 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev d, 970 F.2d 487, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588 (8th Cir. 1992),
rett'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 96 (1993).
44 Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1249, 55 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 136. The court found a
prima facie case for discrimination was established because Flicks showed (1) that he was black,
(2) that he was qualified for his position, (3) that he was demoted from that position and
ultimately discharged and (4) that the position remained opened and was eventually filled by a
white man. Id. at 1249-50, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 136,




46 Hicks, 756 F. Stipp, at 1251, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 137.
50 Id. at 1251, 1252, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 137.
rt Id, at 1253, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 139.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. 52 The Eighth Circuit held
that once Hicks had presented evidence that St. Mary's proffered
reasons were pretextual, he was not required to present any additional
evidence of racial motivation." The court reasoned that because St.
Mary's was in no better position than if it had remained silent, Hicks
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 54
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals decision by holding that the plaintiff must
show not only that the employer's proffered reasons for its actions were
pretextual, but also that the real reason for the employer's action was
discriminatory." According to the Court, once the presumption of
discrimination has been rebutted with a legitimate reason proffered by
the employer for its actions, the McDonnell Douglas framework is no
longer relevant, and the presumption of discrimination is dropped
from the case. 56 Accordingly, the remaining question for the trier of
fact is whether the plaintiff has proven that the defendant has inten-
tionally discriminated against him because of his race. 57
The Court further held, however, that rejection of the defendant's
proffered reasons for its actions will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." A factfinder's disbelief of
a defendant's articulated reasons together with the elements of the
plaintiffs prima facie case may suffice to show discrimination." The
Court faulted the Eighth Circuit's holding that a rejection of the
proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff, reiterating that at
all times a Title VII plaintiff bears the "ultimate burden of persua-
sion."6° Therefore, according to the Court, a finding of pretext of the
employer's articulated, legitimate reasons does not automatically con-
stitute a finding of discrimination.61 The Court further reasoned that
52 Hicks v. St_ Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 493, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) 588,
593 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit directed the District Court to enter judgment for Hicks,
but remanded the case for further findings on the remaining issues, including damages. Id.
53 Id. at 493, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 593.
54 See id. at 492, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 592.
55 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752, 2754, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 102, 104.
a Id. at 2749, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100. The Court stated that the determination
that the employer has met its burden of production of a legitimate reason for its actions can
involve no credibility assessment. M. at 2748, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100. At this stage,
the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons are taken as true. Id.
57 Id. at 2749, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 25
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115).
58 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100.
69 Id.
° Id. at 2749, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100-01.
61 See id. at 2749 n.4, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100 n.4. The Court stated that, "[el yen
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a finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful dis-
crimination is quite different from a finding that the employer's expla-
nation of its action was not believable." According to the Court, if a
plaintiff shows an employer's proffered reason for an action to be
pretextual, the plaintiff is not necessarily proving that discrimination
was the real reason .°
By applying the Court's interpretation of Burdine, the majority
next addressed the dissent's position, which required only that a plain-
tiff show the employer's reasons to be pretextual in order to prove
discrimination. 64
 The Court stated that the plaintiff must do more than
simply show that the employer's asserted reasons for its actions were
false in order to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
reasons offered by the employer were a pretext for discrimination.°
According to the majority, in order to prove that the employer's reason
for its action was a pretext for discrimination, the plaintiff must show
both that the reasons were false, and that discrimination was the real
reason.'''' The Court thus concluded that the "merger" discussed in
Burdine consists of the proof that the employer's reason was false
combined with the more difficult proof that the real reason was dis-
crimination.° The Court further interpreted the "new level of spe-
cificity" at this prong, as requiring a turn from the generalized factors
of the prima facie case to the specific proofs and rebuttals of discrimi-
natory motivation.°
The Court agreed with the dissent that according to the particular
wording of one sentence in Burdine, the falsity of the employer's
explanation alone is enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff.°
The Court, however, dismissed this statement as an "inadvertence," a
though rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of
discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination." Id.
Hicks, 113 S. CL at 2751, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 102.
(13 See id. at 2749 n.4, 2751, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100 n.4, 102.
" See id. at 2751-53, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 102-04.
" Id. at 2751-52, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 102. In other words, to find for the
plaintiff, the factfinder must find that the articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination,
not merely lies or a pretext for some other reason. See id. at 2752, 62 Fair Ent pl. Prac. Gas. (BNA)
at 102.
66 Hicks, 113 S. CL at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 102.
67 1d, at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 103.
" Id, at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 102-03 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255,
25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116).
" Id. at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas, (BNA) at 103 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116 (holding plaintiff may prove he or she was victim of intentional
discrimination, "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence" (emphasis added))).
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dictum that was inconsistent with the rest of Burdine," The Court
further noted that it is not enough for the factfinder to disbelieve the
employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs assertions of dis-
crimination,71
The Court finally addressed the potential consequences of its
decision. 72
 The Court noted that there is no justification for assuming
that those employers whose evidence in the rebuttal prong is disbe-
lieved are perjurers or liars." The Court concluded that if there is any
perjury, it can be properly addressed outside of a Title VII proceed-
ing.74
 According to the Court, the essence of Title VII is not to punish
employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse
employment action, but to award damages against those employers
who are proven to have taken adverse employment action based on,
inter alia, race.75
The dissent, relying heavily on Burdine, argued that the plaintiff
need only prove that the reasons articulated by the employer are
pretextual in order to succeed on a claim of discrimination. 76 The
dissent contended that the defendant's burden of production requires
the employer to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that
the plaintiff will have full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pre-
text." The dissent interpreted Burdine's merger language as giving a
plaintiff two options: either showing discrimination by the employer or
7° Id. at 2753, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 103-04 (discussing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256,
25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116). For examples of such inconsistent statements in Burdine,
compare 450 U.S. at 253, 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115, 116 (holding burden of
persuading trier of fact that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff remains with
plaintiff at all times) with 450 U.S. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116 (holding
plaintiff's showing employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence enough for
factfinder to find for plaintiff, even though plaintiff has not shown defendant intentionally
discriminated).
The Court further stated that any confusion caused by the language in Burdine, indicating
that the falsity of the employer's explanation alone is enough to compel judgment for the
plaintiff, was resolved in Athens, when the Court held that the factfinder must decide whether
the rejection of the plaintiff was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII, not merely
whether the evidence offered by the defendant was credible. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753, 62 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 104 (citing Athens, 460 U.S. at 714-15, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 611).
71 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 104.
72 See id. at 2754-56, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 104-06.
" Id. at 2754, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 104.
74 1d. at 2754, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 105.
mid. at 2756, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 106.
76 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760-61, 62 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 109-10.
77 1d, at 2759, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 108 (quoting Burdine. 450 U.S. at 255 -56,
25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116).
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showing that the employer's proffered reasons are unworthy of cre-
dence. 78
 According to the dissent, either of these showings is sufficient
to establish a pretext for discrimination and, thus, entitles the plaintiff
to judgment. 79
 The majority had interpreted this language as requiring
both a showing of discrimination and incredibility of proffered rea-
sons.80
According to the dissent, the Court unfairly held that the plaintiff
must disprove all reasons suggested by the employer, no matter how
vaguely, in the record. 8 ' Under the majority's analysis, the factfinder
may find nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's actions any-
where in the record, making it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to
prove all the possible reasons to be pretextual. 82
 The dissent argued
that requiring more than a showing of pretext of articulated reasons
increases the burden on the plaintiff in the third prong of the McDon-
nell Douglas tripartite analysis." According to the dissent, by requiring
the plaintiff to demonstrate that reasons not articulated by the em-
ployer, but discerned by the factfinder, are also unworthy of credence,
the majority's analysis disfavors Title VII plaintiffs who do not have
direct, tangible evidence of discriminatory intent.'"
The dissent also pointed out inconsistencies in the Court's hold-
ings." At one point the Court indicated that proof of the falsity of the
employer's proffered reasons, without more, will permit the factfinder
to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination, while in other parts of the
decision, it appeared that the plaintiff must show falsity of the prof-
fered reasons and that discrimination was the real reason. 86 The dissent
concluded that the majority's approach would favor employers who lie,
79 Id. at 2760, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 109 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116).
79 See id. at 2760-61 & n.7, 62 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 109-10 & 11.7 (citing Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116).
99 Id. at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 102.
81 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 110. The dissent later cites
Athens, 460 U.S. at 716, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611, arguing that the analysis under
Aiken requires the factfinder to choose which party's explanation of the motivation it believes,
not one of the vague reasons suggested by the record. Id.
82 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 110.
83 See id. at 2761-62, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 110.
84 Id. at 2761, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 110.
85 /d. at 2762, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 110-11.
w Compare id. at 2749, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 100 (proof of falsity of employer's
prolTered reasons, without more, will permit trier of fact to infer ultimate fact. of discrimination)
with id. at 2752, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA.) at 102 (plaintiff must show both reason was false
and discrimination was real reason).
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frustrating the purpose of Title VII by discouraging plaintiffs who are
afraid of wasting time, effort and money.r
The Court's decision in Hicks leaves several issues unresolved. For
example, it is unclear from a reading of the Court's decision when
proof of pretext will be sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find for
the plaintiff, and when more evidence will be necessary. 88
 Although the
Court now requires that a plaintiff prove pretext and prove that the
real reason for its action was discriminatory, the question remains
whether a plaintiff's evidence of incredibility of the employer's articu-
lated reasons can satisfy both of these at once, without more. In
addition, it is unclear what type of additional evidence will be neces-
sary, especially in the absence of tangible evidence, to prove that the
employer has actually discriminated.
The apparent effect of the Court's holding is to make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on allegations of disparate treatment,
especially where there exists no tangible evidence of discrimination.
Some may argue, however, that plaintiffs are helped by this decision
since they are not always required to produce more evidence than their
prima facie case and proof of pretext of the employer's reasons. The
Court's indication that proving pretext is sufficient to permit a finding
for the plaintiff, seems to leave much discretion to factfinders. 89 Given
identical circumstances, evidence introduced in a showing of a prima
facie case for discrimination and a showing of pretext may mean
different things to different factfinders. That which one factfinder
believes to be sufficient to establish discrimination in light of incred-
ible articulated reasons by an employer, may not prove discrimination
in the eyes of a different factfinder.
The Court's decision opens the door for employers who do not
have legitimate reasons for their disparate treatment of employees to
87 Id. at 2763, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 112.
88 See Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 228, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 443, 446 (N.D. 1993). In Schweigert, the North Dakota Supreme Court declared that:
The Hicks decision does not disturb the reality that success in establishing the
incredibility of the employer's asserted reasons will, in most instances, insure success
for the plaintiff, because the incredibility of the employer's reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination' . . . All Hicks
does is hold that discrimination is a matter of fact, not law....
Id.
" See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins, Co., No. 93-1050, slip op. at 16 (1st Cir. Sept. 29, 1993)
(holding in action brought pursuant to Age Discrimination Employment Act, under McDonnell
Douglas analysis, plaintiff's showing employer's justification for its actions to be pretextual,
together with elements of plaintiff's prima facie case for discrimination, may or may not lead
factfinder to infer employer engaged in intentional discrimination).
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nonetheless successfully defend themselves. Under Hicks, they need
only make up some nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions for the
case to progress. 9" This is not to say Hicks will encourage discrimination
by employers, but creative lawyering may allow employers to fabricate
enough vague reasons that they cannot all be proven to be pretextual.
Even if they are all proven to be pretextual, the plaintiff will still have
to prove that discrimination was the real reason.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks is a narrow decision, with former
Justice White in the majority. Almost immediately after the decision,
debate began concerning its application. 91 It appears, however, that
employers have gained as a result of the decision, and Title VII dispa-
rate treatment plaintiff's will have a more difficult time proving their
cases. By requiring pretext-plus, the Court assuages fears of condemn-
ing employers whose articulated reasons may not be altogether cred-
ible. Rather, the plaintiff bringing suit now must convince the judge
or jury not merely what the defendant did not do (i.e. give legitimate
reasons), but what the defendant did do (i.e. discriminate). 92 Intui-
tively, it makes sense that the plaintiff should have to prove that the
defendant committed the action(s) upon which the complaint is
based .9'
In sum, the United States Supreme Court, in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, held that Title VII plaintiffs must now demonstrate that
the evidence they have presented at the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis to establish that the employer's articulated legitimate
reasons for its actions are actually pretextual (together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case), also consists of evidence that the real
reason is intentional discrimination." If the plaintiff cannot demon-
9° See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 K2d 1251, 1255, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
746, 748 (5th Cir. 1977) (Fifth Circuit required preponderance of evidence standard for defen-
dant's rebuttal of prima facie case, partly due to cur employer would compose fictitious legitimate
reasons for actions).
91 See, e.g., Schweigerl, 503 N.W.2d at 228-29, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 446. In a case
brought. under North Dakota labor law, decided six days after Hicks, the North Dakota Supreme
Court, not being bound by the decision, modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis and disregarded
Hicks by requiring the employer to prove its legitimate reasons for its actions by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. If the employer hided to meet. this sumdard, it would lose, regardless of the
pretext-plus analysis suggested by Hicks. Id. at 229, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 446.
"See LeBlanc, No. 93-1050, slip op. at 14-15 (court lick! in applying McDonnell Douglas
analysis, plaintiff must show sufficient evidence of pretext and evidence that overall reasonably
supports finding of discriminatory animus).
9s See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 275(1, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (RNA) at. 106 ("That the employer's
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that
the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct").
94 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 IIA, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 100 n.4.
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strate discrimination on pretext evidence alone, he or she must present
additional evidence to prove a discriminatory animus. Though the
Court's decision appears to favor employers, the future of the case is
unclear, especially given its ambiguities.
11. GENDER DISCRIMINATION
A. * Gender Discrimination in Law Firm Partnership Decisions: Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 2
 In passing Title VII, Congress intended to prevent
"disparate treatment," which occurs when members of protected
groups are treated less favorably than similarly situated members of
favored groups. 3 Title VII prohibits employers from refusing to pro-
mote an employee solely because of the employee's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.4
 Plaintiffs may sue under one of two
disparate treatment theories: "pretext" or "mixed-motives." 5
 In pretext
cases, the issue is whether legal or illegal motives—but not both—mo-
tivated the employer's actions. 6
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the United States
Supreme Court set forth the analysis for a Title VII pretext case.' In
* Mathieu j. Shapiro, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
849 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1520 (1993).
2 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1988). Section 2000e-2 of Title VII states in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because ofsuch individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
Id.
3 BARBARA L. Scum Sc PAL/I. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2, 1286 (2d ed.
1983). Also prohibited under Title VII are policies and practices which: 1) perpetuate in the
present the effects of past discrimination; 2) have an adverse impact not justified by business
necessity; and 3) fail to accommodate religious observances and practices. Id. at 2.
4 See id. at 1286.
5 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-47, 49 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 954,
961 (1989) (plurality opinion).
6 See I:void, 983 F.2d at 522, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861. In mixed-motives cases,
the issue is whether an illegal motive was the "motivating" or "substantial" factor in an employer's
action, or whether the decision would have been made regardless of the illegal motive. Id. at 522,
60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) al 860-61.
7
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-05, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
965, 968-70 (1973).
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McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, a black male, was laid off due to
general reductions in the employer's work force.' The following year,
the employer publicly advertised openings for the job the plaintiff had
held.' The plaintiff re-applied for his old job, and was rejected)" He
then sued McDonnell Douglas for racial discrimination.'
The McDonnell Douglas Court established the order and allocation
of proof in a Title VII pretext claim) 2 First, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination." The McDonnell Douglas Court
recognized that the elements of a prima facie case may be changed
to fit differing factual situations." The second burden, according to
McDonnell Douglas, is the defendant's burden to rebut the prima facie
case with a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions.' 5
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant's presumptively valid reason for its decision was in fact a
pretext, intended to coverup a discriminatory decision.'"
In 1981, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the
Supreme Court further explained the Title VII analysis in disparate
treatment cases." The plaintiff in Burdine was a woman employed by
8 Id. at 794, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966.
9 Id. at 796, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 9(36.
I° Id. McDonnell Douglas claimed that the plaintiff was turned down because of his partici-
pation in illegal actions against the company. Id. The plaintiff was a "long-time activist in the civil
rights movement" who had participated in "stall-ins" and lock-ins" against the company to protest
what he alleged were racially motivated employment decisions. Id. at 794, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 966.
II /d, at 797, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 967. The plaintiff first brought a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 796, 5 FEP at 966-67. Alter the
Commission failed to conciliate the dispute, the plaintiff brought his civil action. Id. at 797, 5
Fair Enipl. Prat:, Cas. (BNA) at 967.
12 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-05, 5 Fair Em pl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 968-70.
18 Id. at 80'2, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 969. The elements of a prima fitcie case, as
established in McDonnell Douglas, are the following: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class; 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a position in which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) the employer rejected the application, in spite of the plaintiff's qualifications; and
4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications. Id.
The Court established, in a later case, that the plaintiff's burden was to prove a prima facie
case by a preponderance of the evidence. Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-53, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 113, 115 (1981).
to Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 11511.6; McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 n,13, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969 n.13.
19 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 969; see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 116.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970.
17 450 U.S. at 249-50, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 114-17. In 1993, in St. Mary's honor
Center. a. Hicks (subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision in Ezold), the United States Supreme
Court further explained the McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine burden shifting For Title VII litigation.
113 S. Gt. 2742 (1993). How significantly St. Mary's changes the law is still unclear. See St. Mary's,
113 S. Ct. at 2756 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the Texas Department of Community Affairs who applied for the
position of Project Director.' 8 The position remained unfilled for many
months, when a man from another division in the department was
given the job.'°
The Burdine Court explained that the burden on the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case is not an onerous one. 2° The Court further
explained that the prima facie case created an inference of discrimi-
nation. 2 ' The Burdine Court clarified the second burden, explaining
that the defendant must introduce evidence of a reason for its actions
which would be legally sufficient to support a judgment in the defen-
dant's favor. 22
 If the defendant successfully produces such evidence,
the inference of discrimination is rebutted, and the "factual inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity." 23
 The Burdine Court also ex-
plained the dual purpose of this burden: 1) the defendant meets the
plaintiff's prima facie charge, while, 2) simultaneously framing the
factual issue so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext. 24
The Burdine Court went on to explain the plaintiff's final burden
of demonstrating pretext. 25
 This final burden merges with the plain-
tiff's ultimate burden of proving that she has been a victim of inten-
tional discrimination.26 "Explicit evidence of discrimination—i.e., the
`smoking gun'—is not required."27 Rather, the Burdine Court allowed
the plaintiff two ways of establishing pretext. 28 The plaintiff may di-
rectly persuade the court that a discriminatory reason was more likely
to have motivated the defendant than the proffered reason, or the
plaintiff may indirectly show that the defendant's proffered reason is
unworthy of credence. 29
During the Survey year, in Ezold v. Wolf; Block, Scharr and Solis
-Co-
hen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that,
when comparing similarly situated people in a Title VII pretext case,
19 Id. at 250, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 114.
19 Id. at 250-51, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 114.
20 Id. at 253, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115.
21 Id. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
22 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 255-56, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116,
25 Id. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
211 Id.
27 F.201(1 V. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 849, 862 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1520
(1993).
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
29 Id.
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the trial court may not substitute its own subjective standard for that
of a law firm in making partnership decisions." In Wolf, a law firm had
denied partnership to a female associate. 3 ' The Third Circuit reasoned
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania had failed to see that the evidence could not support a finding
of sex discrimination because its own judgment of what the firm's
standard should have been had unduly influenced the court.' 2 Because
Title VII does not entitle courts to create their own personnel stand-
ards for private employers, the Third Circuit reversed the district court
and ruled that the law firm had not violated the law."
In 1983, the law firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen
("Wolf') hired Nancy Ezold ("Ezold") as an associate on a partnership
track." Ezold graduated from Villanova Law School in the top third of
her class and, prior to joining Wolf, worked for two small firms in
Philadelphia."' Ezold was a member of Wolf s litigation department for
her entire tenure with the firm."
Throughout her tenure, Ezold was reviewed under Wolf's stand-
ard evaluation process." The partnership decision, in 1988, required
review by a ten-person Associates Committee." The Associates Commit-
tee then made recommendations to a five-person Executive Committee,
which in turn made a recommendation to the full voting partnership."
Wolf partners evaluate associates on a semi-annual or annual basis,
depending upon the associate's seniority.'" The evaluations ask the
partner's degree of contact with each associate, and then list ten
criteria of legal performance and ten criteria of personal character-
istics."' Although the format changed throughout Ezold's tenure, the
evaluations always listed legal analysis as the first criterion."' For each
3
"983 F.2ti at 512-13, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 853.
31 Id. at 513, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 853.
32 Id. at 512-13, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 853.
33 See, id.
34 Id. at 514, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 854.





Ezold, 983 F.2(1 at 514, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 854.
41 Id. at 515, 60 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 854-55. The ten criteria of legal performance
are: legal analysis; legal writing and drafting; research skills; formal speech; infimmal speech;
judgment; creativity; negotiating and advocacy; promptness; and efficiency. Id. The ten personal
characteristics are: reliability; taking and managing responsibility; flexibility; growth potential;
attitude; client relationship; client servicing and development; ability under pressure; ability to
work independently; and dedication. Id.
42 Id. at 515, 60 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas, (BNA) at 855.
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of the criteria, associates received grades on a Distinguished, Good,
Acceptable, Marginal or Unacceptable scale."
The evaluations also asked partners to describe each candidate's
strengths and weaknesses and to recommend that an associate be made
partner with "enthusiasm," "favor," "mixed emotions" or "negative feel-
ings."44
 One partner then compiled all of the evaluations into a book
and reduced them to a "bottom line" summary memo which served as
a starting point for the Associates Committee's discussion of each
candidate."
Ezold's evaluations included a wide range of grades and com-
ments." Throughout her tenure with Wolf, however, a significant num-
ber of partners consistently questioned her legal analytic ability. 47 In
1988, thirty-two partners made recommendations for Ezold's admis-
sion to partnership." Seven recommended her "with enthusiasm,"
fourteen "with favor," six "with mixed emotions," four with "negative
feelings," and one with "mixed emotions/negative feelings."'" Of the




4' Ezold, 983 F.2d at 515-46, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 855. Each member of the
Associates Committee is responsible for an initial assessment of one of the candidates for partner.
Id. at 516, 60 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 856. This assessment, which is the Committee
member's summarization of his or her own personal view of the candidate's evaluations, is known
as the "bottom line" memo. Id. In 1988, Ezold's overall score in legal skills on the bottom line
memo was a "G" for good. Id.
46 1d. at 516-20, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 856-59. As the court noted, "given the
number of reviewing partners, the evaluations often contain a wide range of divergent views." Id.
at 515, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 855.
47 See id. at 516-20, 60 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 856-59. The court quotes poor reviews
of Ezold's legal skills made by four different partners from 1985 and 1986. Id. at 516-17, 60 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 856-57. The court then produced summary charts for the years 1987
and 1988. Id. at 518-20, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 557-59. In 1987, Ezold received one
"Marginal," four "Acceptables," and three "Goods." Id. at 518, 60 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at
557-58. Two of the "Goods" were from partners who had little contact with her. Id. The other
"Good" included the following comment: "She remains a little weak in her initial analysis of
complex legal issues." Id. Two others had no grade, but commented, "I have been singularly
unimpressed with the level of her ability," and "there seems to be serious question as to whether
she has the legal ability to take on large matters and handle them on her own." Id.
The 1988 results were similar: one "Marginal," five "Acceptables," and five "Goods," with four
of the live "Goods" coming from partners with slight contact. Id. at 519-20, 60 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 558-59. Again, ungraded comments made statements such as, "would feel com-
fortable turning over a significant matter for one of his clients `if not too complex.'" Id. at 519,
60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 858.
48 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 520, 60 Fair Empi. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 859.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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A recurring theme in Ezold's negative evaluations was a lack of
confidence in her ability to handle complex litigation. 5 ' The ability to
be the lead partner on a complex case has traditionally been the mark
of a Wolf partner.52 Based on these evaluations, the Associates Commit-
tee voted 9-1 not to recommend Ezold for partnership." The Associ-
ates Committee, at the initiation of an Ezold supporter, discussed
modifying the partnership standard because Ezold had other valuable
skills.54 The committee ultimately rejected this suggestion. 55 Out of
Ezold's class of eight candidates, the Associates Committee recom-
mended five male associates and one female associate for partnership."
One male associate, Associate X, was not recommended for partner-
ship.57
Upon receiving the negative recommendations, the Executive
Committee conducted its own review of both Ezold and Associate X."
The Executive Committee review concluded that Ezold should not be
recommended for partnership unless the firm was prepared to lower
the firm's partnership standards." All five members of the Executive
Committee voted not to recommend Ezold's admission to the partner-
ship."
Ezold brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Wolf intentionally dis-
criminated against her on the basis of her sex."' The district court
compared Ezold to Associates A-H—eight successful male candidates—
and concluded that the test applied to Ezold was different from the
51 See id. at 516-20, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 856-59.
52 See id. at 517, 532, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 857, 869.
55 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 520, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 859.
54 Id. The Committee did feel that Ezold had other positive attributes. Id. As one partner
believed: "iAllthough lEzold] was not up to par on her legal analytic ability, ... deficiency in a
particular area, even though it was a traditional area where we required a certain superior level,
could be overlooked or relaxed where there were sufficiently compensating skills itt other areas."
Id.
55 Id,
56 Id. at 520, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 860.
57 1d.
56 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 520-21, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 860.
59 Id. at 521, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 860.
6(1 Id. Charles Kopp, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, told Ezold that two domestic
relations partners were leaving the firm, and that if she agreed to work in this department, she
would be made a partner in one year. Id. Kopp believed that Ezold could handle domestic
relations because she was effective with clients, and because domestic relations work did not
require the same level of complex analysis as commercial litigation. Id. Ezold declined this offer,
as well as an offer to remain with the firm as a litigation associate. See id.
61 Ezold v, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1176, 54 Fair Empl, Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 808, 808 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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test applied to male associates. 62 The district court found Wolf's pur-
ported reasons for its decisions to be pretextual because, in the court's
analysis, Wolf promoted male associates who had the same level of
criticism as Ezold had. 65 Thus, the district court concluded that Ezold
had "established that the defendant's purported reasons for its con-
duct [were] pretextual."64
Wolf appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. 65 The firm contended that the district court had "improperly
substituted its own subjective judgment" concerning both the firm's
partnership standard, as well as whether or not Ezold met the stand-
ard.66
 In its analysis, the Third Circuit considered only the sufficiency
of the evidence for the district court's findings, using a "clearly erro-
neous" standard 67 Following the McDonnell Douglas procedure, the
Third Circuit found that Ezold had easily established a prima facie
case. 68 The court also found that Wolf had given an explanation
sufficient to rebut the inference of discrimination. 69 The Third Circuit
then addressed the district court's finding that Wolf's proffered expla-
nation was a pretext and concluded that the district court's analysis
had been clearly erroneous."
The Third Circuit first examined Wolf's proffered reason for its
decision: Ezold's lack of legal analytic ability. 7 ' The evidence, according
to the Wolf court, could not demonstrate that legal analytic ability was
not a necessary precondition for partnership at Wolf." The Wolf court
62 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 524, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862-63.
63 id.
64 Id. at 524, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862.
65 Id. at 512, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 852.
66 Id. at 525, 60 Fair Em pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 863.
67 EZOid, 983 F.2d at 525-26, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 863-64. Wolf, relying on Logue
v. International Rehabilitation Assoc., Inc., 837 F.2d 150, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1382
(3d Cir. 1988), argued that the appellate court should have plenary review of the issues. Ezold,
983 F.2d at 525, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 863. The appellate court ruled that "[t] he
district court's refusal to credit or make findings concerning all of Wolf's proffered evidence"
did not subject its findings to plenary review. Id. Thus, the appellate court followed the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in evaluating the district court's
resolution of the ultimate issue. Id. at 525-26, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 864-65.
" Id. at 523, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861-62. The appellate court agreed with the
district court, which had found that "favorable evaluations" and "a score of 13' on her 1988
bottom line memo" satisfied the prima facie requirement that Ezold he "qualified." Id.
Id. at 524, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862.
7') Id. at 524, 526-29, 60 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 863-66,
71 Id. at 526-27, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 864-65. Legal analysis was defined on the
1987 and 1988 evaluation forms as the "ability to analyze legal issues; grasp problems; collect,
organize and understand complex factual issues." Id. at 515, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
855.
72 See. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 864-65. The court stated that
March 19941
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 491
noted that no one was taken into the partnership without "serious
consideration of [her] strength in the category of legal analytic abil-
ity."73 The firm's refusal to relax its standards was not evidence of illegal
discrimination.74 The court found that the evidence could not cast
doubt on Wolf's proffered reason for its decision."
Because Ezold had cast no doubt on Wolf's proffered reason, the
district court had erred by using anything other than that reason in
its analysis." The Third Circuit explained that the district court had
employed a "pick and choose" method of selection and had compared
the "personalities, work habits, and other criteria besides legal analysis"
of Ezold and male Associates A-H." The district court's comparison
had been based on its own judgment of what Wolf's subjective standard
should have been. 78 The Third Circuit further noted the right of pri-
vate employers to make subjective decisions, and the necessity for
courts to respect those subjective decisions. 79
Having established that the district court's analysis was clearly
erroneous because it had used the wrong standard for comparison, the
Third Circuit proceeded to examine the evidence using the standard
Wolf had articulated. 8° The Wolf court compared the evaluations of
Ezold's legal analytic ability to the same evaluations of male Associates
A-H, the allegedly favored group.'" For Ezold to prevail, the evidence
"falbsent evidence to show that legal analytic ability was not a necessary precondition for
partnership at Wolf, the district court's opinion about Ezold's comparative strengths in the other
categories on the evaluation form is immaterial." Id. at 526, 60 Fair Empl. fear.. Cas. (BNA) at
864.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 526-27, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (15NA) at 864.
75 See u1. at 527, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 864-65,
76 Id. at 527-28, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 865.
77 Ezold, 983 E2d at 528, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 865.
78 See id. at 528, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 865.
79 Id. at 527, 00 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 865. The court analogized to academic tenure
decisions, stating that courts must be vigilant not to substitute their own judgment for the
judgment of colleges with respect to the qualifications of their faculties. Id. The court went on
to say that: "These cautions against 'unwarranted invasion or intrusion' into matters involving
professional judgments about an employee's qualifications for promotion within a profession
inform the remainder of our analysis." Id.
For an analysis of the failings of the courts when applying Title VII to academic institutions
and other professional or white collar jobs, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Tide VII to Jobs
in High Places, 95 Ilmtv. L. REV. 947 (1982). Bartholet argues that the courts' leniency toward
subjective standards in white collar situations is in striking contrast to the courts' strict scrutiny
of subjective standards in blue collar situations. See id. at 975-77.
"See Ezold, 983 E2d at 532-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 869-75.
81 Id. at 533-38, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 870-74. The court emphasized that it was
comparing only die evaluations of legal analysis. See id. at 518 n.7, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 857 n.7.
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had to support the conclusion that her legal analytic ability was equal
to that of at least one male who was made a partner."
Re-examining the record, the Third Circuit found no evidence
that Ezold had been treated differently from male associates." First,
the court did not believe that Ezold had placed any doubt on the
substantial number of negative evaluations of her legal analytic ability. 84
In the Wolf court's view, even Ezold's supporters supported Ezold for
reasons other than legal analytic ability." In fact, the court reasoned,
many of her supporters questioned her legal analytic ability. 86
In addition, the evaluations of Ezold's legal analytic ability did not
compare favorably to the evaluations of successful male candidates."
Male candidates A-H, according to the Third Circuit, faced "no com-
parable degree of criticism about their legal analytical skills." 88
 The
Third Circuit also compared Ezold to men who were passed over for
partnership, which the district court had failed to do, and again found
no evidence to show that men and women had been treated differ-
ently." The Third Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient
82
 Id. at 530, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 867-68. The required comparisons are
significantly harder to make in cases "involving promotions that are dependent on an employer's
balanced evaluation of various subjective criteria." Id. at 529, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
867.
Andrea Waintroob, in her study of Title VII in white collar and professional jobs, concluded
that "as the employment level rises, judicial tolerance of subjectivity increases." Andrea R. Wain-
trooh, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the While Collar and Professional
Level, 21 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 45, 50 (1979), Waintroob argues that in higher level jobs courts
are willing to judge only that the employer's criterion are applied fairly, not that the criterion
are fair. See id. at 52-54.
ss Ezold, 983 F.2d at 547, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 881.
&' Id. at 532, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 869.
85 Id. at 532-33, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 869.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 533-38, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 870-74.
"Ezold, 983 F.2d at 538, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 874. The court undertook
extensive analysis of the comments and grades of these other associates, comparing each to Ezold.
Id. at 533-38, 6(1 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 870-74. The court found that associates A-H
each got better legal analysis grades, both on the whole and from individual partners. See id. For
instance:
[T]he district court failed to point out that no partner actually rated A lower than
Ezold in the criterion of legal analysis ....
Gregory Magarity, Ezold's most ardent advocate, rated A as "distinguished" in
legal analysis in 1987 and 1988, higher than the grade of "good" he gave Ezold in
those years  Boote, a supporter of Ezold, also rated A higher than Ezold in this
category.
Id. at 533-34, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 870.
"Id. at 538-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 874-75. The court offered a long
paragraph of quotes about male associates who were not promoted to partner, such as, "[he] has
good talents although he is not as capable in legal analysis as others," and "[his) best skills are
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to show that Wolf's proffered standard for its decision was unworthy
of credence, or that Wolf, under that standard, had treated Ezold
differently from similarly-situated men. 9°
Finally, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals examined Wolf's past
treatment of the plaintiff, its general policy and any specific instances
of past behavior which might indicate that gender was "more likely" to
have been the cause of dismissal than Wolf's proffered reason.° Again,
the court found no evidence of disparate treatment based on gender. 92
With no evidence to show disparate treatment, the Third Circuit re-
versed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Wolf."
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen received national atten-
tion, because it is believed to be the first sex-discrimination case against
a law firm to reach the trial stage. 94 Thus, for many women, the case
was a symbolic one.95 In fact, the Women's Law Project submitted an
amicus curiae brief for twenty-five groups. 96 Although the appellate
court ruled in Wolf's favor, the case is still expected to have an impact
on law firms' partnership decisions.° Many firms recognized that it
in client relations and desire to please, rather than legal analysis or intellectual genius." Id. at
538, 60 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 874.
9° Id. at 539, 60 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 874-75.
91 See id. at 539-47, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 875-81. The district court had found
three other pieces of evidence which it believed supported Ezold's claim of pretext. Id. at 539-40,
60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 875. First, there were four instances of conduct. which evidenced
discriminatory animus. Id. Second, Wolf's assignment process kept Ezold away from the difficult
cases, so that she was unable to prove her legal ability. Id. at 540, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 871. Third, the lack of female partners at Wolf showed a pattern of discrimination. Id.
92 Ezoki, 983 F.2{1 at 540-47, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 875-81. As to her poor
assignments, the court found that Ezold's early assignments were not relevant in evaluating the
partnership decision. id. at 590-91, 60 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 875-76. In addition, her
assignments were due to her credentials and evaluations, not to her gender. See id. at 591, 60 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 876. Finally, assignment issues came tip with male associates, showing
that the issue was one of treating all employees Fairly, which the law does not mandate, rather
than an issue of invidious discrimination. Id. at 542, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 876-77.
As to the number of female partners, the court concluded that raw numbers, absent any
analysis of the qualified applicant pool or the flow of qualified applicants, were riot probative of
Wolf's alleged discriminatory intent. Id. at 542-0, 60 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 877-78.
Finally, the court found that the specific instances of conduct involved partners no longer
with the firm, legitimate complaints about Ezold's behavior with the support staff, and incorrectly
drawn factual conclusions. See id. at 543-45, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 878-80.
"Id. at 547-48, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 881.
94 Richard Burke, Wolf, Block is the Loser in Sex-Bias Case, PHII.A. lrit2., Nov. 28, 1990, at Al;
Marian Uhlman, High Court Refuses to Hear Lawyer's Sex-Bias Case, PHIIA. 11n11,2., OCL 5, 1993, at
Bl; Susan Warner, Court Backs Wog Block in Sex -Bias Case, PHILA. INQ., Dec. 31, 1992, at Al.
95 Melissa Dribben, Nancy Ezold, Torchbearer, PHILA. 1Nt2., Jan. 7, 1993, at Bl.
96 Ezold, 983 F.2d at 512, 60 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 852. Fifty-five organizations joined
the brief which was submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. Uhlman, supra note
94, at B5.
r Janet L. Fix, A Woman's Case, A Nation's Issue, PHILA, INQ., Dec. '3, 1990, at. Cl. The then
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might very easily have been them, instead of Wolf, defending their own
hiring practices in a gender-discrimination suit."
In ruling for Wolf, the Third Circuit has extended to law firms the
deference typically shown in Title VII litigation to professional organi-
zations which have made "subjective" decisions. 99
 The court did not
subject Wolf's stated reason for its actions to a significant amount of
scrutiny. ] °" Thus, as long as an employer can articulate a legitimate
subjective reason for its actions and provide a reasonable amount of
documentation, the employer appears to be insulated from serious
judicial review. 101
 The plaintiff will bear a stiff burden in showing either
the employer's stated reason or the subjective judgments unworthy of
credence.
Critics argue that by removing subjective decision-making from
judicial review, courts are enforcing the "glass-ceiling" which prevents
minorities from reaching the top of professional organizations.'" The
courts' respect for professional organizations' subjective standards,
according to the critics, allows the perpetuation of inequality in the
guise of neutral decision-making.'" These "standards" will allow the
favored groups who are already atop the professional hierarchies to
ensure that those who have been historically discriminated against will
continue to be excluded.' 94
 Thus, the critics fear that the "hands-off"
policy which the Third Circuit announced will allow discriminatory
chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association said "the judge's opinion will be felt in every law
firm in the country." M. at C1.
Similarly, E,old's lawyer, Judith P. Vladeck believed the original decision would "[semi] a
message to a male-dominated profession." Burke, supra note 94, at Al. Mark Dichter, Won
lawyer, claimed that "Fill left standing, (the ruling) can have broad implications" for the legal
profession. Id. at Al2. According to Burke's article, Dichter claimed the ruling would have
allowed "everybody who is unhappy" to file a lawsuit. Id.
98
 See Mary Walton, Fighting the Firm, PHILA. INQ. FEATURES MAG., July 28, 1991, at 11.
99 See Bartholet, supra note 79, at 975-76 (courts apply far more lenient standards to white
collar employers),
"Linda Wharton et al., Ezold Case is a Fight for Women, PHILA. INQ., Feb. 15, 1993, at M3.
1 ° 1 See id. at A13; Uhlman, supra note 94, at B5 (the Third Circuit's ruling "makes it almost
impossible to envision a discrimination case in which a plaintiff employed in an upper-level job
could win without 'smoking gun' proof").
It is unclear which subjective reasons will be accepted as legitimate by the Third Circuit. See
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 526-27, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 864-65. It is clear that the burden
is on the plaintiff to "[cast] doubt on an employer's articulated reasons for an employment
decision." Id. at 527, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 865.
102 Uhlman, supra note 94, at Bl; Warner, supra note 94, at Al; Wharton et al., supra note
100, at A3.
103
 See Dottie Enrico, Top Court Thickens 'Glass Ceiling; NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1993, at 33.
" See Clare Dalton, Discrimination at its Most Dangerous, BOST. GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1993, at Al,
A4. Dalton argues that whether this discrimination is deliberate or not, whether it is conscious
or not, it is what happens. Id.
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practices to continue, as long as they are hidden behind the cloak of
a "subjective" standard.'" Institutional inequality and discrimination
will be allowed to continue so long as the subjective criteria are applied
in a "fair" procedure.'06
In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis -Cohen, ensured that judges in
Title VII suits will defer to subjective standards offered by professional
defendants as the legitimate reason for their actions.'" The Third
Circuit was willing to review the entire record in order to find that the
evidence could not support the district court's verdict. In the future,
the difficulty which professional Title VII plaintiffs have in pretext
discrimination suits will continue.
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. *Reductions-in-Force Do Not Absolve Employers From Title VII
Liability: Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corporation'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employers from making employment decisions on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 2 Congress enacted Title VII to
assure the equality of employment opportunities by eliminating arbi-
trary preferences for any group, minority or majority. 5
 Accordingly, an
employer may avoid liability by articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its employment decision. 4
 For example, an employer
105 See Wharton et al., supra note 100, at A13 (courts, for unexplained reasons, will treat law
firms with kid gloves).
Elizabeth Bartholet argues that the courts' unwillingness to intrude on white collar decisions,
compared to their willingness to intrude on blue collar decisions, is ironic. Bartholet, supra note
79, at 979-80, The courts argue that they are not qualified to make tenure or partnership
decisions. Id. at 979. However, Bartholet points out, judges certainly know more about working
in academia or in a law firm than they do about working in a factory. Id. at 979.
100 See generally Waintrooh, supra note 82, at 45-119.
u17 See &old, 983 F.2d at 527, 60 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 864-65.
* Brian R. Suffrcdini, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 996 F.2d 632, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 221 (3d Cir. 1993).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The relevant section of Title V11 states: It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer—(1) to tail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id.
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
965, 968, motion of respondent to relax rusts denied, 414 U.S. 811, 811 (1973).
4 See id. at 802, 5 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 969.
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may proffer that its decision to discharge an employee was part of a
general reduction-in-workforce precipitated by economic concerns.'
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the United States
Supreme Court developed a three-prong allocation of proof for em-
ployment discrimination cases brought under Title V11. 6 The plaintiff
in McDonnell Douglas, a qualified African-American mechanic, was laid
off by McDonnell Douglas during a general workforce reduction: 7
Soon afterward, McDonnell Douglas publicly advertised for qualified
mechanics and the plaintiff was rejected for re-employment." The
plaintiff alleged that he was rejected on account of his race. 9 The
McDonnell Douglas Court found that the first prong of the Title VII
proof allocation, which places the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case for Title VII discrimination on the complainant, had
been satisfied by the plaintiff.m Likewise, the Court found that the
second prong, which shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory
action, had been successfully met by McDonnell Douglas." The Court
reasoned, however, that while an employer may justifiably refuse to
rehire an employee who has engaged in unlawful acts against it, under
the third prong of the burden allocation, the plaintiff must be given
a "full and fair opportunity" to demonstrate that the employer's prof-
fered reason for discharging him was pretextua1. 12 Thus, the Court
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251, 254-56, 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 113, 114, 116 (1981).
6 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969-70.
7 Id. at 794, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966.
8 1d. at 796, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 966.
9 Id. Respondent also alleged that McDonnell Douglas had refused to rehire him because of
his involvement with civil rights activities. Id. at 796, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 966-67.
la Id. at 802, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969. A complainant successfully establishes a
prima fade case by showing (1) that complainant belongs to a racial minority; (2) that complain.
ant applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that
complainant was nevertheless rejected; and (4) that after that rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifica-
tions. Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court noted, however, that these requirements will vary with
the particular facts of the case at hand, and agreed with the Court of Appeals' finding that the
plaintiff had satisfied this analysis. Id. at 802 n.13, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969 n.13. The
Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the respondent had proved a prima facie
case. Id. at 802, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969.
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 969. The Court
found that the employer's proffer that the plaintiff s illegal activity against it subsequent to his
discharge was the cause for his rejection, was sufficient to satisfy its burden under the second
prong. Id.
12 1d. at 804-06, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970.
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held that the plaintiff had a right to a re-trial on the issue of McDonnell
Douglas' allegedly pretextual motives. 19
In 1981, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the
United States Supreme Court clarified the second prong of the McDon-
nell Douglas Title VII analysis." The Burdine Court held that while the
employer in a Title VII action must articulate nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for its actions, it does not have the burden of persuading the court
that it was actually motivated by its proffered reasons.' 5 Instead, the
Court determined, it is sufficient that the employer merely raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the corn-
plainant."3 In Burdine, the plaintiff was fired by her employer during a
general staff reduction, and although subsequently rehired into an-
other division of the agency, she was not given the promotion she had
applied for prior to her discharge.'? The position she sought had been
filled with a male employee from another division. 18
 The plaintiff
brought a Title VII action against her employer alleging gender dis-
crimination.' 9 The Burdine Court reasoned that the ultimate burden
of persuasion in Title VII cases always rests with the complainant, and
that the task of proving that a proffered explanation for employment
decisions is false is not overly difficult. 2° Therefore, the Court clarified
that under McDonnell Douglas, when the complainant has demon-
strated a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer bears only
the burden of clearly articulating nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions. 21
In 1987, in Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas Burdine
12 Id. at 805, 807, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 970-71.
14 See Burdine, 450 U.S, at 254-56, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
12
 kl. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116. The complainant at all times carries the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 253, 25 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 115.
16 1d. at 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
17 1d. at 250-51, 25 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 114.
to 1d.
12 Burdine, 450 U,S. at 251, 25 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) al 114.
20 Id. at 253, 258, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 115, 117. The Court noted that a
complainant is sufficiently aided by the fact that the employer's proffer must be clear and
reasonably specific, that the employer will naturally want to persuade the fact finder that its
actions were lawful, and that the plaintiff has access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files concerning plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 258, 25 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 117.
21 See id. at 256-57, 260, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 117, 118. The employer need only
present evidence which would allow the trier of fact to conclude that no discriminatory animus
affected the employment decision. Id, at 257, 25 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 117. An
explanation by the employer of what it has done will satisfy the burden, so long as it evinces
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 117.
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three-prong allocation of proof, and held that in the context of a
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff's evidence need only support
an inference that the employer's intentions were discriminatory, and
need not necessarily lead to that conclusion. 22 The employee in Chipol-
lini, a 58-year-old construction manager, was discharged purportedly
due to the dissolution of his position and his diminished effectiveness
on the job.23
 His duties and title, however, were soon assumed by his
former assistant, an individual ten years his junior. 2^ Additionally, the
employee submitted evidence to the court contradicting his employer's
position that his effectiveness had declined.25
 The court reasoned that
since direct proof of discrimination is rarely available, evidence sup-
porting an inference that the employer's proffered reason may be
pretextual creates an issue of fact that cannot be resolved without a
tria1. 28
 Thus, the Third Circuit held that since the plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient to create an inference of pretext on the part of his
employer, a trial was required.27
During the Survey year, in Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth CVO., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that where
a labor force reduction is the proffered reason for discharge of an
employee, the trial court must closely examine the evidence relating
to the employer's motives before granting summary judgment to the
employer.28 The Josey court determined that an African-American em-
ployee who was discharged as part of an alleged reduction-in-workforce
put sufficient facts into evidence to successfully challenge his em-
ployer's proffered reason for his dismissal. 29
 The court reasoned that
Title VII could never be enforced during economic downturns if a
22 814 F.2d 893, 897, 900.-01, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681, 684, 687-88 (3d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052, 1052 (1987). The Third Circuit has found that circumstantial evidence
relating to the defendant's credibility, the timing of an employee's discharge, and the employer's
treatment of the employee may raise an inference of pretext sufficient to enable the employee's
Title VII action to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Weldon v. Kraft, 896 F.2d 793,
799, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1990) (evidence of employer's treatment
of employee may raise inference of pretext on part of employer); White v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 597, 601 (3d Cir. 1988) (timing of employee's
discharge raised issue of fact regarding employer's proffered reasons for discharging employee);
Chipollini, 814 F.2(1 at 901, 43 Fair Empl. Pnic. Cas. (BNA) at 688 (issue of pretext may turn on
employer's credibility).
28 See 814 F.2d at 895, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 683.
24 id.
25 See id. at 900, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 687.
26 Id. at 899-900, 43 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 686-87.
27 Id. at 901, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 688.
28
 996 F.2d 632, 639-40, 642, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 221, 226-28 (3c1 Cir. 1993).
29 See id. at 642, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228.
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financial explanation could summarily absolve employers of liability
for their discriminatory acts." The Josey court explicitly articulated the
principle that financial pressures cannot absolve an employer of liabil-
ity for discriminatory employment decisions, or a court of the respon-
sibility to closely examine facially legitimate proffers of pretext."
In Josey, Ted Josey, an African-American, charged the John R.
Hollingsworth Corporation ("Hollingsworth") with racial discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII." Josey began working for Hollingsworth,
then a family-owned company, in 1976. 33 In 1978, the company
promoted Josey to Supervisor of the second shift." In 1982, the
Hollingsworth family sold the company to thirteen key and trusted
employees, all of whom were caucasian. 35 In 1987, Josey was promoted
to Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance, making him the only black
employee to hold an office position in the 30 year history of
Hollingsworth . 36
Upon promoting Josey to this management position, Ray White,
a shareholder and the vice-president of Hollingsworth, instructed
Robert Kirby, a shareholder and the Manager of Quality Assurance, to
train Josey to succeed Kirby in the manager's position upon Kirby's
upcoming retiremen t. 37
 Kirby felt that Les Horvath, a shareholder who
had sought to replace Kirby, should be his successor, and refused to
train Josey." White acknowledged that Kirby would be a problem dur-
ing the transition, and imposed a training schedule on him which
Kirby followed for only two weeks."
According to the court, Josey believed that Kirby's intransigence
was racially motivated. 40
 Prior to the promotion, Kirby had remarked
to Josey that a position could not be significant if an African-American
could fill it; following the promotion, Kirby told employees that he
" Id. at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 222.
33Josey, 996 E2d at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 222. Hollingsworth produces
electrical equipment for the military. Id.
si
"Id. By 1988, only seven shareholders remained. Id. at 636, 62 Fair Etti pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 223. The company does not allow further transfers of the shares, but requires that shareholders
wishing to redeem their shares must sell them back to the company, after which they will not be
resold. Id. at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 222.
35 Id.
37 Id.
3 Josey, 996 F.2d at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 223.
39 Id. at 635, 636, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 223, 224.
90 Id, at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 223.
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had Josey cutting out paper dolls as part of his training. 4 ' Other
Hollingsworth employees indicated to Josey their belief that his pro-
motion was racially based, and Josey received anonymous racial hate
notes in his office." In February of 1988, White terminated a manager
suspected of leaving the notes, but cited economic concerns as the
basis of the dismissal." That month, White refused Josey's request for
an unpaid leave of absence pending Kirby's retirement in March. 44
According to Josey, in March or April of 1988, Hollingsworth's
board of directors adopted a policy of preferring shareholders when
layoffs occur." The following May, Kirby postponed his retirement
indefinitely, and White discharged Josey citing economic concerns and
claiming that there was no other position where the company could
use him at his current pay level." Horvath was to replace Josey as
Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance, despite the fact that he was
paid a higher salary than Josey. 47 A less-experienced caucasian em-
ployee was chosen to fill Josey's former position as second shift Super-
visor, and remained with the company even after the elimination of
the second shift." In the summer of 1988, Kirby announced that he
would retire at the end of the year, and Horvath, whose engineering
position was to be eliminated, was designated as his replacement."
Josey filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which dismissed the claim and issued a right to sue."
Josey then filed a Title VII action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 51 The district court granted
summary judgment for Hollingsworth, holding that Josey had failed to
meet his evidentiary burden following Hollingsworth's proffer of a
legitimate economic reason for its action." The court found that
41 Id.
42 Id.
"Josey, 996 F.2d at 635, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 223.
44 Id.
45 Id. By 1988 only seven of the original thirteen shareholders remained, three of whom were
Kirby, Horvath, and White. Id. at 636, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 223.
46 Id. Due to economic difficulties stemming from downturns in the defense industry,
Hollingsworth, which had at one time employed 450 people, had reduced its labor force to
approximately 175 by 1988. Id.
47 Id.
as Josey, 996 F.2d at 636, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 223.
49 1d.
50 Id,
51 Id. Josey also alleged a disparate impact claim which was rejected by the district court
because Josey failed to raise it until after the close of discovery. Id. at 636, 62 Fair Empl. Prac.
Gas. (BNA) 224.
52 See id. at 636, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 223.
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Hollingsworth's proffer was fully supported, and that White, as the sole
decision-maker, earnestly desired to replace Kirby with Josey." The
district court concluded, therefore, that a finding of discriminatory
intent was extremely implausible, and granted Hollingsworth's motion
for summary judgment."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling and held that the indirect
evidence presented by Josey raised issues of fact that could not be
decided at the summary judgment stage.55 The Posey court agreed with
the lower court that, as required by the first prong of McDonnell
Douglas' burden of proof allocation, Josey had established a prima facie
case of discrimination; thus, Josey had created a presumption of dis-
criminatory intent to be rebutted by Hollingsworth. 55 The court also
agreed that, by proffering economic difficulties precipitating a reduc-
tion-in-force, Hollingsworth had satisfied the second-prong burden, as
clarified by Burdine, to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for Josey's dismissal." The Josey court held, however, that in ana-
lyzing Josey's evidence under the third prong of McDonnell Douglas,
the district court had not examined the facts closely enough for incon-
sistencies weighing in the plaintiff's favor." The Third Circuit reasoned
that, while a court may find economic difficulties to be a plausible,
legitimate reason for discharging an employee, a court must still closely
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to
discern whether a fact finder could infer a discriminatory intent by the
employer. 59
 Therefore, the Josey court held that where financial difficul-
ties are proffered by the employer, the court is obligated to closely
examine the evidence before denying the complainant a trial byjury.5°
Upon analyzing the evidence, the Josey court found that several
inconsistencies called Hollingsworth's proffered reasons into ques-
tion. 6 ' The court found that since Hollingsworth denied Josey's request
for temporary leave without pay, a fact finder could question the
credibility of Hollingsworth's proffer that it discharged Josey for finan-
Josny v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., No, 91-4606, 1992 WL 78838, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
9, 1992).
54 Id.
55 Josey, 996 F.2d at 642, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228.
58
 Id. at 638, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 225.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 639-40, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226.
59 Id., 62 Fair Empl. I'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 226-27,
40Josey, 996 1.7.2d at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 226.
81
 See id. at 640-41, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226-28.
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cial reasons.62 Additionally, Horvath assumed Josey's position upon his
discharge, despite White's assertion that the job was no longer neces-
sary; furthermore, a less-experienced caucasian replaced Josey as sec-
ond shift Supervisor, and remained with Hollingsworth even after the
elimination of the second shift. 63 The court also reasoned that the
credibility of Kirby's decision to postpone his retirement should be
judged at trial, and not in the context of a motion for summary
judgment. 64 Finally, the court questioned the lower court's finding that
White had closely monitored Josey's training by Kirby, in light of the
fact that White did not know that Kirby had abandoned the training
after two weeks, even after Josey's request for unpaid leave. 65
In addition to finding a genuine issue regarding Hollingsworth's
credibility, the Posey court determined that the timing of Josey's dis-
charge, in relation to several other events, raised material issues of
fact. 66 The court reasoned that Hollingsworth's policy of preferring
shareholders was adopted shortly before Josey's dismissal; furthermore,
while Hollingsworth had reduced its workforce from 450 to 175 em-
ployees by 1988, the preference policy was only instituted in March or
April of 1988. 67 The court also reasoned that a fact finder might find
that Kirby's retirement announcement, made so soon after Josey's
dismissal, was evidence of pretext. 68
52 Id. at 638-39, 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 225-26, 227. The Court relied on
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, where the Third Circuit found that the determination of an employer's
credibility cannot he determined in the context of a motion for summary judgment, but must
be addressed at trial. See 814 F.2d 893, 901, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681, 688 (3d Cir.
1987).
63 prey, 996 F.2c1 at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226.
G Id. at 641, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 227.
65 Id. 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228.
66 Id. at 638-39, 640, 641, 62 Fair awl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 225-26, 227. The court relied
on White v. Watinghause Electric Co., where the Third Circuit held that the timing of an em-
ployee's discharge raised an issue of fact regarding the employer's proffered reasons for the
discharge. 862 F.2d 56, 62, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 597, 601 (3d Cir. 1988). The employee
in White was dismissed during a reduction-in-force when he was only three months shy of having
served thirty years with the company. Id. at 58, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 598. Had he
reached the thirty-year milestone, he would have been entitled to special retirement benefits and
the option of retiring at a younger age than is customarily allowed. Id. at 58-59, 48 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 598. The employee sued under Title VII alleging age discrimination. See id.
The court reasoned that where the decision to discharge or retain an employee includes a close
connection between the employee's age and wages, the issue of pretext must be considered. See
id. at 62, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 601. Therefore, since the timing of the employee's
termination raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's reasons were merely
pretextual, the court concluded that summary judgment could not be granted and that a trial
was required. Id.
Josey, 996 F.2d at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 227.
68 Id. at 640, 641, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 227.
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Concentrating on a third body of indirect evidence presented by
Josey, the Posey court found that evidence illustrating Josey's treatment
at Hollingsworth was sufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory
animus. 60
 The court reasoned that without more information about the
decision-making process at Hollingsworth, the fact that the person
suspected of leaving derogatory notes was a manager could evince the
true position of the company with respect to African-American employ-
ees. 7° Similarly, Kirby's racial remarks to Josey and Kirby's flaunting of
his intransigence in front of the other employees could suggest that
management encouraged an atmosphere of racial prejudice within
the company.7 ' Thus, the court held that Josey's treatment at
Hollingsworth, along with the credibility of the company's managers
and officers, and the timing of its decisions, could allow a fact finder
to conclude that Hollingsworth's proffered reasons for dismissing Josey
were pretextual. 72
Josey is not inconsistent with prior Third Circuit opinions, or with
the holdings of the other circuits." Reductions-in-force have been
widely recognized as providing a legitimate reason for discharging
69 Id. at 641, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 227.
7° Id, The court of appeals felt that the district court should have further explored the
decision-making structure of Hollingsworth. Id. The court relied on Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., where
the Third Circuit held that. evidence of an employer's treatment of an employee may call into
question an employer's proffer of nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's discharge. See
896 F.2d 793, 799, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1990). In Weldon, the plaintiff
was an African-American employee allegedly discharged for poor work performance, failing to
produce adequate documentation explaining his absence from work, and failing to follow com-
pany policy regarding the return of unused business-trip advance money. Id. at 794, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 356. Disputing these proffers, the plaintiff contended that his supervisor had
a history of- difficulty in dealing with African-American employees, and that the employer treated
African-American employees more harshly than white employees. See id. at 794-96, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 356-58. Although the court found this to be a close case, it reasoned that if
a fact finder were to credit the plaintiff's testimony regarding the harsh treatment given to
African-Americans at Kraft, it could conclude that Kraft's reasons were mere pretexts. Id. at 799,
52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 360. Thus, the court held that a trial was required to determine
whether the treatment of African-American employees at Kraft could reveal pretextual motives
on Kraft's part, See id. at 799, 801, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 360, 361.
Josey, 996 F.2d at 641, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 227.
72 1d. at 641, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 227-28.
73 See, e.g., Bell v. AT&T, 946 F.2d 1507, 1511, 57 Fair Empl. Pere. Gas. (BNA) 181, 185 (10th
Cir. 1991) (employer must assert legitimate justification for leaving certain employees out of
group susceptible to termination in reduction-in-force); Barnes v. GenCorp, 896 F.2d 1457, 1474,
1475, 56 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 1203, 1217 (6th Cir.), cerl. denier, 498 U.S. 878, 878 (1990)
(employer cannot avoid liability for discriminatory discharge of employee merely by charac-
terizing action as reduction-in-force); While, 862 F.2d at 62, 48 Fair Empl, Prac, Gas. (BNA) at
601 (reduction-in-force does not insulate employer from Title VII liability); Chipollini v. Spencer
Gifts, 814 F.2d 893, 901, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 681, 688 (3d Cir. 1987) (employer's
proffered reason of general reduction-in-force vulnerable to challenge in Title VII action).
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employees, and nowhere have they been held to create a veil of
absolution for employers who use them to accomplish discriminatory
ends.74 Josey's significance lies in the Third Circuit's explicit mandate
that, when employers proffer reductions-in-force in Title VII actions,
a thorough analysis of the facts must ensue to reveal any possible
factual issues that require a trial on the merits."
It does not seem likely that Josey will have a marked effect on the
ultimate decisions reached by Third Circuit courts in Title VII reduc-
tion-in-force cases. That is to say that Josey will not lessen the plaintiff's
ultimate burden of proof at trial, even though the case directs district
courts to look more closely for material issues of fact at the summary
judgment stage than they might in cases not involving the reduction-
in-force proffer." Ultimately, the impact of Josey will probably be mani-
fested by an increase in reduction-in-force cases that survive summary
judgment.
Where the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine allocation of proof reduces
the effort required of Title VII defendants at the summary judgment
stage, by requiring that they merely need to clearly articulate their
nondiscriminatory reasons for acting, Josey serves to increase that bur-
den if summary judgment for the defendant is to be realized. 77 In order
to ensure summary judgment, a defendant employer may be forced
into a more rigorous battle to demonstrate that no material issues of
fact exist. Ultimately, if a strict construction of Josey is adhered to, it is
possible that any employer who engages in a reduction-in-workforce
for economic reasons may find itself unable to dismiss a Title VII action
through summary judgment. Therefore, the cost of going to trial may
be a more prominent factor in employers' decisions to discharge mi-
norities during times of financial hardship. This result is to be wel-
comed by the courts and society, for it will encourage employers to
evaluate their true motives for discharging employees during reduc-
tions-in-force.
In sum, the Third Circuit, in Josey, held that in Title VII discrimi-
nation cases where the defendant employer proffers economic hard-
ships resulting in a reduction-in-workforce, the district court must
closely examine the evidence for material issues of fact requiring a
trial." The court reasoned that Title VII would be rendered ineffective
74 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
75 See Josey, 996 F.2d at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 226.
76 See id.
77 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 25 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 113, 116 (1981).
Josey, 996 F.2(1 at 640, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226.
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if financial difficulties could provide a veil of immunity for employers,
and its conclusion was fully in accord with the practices of the other
circuits.79 By explicitly mandating that a closer look be taken at the
material issues of fact that might arise in reduction-in-force cases, Josey
may reduce the number of Third. Circuit cases that are disposed of by
summary judgment, and thus influence employers to consider the
reasons behind their employment decisions more circumspectly.
IV. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
A. *Ninth Circuit Overrules EEOC
 English-Only Guidelines in Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co. 1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any individual with respect to the terms or conditions of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin.2
 Title VII makes no reference to discrimination on the basis of lan-
guages The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has, however, in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National
Origin ("Guidelines"), stated that an employer's speak-English-only
rule establishes a prima facie case of national origin discrimination
under the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination. 4
79 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
* By Brett M. Goldberg, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE, LAW REvIEw.
1
 998 F.2d 1480, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 525 (9th Cir. 1993).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1)to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely effect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
Id.
3 Juan F. Pere4, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the
Workplace, 23 J.L. REFORM 265, 273 (1900).
4 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1993) provides in pertinent part:
Speak-English-only rules
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only English at
all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment.
The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin charac-
teristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their
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The two most prevalent theories for proving discrimination under
Title VII are disparate treatment and disparate impact.5 In a disparate
treatment context, the employee makes out a prima facie case by
evidence giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. 6 In the
disparate impact context, on the other hand, intent is irrelevant.? A
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under disparate impact theory
by pointing to a facially neutral practice which has a disproportionate
impact on members of a protected group." If an employment practice
does have discriminatory disparate impact, it violates Title VII unless
it can be justified by business necessity.'
In 1980, in Garcia v. Gloor, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the mere existence of an employer's Eng-
lish-only rule, as applied to bilingual Hispanic employees, was in-
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimina-
tion. 1 ° Garcia, a bilingual Mexican-American, was a salesman for Gloor
Lumber and Supply, which had a rule prohibiting employees from
primary language or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also
create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national
origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the
Commission will presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely scrutinize
it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that
the rule is justified by business necessity.
Id. The EEOC interprets 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 as creating a presumption of disparate impact
discrimination, not disparate treatment. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 EEOC
Compliance Manual § 623.6 (1984).
5
 Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 668 n.13, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1519, 1530 n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Id, at 666-67, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1529-30. If discriminatory intent is proven,
the employer is in violation of Title VII unless it can show that the discriminatory treatment is
necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031,
1038, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 435, 439 (9th Cir.), en bane reh'g denied, 861 F.2d 1187, 51
Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016, 51 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 457 (1989). Disparate treatment exists when an employer intentionally treats
some employees less favorably than others because of their membership in a protected group.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1514, 1519 n.15 (1977).
7 'Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1519 n.15.
g
 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1, 4 (1982).
9 Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1484, 1488
(11th Cir. 1993). Disparate impact was originally a judicially established theory of action. See
Ward's Gave, 490 U.S. at 665, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Disparate impact has since been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991).
1 °618 F.2d 264, 272, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1403, 1409 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1113, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1220 (1981).
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speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communicating with
Spanish-speaking customers." The Gloor court reasoned that language
was not, at least for a bilingual employee, an immutable characteristic
of national origin. 12 The court further reasoned that Garcia, who was
bilingual, could easily comply with the rule, and that there was no
disparate impact when the affected employee could readily observe the
rule and nonobservance was a matter of individual preference.' 3 The
court, therefore, concluded that Garcia had failed to establish a prima
facie claim of disparate impact discrimination.' 4
Subsequent to Gloor, and in response to it,' 5 the EEOC in 1980
adopted Guidelines which stated that the mere existence of an Eng-
lish-only rule established a prima fade case of disparate impact.' 6
According to the Guidelines, an English-only rule is a burdensome
term and condition of employment because language is often an es-
sential national origin characteristic.° The EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII through its Guidelines stood in opposition to Gloor's holding,
because the EEOC presumed a Title VII violation regardless of bilin-
gual fluency.' 8
In 1987, in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII does not bar an
employer from enforcing a limited business-related English-only rule
against a bilingual employee.' 9 Jurado was a Mexican-American radio
announcer who, for programming reasons, was ordered not to speak
Spanish on the air. 2° The court reasoned that the English-only order
did not constitute disparate treatment because it was motivated by
business considerations, not racial animusf2 ' Citing Gloor, the court
" Id. at 266, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1404.
12 Id. at 270, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1408. Title VII is violated only when
discrimination is based on traits, such as skin color or sexual anatomy, which are beyond the
power of the employee to alter. Id. at 269, '22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1407. The court did
recognize, however, that for a monolingual speaker, language might be an immutable charac-
teristic. Id. at 270, 22 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1408.
11 Id. at 270, 22 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1407,
14 Id. at 270, 272, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1407, 1409.
15 Comment, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public and
Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. U. 65, 78 n.120 (1992) ("According to Mr. Robert T. Olrnos, who
helped draft the EEOC guidelines, they were directly in response to the Gloor decision.").
16 See Perea, supra note 3.
17 1d.
18
 Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1189 & n.2, 5l Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA)
452, 454 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of application for rehearing en bane) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
19 813 F.2d 1406, 1411, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 870, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1987).
28 Id. at 1408, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 871-72.
11 /d, at 1409, 1410, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 872, 873.
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further stated that Jurado had failed to make out a disparate impact
claim because he was fluently bilingual and could easily comply with
the order.22
In 1988, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the existence of an English-
only rule did establish a prima facie case of disparate impact." Gutier-
rez was a bilingual clerk employed by a municipal court which forbade
employees to speak Spanish except when acting as translators, or
during breaks. 24 The Gutierrez court distinguished Jurado's disparate
impact holding as turning not on the failure to allege a prima facie
case, but rather on the business necessity of the English-only rule. 25
The Gutierrez court reasoned that an employee's primary language is
an important national origin characteristic, and that a rule restricting
its use impinges on an employee's ethnic identity. 26 The court therefore
expressed its agreement with the Guidelines that English-only rules can
be presumed to have an adverse impact on bilingual employees and
are valid only if justified by business necessity.27
In 1988, Gutierrez's employer petitioned for rehearing en banc
and was denied." Judge Kozinski in dissent, however, argued that
Gutierrez had misinterpreted jurado. 29
 He pointed out that in its discus-
sion of disparate impact the Jurado court had relied exclusively on
Gloor, which had rejected the business necessity test. 3° In 1989 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Municipal Court v. Gutierrez and
vacated the Appeals Court's judgement as moots' Jurado remained
good law in the Ninth Circuit, but it was unclear what jurado's view of
22 /d. at 1412, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 875.
23 838 F.2d 1031, 1040-41, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 435, 440-41 (9th Cir.), en banc
reh'g denied, 861 F.2d 1187, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) 457 (1989).
24 Id. at 1036, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 437.
25 Id. at 1041 & n.I3, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 441 & n.13.
26 See id. at 1039, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 439.
27 Id. at 1040, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 440.
23 Gutierrez v Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452 (9th Cir.
1988).
29 /d. at 1190-91, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 454-55 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
3° Id. at 1190, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 454. judge Kozinski, therefore, argued that
Gutierrez was particularly appropriate for en bane consideration because it created both an
inter-circuit conflict with Gloor, and an intra-circuit conflict with Jurado. Id. at 1188, 51 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 452.
31 Municipal Court v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016, 51 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 457 (1989).
It appears Gutierrez was vacated because the employee was no longer working for the Municipal
Court. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 457
(1989) (No. 88-1395).
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the law was. 32
 On the one hand, Gutierrez had construed Jurado as
endorsing the guidelines and the EEOC's view." According to this view
of furado, an English-only rule constituted discriminatory disparate
impact, even as applied to bilingual employees, except upon a showing
of business necessity." On the other hand, Judge Kozinski had inter-
preted jurado as an endorsement of Gloor, and an implicit rejection of
the guidelines. 35
During the Survey year, in Garcia v. Spun Steak Go., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the
Guidelines and held that an English-only rule as applied to bilingual
employees was not a prima facie violation of Title VII. 36 In Spun Steak,
two Hispanic employees claimed that their employer's imposition of
an English-only rule violated Title VII by producing a disproportionate
adverse effect on their national origin group." The Spun Steak court
reasoned that the prerogative to converse at work was a privilege
granted by the employer, which the employer has the right to circum-
scribe if doing so does not result in denying the privilege to members
of a protected group." Thus, an employer imposing a speak-English-
only rule is liable under Title VII only with respect to those employees
who have such limited proficiency in English that the rule effectively
denies them the privilege of conversing on the job. 39
Spun Steak Co. employed thirty-three workers, twenty-four of
whom were Hispanic Spanish-speakers." Two employees spoke no Eng-
lish:" The remainder had varying degrees of English proficiency. 42
In response to reports that plaintiffs Priscilla Garcia and Maricela
Buitrago were using their bilingual capabilities to harass and insult
other workers in a language they could not understand, Spun Steak
promulgated a rule prohibiting the speaking of Spanish during work-
ing hours. 43
 In November 1990, plaintiffs Garcia and Buitrago received
32 Although Gloor and the Guidelines are hicially contradictory, the Jurado court cited both
approvingly. 813 F.2d at 1411, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 873-74.
33 Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041 & n.13, 51 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (DNA) at 441 & n.13.
34 See id.
35 Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1190, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 454 (denial or application
fitr rehearing en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
36 998 F.2d 1480, 1489, 1490, 62 Fair Emipl. Prac. Gas, (DNA) 525, 533 (9th Cir. 1993).
37 Id. at 1484, 1485, 62 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 528, 529.
:144 See id. at 1487-88, 62 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 531-32,
39 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 532.
40 1d. at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 527.
41 Spun Steak 998 F.2d at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 527.
42 Id.
41
 Id. at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prat:. Gas, (DNA) at 527-28. The same justification had been
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warning letters for speaking Spanish during working hours." For two
months thereafter they were not permitted to work next to each
o then .°
Garcia, Buitrago and Local 115, United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter "the employees")
filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming that Spun Steak had violated
Title VII by enforcing its English-only rule. 46
 Upon investigation, the
EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that Spun Steak's English-
only rule violated Title V11. 47 The employees subsequently filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia.48
 The district court granted the employees' motion for summary
judgement, concluding that the English-only policy disparately im-
pacted Hispanic workers without sufficient business justification, and
thus violated Title VII. 49
 Spun Steak appealed the grant of summary
judgement to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit?'
The Ninth Circuit held, as a threshold matter, that a discrimina-
tion claim being brought under Title VII section 703(a) (1) could be
pursued under disparate impact theory. 5 ' The court reasoned that
because the employees' claim focused on terms, conditions and privi-
leges of employment, it was necessarily a claim under Title VII section
703(a) (1), not (a) (2). 52
 The court noted that the disparate impact
cause of action developed out of the language in section 703(a) (2)
prohibiting discriminatory denial of employment opportunities. 53 Nev-
ertheless, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
instructed that the language of section 703(a) (1) be read broadly. 54
offered by the employer in Gutierrez. 838 F.2d at 1042, 51 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 442.
The Spun Steak Company's rule provided, in pertinent part:
[lit is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be spoken in
connection with work. During lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are
obviously free to speak Spanish it' they wish. However, we urge all of you not to use
your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other employees to suffer
humiliation.
Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 528.
"Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 528.
45 Id.
46 Id.
17 Id. at 1483-84, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 528.
48 Id. at 1482, 1484, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 527, 528.





54 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 529.
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The court, therefore, concluded that there was no reason not to allow
section 703(a) (1) claims to proceed under a disparate impact theory.55
The Spun Steak majority then articulated the elements of a section
703(a) (1) disparate impact claim. 56
 In order to establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must identify a facially neutral employment practice
which 1) has a significant adverse effect on the terms, conditions or
privileges of employment of a protected class, and 2) redounds dispro-
portionately on the protected class as compared to the general em-
ployee population.57
 The majority conceded that if the English-only
rule produced significant adverse effects, those effects would redound
disproportionately on the Hispanic workers. 55
 The employees argued
that the English-only rule had significant adverse effects on them in
three ways: 1) it denied them a privilege of employment that was
enjoyed by monolingual English-speakers; 2) it denied them the ability
to express their cultural heritage on the job; and 3) it created an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation. 59
 The Spun Steak
majority rejected all three arguments. 6°
First, the employees argued that the rule denied them a privilege
given by the employer to native English-speakers: the ability to converse
at work in the language with which they felt most comfortable." The
majority reasoned that the prerogative to converse at work was a privi-
lege granted at the employer's discretion. 62 The employer, therefore,
had the right to define the privilege's contours.° The majority found
that Spun Steak had granted its employees a privilege to converse at
work, not a privilege to converse at work in the language with which
they felt most comfortable." The majority reasoned that for bilingual
employees, who could readily comply with the rule, the slight incon-
venience of having to converse in English rather than Spanish did not
amount to a withdrawal of the privilege to converse.65
 The majority
fttrther reasoned that merely hampering the enjoyment of a privilege
55 Id.




 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486-87, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (11NA) at 530-31.
nu Id. at 1487, 1488, 1489, 62 Fair Empl. Frac. Gas. (BNA) at 531', 532.
61 Id. at 1487, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
62 Id. The court thus departed from the reasoning in Gloor, which had specifically stated that
"fa]n employer's failure to forbid employee's to speak English does not grant them a privilege."
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1406.
63 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
64 1d.
65 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 531-32.
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was not sufficient adverse impact to constitute a violation of Title V11. 66
Consequently, the majority concluded that only with respect to those
employees with such limited proficiency in English that the rule effec-
tively denied them the privilege of conversing on the job could it be
said there was a significant adverse impact in violation of Title VII. 67
Second, the employees argued that the English-only rule denied
them the right to cultural expression." The Spun Steak majority rea-
soned, however, that Tide VII was concerned only with disparities in
the treatment of workers." The employees' desire to engage in cultural
expression at work, the majority stated, was a substantive privilege
outside the ambit of Title VIL 7°
Finally, the employees argued that the English-only rule created
an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation by infusing the
work environment with racial tensions." Although the majority con-
ceded that hostile working conditions could amount to a burdensome
condition of employment in violation of Title VII, the majority held
that the existence of the rule in and of itself did not prove the existence
of such conditions. 72
 In a disparate impact case, the majority noted,
the employee must not merely raise an inference of discrimination,
but must prove the alleged discriminatory effect." The existence of a
hostile working environment, the majority reasoned, was a question of
fact for which a per se rule was particularly inappropriate. 74 The ma-
jority observed that Spun Steak's English-only rule had in fact been
adopted to promote racial harmony by preventing employees from
harassing members of other ethnic groups." Thus, the mere existence
of the English-only rule, the majority concluded, was insufficient to
prove the existence of a hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII 76
Having rejected all three of the employees' arguments, the Spun
Steak majority concluded that the bilingual employees of Spun Steak,
had not made out a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination." In
66 /d. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
67 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cos. (BNA) at 532.
68 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
72 Id. at 1488, 1489, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
73 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486, 1490, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 530, 533.
74 Id. at 1489, 62 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1490, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533.
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so holding, the majority recognized that it was rejecting the EEOC
Guidelines, which provided that an employee may make out a prima
facie case of disparate impact discrimination by merely proving the
existence of an English-only rule. 78 Although the majority conceded
that administrative interpretations are generally entitled to judicial
deference, the majority noted that the judiciary is not bound by those
interpretations. 79 Finding nothing in the plain language of the statute
to support the EEOC's view, the majority, relying on Title VII's legisla-
tive history, indicated that Title VII should be interpreted narrowly."
The majority added that the United States Supreme Court had held
that a plaintiff in a disparate impact case must prove the alleged
discriminatory effects' The majority, therefore, concluded that the
Guidelines, by allowing the employee a prima facie case on an infer-
ence of discrimination grounded in the mere existence of an English-
only rule, contravened the Supreme Court's prior holding. 82
Judge Boochever in a dissenting opinion agreed with the Spun
Steak majority except for its rejection of the Guidelines." Judge
Boochever argued that the Guidelines should be deferred to in this
case.s4 Because it is difficult to prove a hostile working environment
other than by self-serving statements, Judge Boochever stated that the
EEOC's presumption that an English-only rule creates a hostile envi-
ronment should be enough to establish a prima facie case."
The courts in Gloor and Gutierrez differed in their understanding
of the burden an English-only rule imposes on bilingual employees. In
Gloor, the burden was measured by the difficulty an employee experi-
enced in complying with the rule. 86 In Gutierrez, the burden was nec-
essarily heavy, regardless of ease of compliance, because an English-
only rule constituted an impingement on personal identity." Spun
Steak avoided this argument altogether by noting that the prerogative
78 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489, 02 Fair Empl. Prac. Ca,. (BNA) at 533,
79 Id.
146 Id. at 1489-90, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533.
81 Id. at 1490, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533.
82 Id.
83 Spun Steak, 998 E2d at 1490, 62 Fair Empt, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 534 (Boochever, J.,
dissenting).
84 Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1490, 1491, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 534 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
Apparently judge Boochever thought this should be an exception to the majority's position that,
in a disparate impact. case, the discriminatory harm must be proved, not merely inferred. See
supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
86 See Gloor, 018 F.2d at 270, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1407.
87 See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-40, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 439-40.
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to speak at work is an employer-granted privilege. 68 The Spun Steak
majority, therefore, characterized the English-only rule not as impos-
ing a burden but as limiting a privilege:" The majority emphasized that
Title VII only protects against employment practices which have a
significant adverse impact, and that, as applied to bilingual employees,
an English-only rule is merely an inconvenience not rising to the level
of significant adverse impact." Under Spun Steak, only a rule resulting
in a complete withdrawal of a privilege constitutes a significant adverse
impact.9 ' Thus, according to Spun Steak, mere impairment of the
privileges of a national origin group is not a violation of Title VII. 92
Although the Spun Steak court cited Gloor approvingly," and al-
though it came to the same conclusion, it did not use the same rea-
soning. In Gloor, an English-only rule applied to bilingual speakers did
not constitute national origin discrimination because compliance did
not involve a significant burden.94 In Spun Steak, on the other hand,
an English-only rule did not constitute national origin discrimination
as applied to bilingual speakers because it did not signal a discrimina-
tory denial of the employer-granted privilege to converse on the job."
Nevertheless, Spun Steak agreed with Gloar that employers can impose
English-only rules on bilingual employees without any need to justify
them by business necessity. 96 After Spun Steak, employees fighting such
rules under Title VII will inevitably fail unless they can prove that their
proficiency in English is so limited that such rules effectively deny them
the privilege of conversing on the job." Given the fact that such
monolingual employees may be unlikely to bring suit at all, Spun Steak
may have the practical effect of freeing employers to impose English-
only rules with impunity. Moreover, although the English-only rule in
Spun Steak was applied only "at certain times," nothing impedes ex-
tending its reasoning to rules applied "at all times."98 If the prerogative
88 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487, 62 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 531.
91 See id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
92 See id.
93 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533.
54 See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1407.
55 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
99 1d. at 1490, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533; Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1190, 51 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 454 (denial of application for rehearing en bane) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
117 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 532.
58 In Spun Steak, the English-only rule applied during work hours but not during break times.
998 F.2d at 1483, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 528. The Guidelines distinguish between
rules applied only at certain times and those applied at all times, and require a higher level of
scrutiny as to the latter. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1992). See supra note 3 for relevant text of the
Guidelines.
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to speak at work is not a right but a privilege, the employer should be
free to define its contours during break times as during working hours.
In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., held that an English-only rule, as applied
to bilingual employees, does not constitute national origin discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 99 The court thus clarified the Ninth Circuit's view
of English-only rules, which had been muddied in the wake of Jurado
and Gutierrezim The court explicitly rejected the Guidelines which held
that such rules were a burdensome term and condition of employment
even as applied to bilingual speakers." After Spun Steak, an English-
only rule is a violation of Title VII only with respect to those employees
whose command of English is so limited that an English-only rule
effectively denies them the privilege of conversing on the job. 1 °"
B. *Minority-owned Company's Word-of-mouth Recruiting not
Disparate Treatment in Violation of Title VII: EEOC v. Consolidated
Service Systems'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Tide VII") prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 2 By enacting Title VII, Congress in-
1111 998 F.2d at 1490, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 533.
111°Although Gloor and the Guidelines arc facially contradictory, the furado court cited both
approvingly. 813 F.2d at 1411, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 873-74. Gloor was cited for the
proposition that an English-only rule does not constitute disparate treatment if it is business
related. Id. In filet, the Gloor court never readied the issue of business necessity because it held
that an English-only rule is not prima facie discriminatory. Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1190, 51 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 454 (denial of application for rehearing en Banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). The Guidelines, on the otherhand, were cited in the section of the fit -ratio opinion
discussing disparate treatment but not in the section discussing disparate impact. Id, at 1190 rt,3,
51 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 458 n.3 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Such an interpretation
contradicts the EEOC's intent. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 Compliance Manual
§ 623.6 (1984). Moreover, construing the Guidelines as referring to disparate treatment claims
but not disparate impact claims is illogical. If the burden of an English-only rule is sufficient to
raise an inference of discriminatory intent, it must a-fortiori be sufficient to raise an inference
of discriminatory impact. These inconsistencies may be partially responsible for variant interpre-
tations ofJurado. Compare Gutierrez, 838 F.2c1 at 1041 n.13, 51 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 441
n.13 ("Significantly, at the same place in Jurado that we cited 1G/fiord we cited with approval the
EEOC English-only guidelines, and specifically mentioned the business necessity requirement.")
with Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1190 & n.3, 51 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 454 & n.3 (denial of
application for rehearing en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (in hamhanded fashion, the Gu-
tierrez panel throws Juradn's rationale out the window and substitutes its own.").
101 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 533.
1 °2 Id. at 1488, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 532.
* By Elizabeth A. Madden, Staff Member; BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 61 Fair Ernpl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 327 (7th
Cir. 1993).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988). Section 2000e provides in relevant part:
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tended to prohibit disparate treatment which occurs when an em-
ployer treats some employees or applicants for employment less favor-
ably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origins An employer must be shown to have a discriminatory motive
for a claim of disparate treatment. 4
 In some situations motive can be
inferred simply from differences in treatment and unequal repre-
sentation in the work force, 5
 Congress, however, recognized that racial
imbalances in the work force could come from legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory factors. 6
 Thus, Title VII does not require an employer to engage
in hiring quotas and allows employers to rely on nondiscriminatory,
objective hiring standards.?
In 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Barnett v.
W.T. Grant Co., held that word-of-mouth hiring constituted disparate
treatment under Title VII because it tended to perpetuate the all-white
composition of a work force. 8
 The employer primarily used word-of-
mouth hiring to find drivers, but used advertising and open recruiting
in its warehouse operations .9
 The plaintiff represented potential black
driver applicants who were unaware of driving positions or discouraged
(a) It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
3
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 14 Fair Empl. Prac.




 EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 297, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
408, 411 (7th Cir. 1991).
7 Id. at 296-97, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 411. The Chicago Miniature court cited
relevant portions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 which provide:
(i) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall he interpreted to require any em-
ployer ... subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individ-
ual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer, ..• in comparison with the total number
or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any
community....
Id.
"518 F.2d 543, 549, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1057, 1062 (4th Cir. 1975).
See id.
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from applying because of the employer's hiring practices.'" The racial
composition of its warehouse operations were mixed, but all of the
employer's drivers were white." The court stated that the statistics were
suggestive of discrimination because blacks were all in one work cate-
gory." The court contrasted the use of word-of-mouth recruiting of
drivers which led to an all-white driving force with the open recruiting
for other positions which led to a racially mixed force." The court
found that the difference in hiring practices was discriminatory." Thus,
the court held that word-of-mouth hiring was discriminatory as it
tended to perpetuate an all-white composition of the work force.''
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in
Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,that word-of-mouth hiring gave rise to a
claim for disparate treatment in violation of Title VII."' The three
appellants, two blacks and one "dark-skinned Puerto Rican," had ex-
tensive ironworker experience, repeatedly requested to be foremen,
but were never appointed to the job by the defendant employer." The
construction industry in the defendant's geographic area had a long
history of discrimination against blacks prior to the enactment of Tide
VII.' 8 The construction company's foreman jobs were not posted, but
only known through word-of-mouth and selection was on the basis of
subjective criteria." Ten percent of the ironworkers were black, but
only one of the 126 foremen was black.° The court reasoned that
word-of-mouth hiring could only be upheld when it was necessary to
insure the safest and most competent workers. 2 ' Thus, the court held
that solicitation of whites for the job of foreman through word-of-
mouth hiring and failure to solicit qualified blacks, combined with the
history of discrimination in the area, was a strong prima facie case of
disparate treatment. 22
Id. at 547, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1060,
IL Id. at 549, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1061.
L 2 id.
13 Barnett, 518 F.2d at 549, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1062.
14 1d.
L 5 Id. at 549-50, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1062.
16 655 F.2d 1007, 1017, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 798, 806 (2d Cir. 1980).
17 1d, at 1010-11, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 800-01.
18 Id. at 1010, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 800.
I9 Id. at 1011, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 800.
20 Id. at 1010, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 800,
21 Grant, 635 F.2d at 1016, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 805.
22 Id. at 1017, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 806. Word-of-mouth hiring by a predomi-
nantly white or predominantly male work force has been disfavored where a statistically significant
disparity between the make-up of either the applicant pool or the group hired, and that of the
relevant labor market exists. BARBARA LINIMtMANN RIME, & PAW, GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 571 (American Bar Association 1983).
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In 1991, in EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that word-of-mouth recruiting
and hiring did not give rise to a claim of intentional discrimination
without sufficiently disparate statistical representation of blacks in the
work place as compared to the relevant labor market." Chicago Mini-
ature successfully used word-of-mouth recruitment to fill its entry level
job openings. 24 Chicago Miniature never advertised for its entry-level
jobs and only rarely used the State of Illinois unemployment referral
service. 25 Chicago Miniature used newspaper advertisements to attract
clerical and secretarial applicants. 26 The court reasoned that the em-
ployer made an intentional decision to employ word-of-mouth hiring. 27
Nonetheless, the court held that the intentional use of word-of-mouth
hiring without statistical disparity was not enough to give rise to a claim
of disparate treatment. 28
The Seventh Circuit stated, however, in dictum, that it is not
impossible to infer intentional discrimination from word-of-mouth re-
cruitment.26 The court observed that word-of-mouth hiring is given
minimal weight in disparate treatment claims because it involves no
affirmative act by the employer," The court reasoned that inferring
intent from non-action is more difficult than inferring intent from
particular actions. 3 ' Thus, the court held that word-of-mouth hiring
alone did not lead to a claim of disparate treatment."
During the Survey year, in EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a minority-owned
business' reliance on word-of-mouth recruiting did not compel an
inference of intentional discrimination and did not violate Title VII,"
25 See EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 301-04, 57 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 408, 415-17 (7th Cir. 1991). The court held that the plaintiff had not stated a prima
facie case of disparate treatment because the statistics relied on by the district court were not
correctly gathered. Id. The court then analyzed whether other factors such as word-of-mouth
hiring could create a claim of disparate treatment and held that without enough statistical
disparity, word-of-mouth hiring alone did not create a claim of disparate treatment. Id.
24 Id. at 295, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 409.
25 Id.
2t;
	 at 298, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 412.
27 id.
28 See Chicago Miniature, 947 F.2d at 304, 57 Fair Em pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 417.
29 Id. at 298, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 412.
89 Id. at 298-99, 57 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 412.
81 Id. at 299, 57 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 412.
32 Id. at 304, 57 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 417.
55 See 989 F.2d 233, 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1993). The court
also held that the defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees because the EEOC's Suit was not
frivolous due to the statistical disparity between the racial composition of the labor market and
Consolidated's work force. Id. at 234, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 328; see also 42 U.S.C.
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The court reasoned that word-of-mouth hiring was adopted as the
cheapest and most efficient method of hiring employees. 34 The Sev-
enth Circuit, therefore, did not find the requisite intent of disparate
treatrnent. 35
Consolidated, a small janitorial service, was owned by a person of
Korean origin. 38 The company primarily used word-of-mouth hiring for
the workers it employed." It placed one advertisement in a Korean
language paper which resulted in no hires. 38 Consolidated also placed
two advertisements in the Chicago Tribune to recruit workers for a
potential contract job. 39 It did not receive the contract for which it was
seeking employees and therefore did not hire anyone.'" As a result of
Consolidated's primary reliance on word-of-mouth hiring, between
1983 and the first quarter of 1987, seventy-three percent of those who
applied to Consolidated and eighty-one percent of the people hired
were of Korean origin. 41 Less than one percent of the relevant area
labor market was Korean, and no more than three percent of the
janitorial and cleaning work force was Korean. 42
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
brought suit against Consolidated in 1985 charging that the company
discriminated in favor of persons of Korean origin in violation of Title
V11. 43 After a bench trial, the district court judge dismissed the suit on
the grounds that the EEOC failed to prove either disparate treatment
or disparate impact under Title V11. 44 The EEOC appealed the denial
of its claim of disparate treatment: 45
§ 2000e-5(k) (1988). The court noted that the defendant:shi -den would have been lighter under
the Equal Access to justice Act which requires only that a suit be groundless, not frivolous.
Consolidated, 989 F.2d. at 235, 61 Fair Ern pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 328; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
34 COnSOilliaied, 989 F.2(1 at 236, 61 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330.
35
 Id., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
36 Id. at 234, 61 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 328.
37 1d. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
" Id.
35 Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 235, 61 Fair Etnpl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
46 id. at 237, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330,
41 Id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
42 Id.
93 Id.
44 Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 234, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 328.
45 See id. at 236, 61 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (TINA) at 330. The EEOC did not appeal the denial
of its disparate impact claim. Id. The Seventh Circuit held in Chicago Miniature that word-of-
mouth recruitment was not an employment practice and therefore was not subject to review for
disparate impact. 947 F.2d 292, 305, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 908, 418 (7th Cir. 1991).
Because Chicago Miniature was decided while Consolidated was pending appeal the EEOC aban-
doned its claim. See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330.
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The Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court." The Consolidated court did not find the
necessary intent for a disparate treatment claim from Consolidated's
use of word-of-mouth hiring alone or in combination with other fac-
tors. 47
 The court reasoned that there were legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for Consolidated's use of word-of-mouth hiring. 48
The court reasoned that word-of-mouth hiring was inexpensive
and effective for Consolidated." The court pointed to the fact that
Consolidated used word-of-mouth hiring because it was a small com-
pany and it was the cheapest method of recruitment." In addition, the
court noted that word-of-mouth hiring was effective because Consoli-
dated found all the competent workers it wanted and was able to pay
them what it wanted.51 The Seventh Circuit also reasoned that the
passive stance of recruitment may have provided better employees."
The court stated that because current employees would not want to
get in trouble with their employer they would have an incentive to refer
good people for job openings." Furthermore, the court reasoned that
word-of-mouth hiring provided potential employees with an accurate
job description leading to a higher probability of a good match. 54
The court stated, however, that Consolidated was not exempt from
Title VII because it was a small company." Further, it held efficiency
was not a defense to intentional discrimination." Efficiency was only
relevant, according to the court, because it was the reason why the
method, word-of-mouth hiring, was adopted.57
The court stated that other employment methods Consolidated
could have used for free did not undermine its use of word-of-mouth
hiring because it was unaware of them." Consolidated did not know
about the Illinois job Service and did not use it for that reason." Thus,
48
 See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 238, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 331.
47 See id. at 236-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329-31.
48 See id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
49 Id. at 235-36, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
5° Id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
5L Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.




 Id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
58
 See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
57 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2) (1991). Section 2000e-2(k)(2) provides: "[a]
demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as
a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this tide." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2)
(1991).
58 See Consolidater4 989 F.2d at 235, 61 Fair Em p1. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
59 Id.
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the court refused to infer intent to discriminate from its failure to use
that service."
The court concluded that even when Consolidated did use an
alternative method of hiring its word-of-mouth hiring was not discred-
ited. 6 ' The court noted that the newspaper advertisements Consoli-
dated placed ran for a short period of time and resulted in no hires."
The court reasoned, therefore, that this result reinforced Consoli-
dated's passive use of word-of-mouth hiring."
The court held that the statistical disparity between the rate of
non-hires for Koreans, versus non-Koreans, was not evidence of inten-
tional discrimination 6`1 The court noted that the EEOC could not find
any non-Koreans who were truly interested in the advertised job. 65 In
addition, the court noted that Consolidated did not hire any individu-
als who responded to the advertisement." The court reasoned, there-
fore, that Consolidated did not engage in discriminatory hiring be-
cause it was not, in fact, hiring at all."
The court also reasoned that it was difficult to infer intent, because
of the passive nature of word-of-mouth hiring." The court stated that
only if an employer acts on an aversion or preference for members of
its own ethnic/immigrant community will there be intentional dis-
crimination." As Consolidated took no significant action and there was
no direct evidence of a preference or aversion, the court concluded
that there was no intentional discrimination. 7° The court thus attrib-
uted the outcome of statistical disparity to the make-up of Consoli-
dated's employee community. 71
Finally, the Seventh Circuit stated that knowledge of a disparity is




65 Consolidated 989 F.2d at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
64 See id. at 236-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 330.
65 Id, at 237, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330. The court did not find any of the witnesses
brought in by the EEOC credible. Id. In addition, although the EEOC claimed that 99 non-Ko-




62 Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
69 Id.
7° Id. at 235-36, 61 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
71 Id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
72 Id. at 236, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329 (citing American Nurses' Assoc. v. Illinois,
783 F.2d 716, 722, 40 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cat. (BNA) 244, 249 (7th Cir. 1986); Chicago Miniature,
947 F.2d 292, 299, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1991) (it is not intentional
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stated that a racially or ethnically uniform work force does not impose
a duty on an employer to spend money on advertisements." The court
reasoned that it would be ironic if the EEOC forced immigrants, often
the target of discrimination, to implement expensive hiring proce-
dures." The court stated that immigrant communities are close-knit
and small businesses are often the first opportunity for success." The
court observed, therefore, that to put an additional burden on them
would be counter-productive." The court analogized to black-run busi-
nesses and stated that the potential economic burdens would threaten
minority-owned businesses."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Consolidated,
that word-of-mouth hiring did not compel an inference of intentional
discrimination, augments its previous holding in Chicago Miniature
that word-of-mouth hiring did not bar an inference of intentional
discrimination. Thus, after Consolidated, word-of-mouth hiring by itself
will not be diapositive in cases of disparate treatment under Title VII
in the Seventh Circuit. Two strains of analysis run through the Consoli-
dated opinion." First, the court emphasizes the economic justification
for word-of-mouth hiring which could lead to the application of the
opinion's deferential approach to employers in all contexts." Second,
the court references the intent of Title VII, to protect individuals
vulnerable to discrimination, which would lead to a more limited
application and a deferential approach to the use of word-of-mouth
hiring only in the context of minority/immigrant communities. 8°
The Consolidated opinion could be applied in all word-of-mouth
disparate treatment cases if the court's emphasis on efficiency is fo-
cused on by subsequent courts. The court emphasized the efficient,
effective and common sense nature of word-of-mouth hiring." The
policy of Title VII is given minimal emphasis in comparison. 82 This
discrimination to adopt method of hiring because it is efficient even if employer is satisfied with
resultant racial, religious, ethnic, national-origin or gender composition)).
78
 Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 237, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330.
74 1d, at 238, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 331.
75
 Id. at 237-38, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 331.
76 See id. at 238, 61 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 331.
77 Id.
78 See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 235-38, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 329-31.
78 Id. at 235-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329-30.
80 Id. at 237-38, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 331.
81 /d. at 235-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329-30.
Si See id. at 237-38, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 331. The discussion of the intent of
Title VII is at the very end of the opinion. Id. In contrast, the court begins the opinion with the
economic justifications for word-of-mouth hiring. Id. at 235-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA)
at 329-30.
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structure suggests that the Seventh Circuit will he deferential to em-
ployers in cases of word-of-mouth hiring. The deferential approach of
the court is further suggested when the court accepted Consolidated's
alternative reasons for the use of word-of-mouth hiring, refused to infer
intent from the employer's failure to use other inexpensive hiring
methods and posited rationales for the use of word-of-mouth hiring."
A broad application of the Consolidated opinion would create
problems for minority plaintiffs attempting to establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment where word-of-mouth hiring exists. Such
an application would place the burden on plaintiff's to find more active
employment practices instead of placing the burden on the employer
to justify its practices. A subsequent interpretation based on the
efficiency arguments, therefore, would effectively hurt the minority
plaintiffs that the Consolidated court was attempting to protect and
would be in direct conflict with the intent of Title VII.
The holding in Consolidated should be limited to situations in
which minority or immigrant-owned businesses engage in word-of-
mouth hiring to the detriment of majority groups. A limited applica-
tion of Consolidated is consistent with both Grant and Barnett where
word-of-mouth hiring was scrutinized and held to be evidence of in-
tentional discrimination when it resulted in a racial imbalance in the
work force, but only because additional factors showing intentional
discrimination were present. In Barnett, not only was the employer
using word-of-mouth hiring, but it used a different method of hiring
in a separate part of its business and achieved a racially mixed work
force." Similarly, the employer in Grant engaged in word-of-mouth
hiring, but, in addition, the construction industry in the defendant's
geographic area had a long history of discrimination against blacks."
In Consolidated the court considered irrelevant the company's use of
a Korean language paper for advertising because the advertisement
failed to produce any hires." In Consolidated, therefore, there were no
other factors that indicated discriminatory intent."
In addition, the Consolidated opinion emphasized that Consoli-
dated was an immigrant-owned business." The court noted that the
intent of Title VII is to protect immigrant and minority communities."
85 See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 235-37, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329-30,
84 51 8 E2d at 549, 10 Fair Erni)]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1062.
85 635 F.2d at 1010, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 800.
s6 989 F.2d at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
87 See id,
88 id. at 238, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 331.
89 See id.
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To apply the holding to majority-owned businesses, however, would
hurt minorities and immigrants in contradiction of Title VII. The
ramifications of a limited application of the Consolidated holding would
be that discrimination would only be hard to prove when a minority
or immigrant-owned business used a passive approach like word-of-
mouth hiring to the detriment of a majority group.
In sum, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v.
Consolidated Service Systems, held that a minority-owned business' use
of word-of-mouth hiring did not compel an inference of intentional
discrimination under Title VII. 9° The result reached in Consolidated
does not contradict the intent of Title VII and previous decisions if its
reasoning is held to the context of minority or immigrant owned
businesses. If the court's deferential approach to an employer's eco-
nomically driven decision to use word-of-mouth hiring is taken out of
the context of a small, minority-owned business, however, a significant
burden of proof will be placed on minority plaintiffs when faced with
discrimination due to word-of-mouth hiring. This result would be in
direct contradiction to the intent of Title VII.
V. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. *ADEA Protection Does Not Extend to Employees Fired to Avoid
Payment of Full Pension Benefits: Hazen Paper Co. v. Bigginsl
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter
"ADEA") makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against any
employee or potential employee on the basis of age.2
 The law aims "to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment
"3
 More specifically, the ADEA strives to protect those Americans
who are age forty or older from age discrimination. 4
Recently, the United States Circuit Courts have differed over the
issue of whether frustration of certain employee benefits, like pension
90 See id. at 235, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
* By Robert Toner, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 113 S. Ct. 1701, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793 (1993) [hereinafter Hazen Paper Co.).
2 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1988). The pertinent language of § 623 (a) (1) states: "It shall be
unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
3 29 U.S.C. § 621(h) (1988).
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988). The pertinent language of § 631(a) states: "The prohibitions
in this chapter ... shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." Id.
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plans, can lead to employer liability under the ADEA. 8 The First, Third,
and Seventh Circuits have determined that such benefits are so inex-
tricably intertwined with age that employment decisions based upon
them constitute age discrimination under the ADEA. 6 In contrast, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that interference with these types
of benefits are analytically distinct from age discrimination and em-
ployers who discriminate on the basis of these benefits should not be
held liable under the AREA.'
In 1988, in White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the firing of a 51 -year-
old employee just prior to the complete vestiture of his pension
benefits could violate the ADEA if that law is analyzed using the the
disparate treatment theory.8 Westinghouse terminated White three
months before his pension fully vested. 9 The company did not replace
him.'° The court reasoned that such pension benefits were "inextrica-
bly linked" to an employee's years of service and are thus linked to his
or her age." The court also emphasized that there is a close practical
link between pension benefits, seniority, and age. 12 Thus, the court
held that employment decisions based upon the status of a worker's
pension plan could constitute age discrimination.' 3
5 Compare White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62, 48 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas, (DNA)
597, 601 (3rd Cir. 1988) (older employee fired to prevent pension benefits from vesting stated
cause of action under the ADEA) and Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1206, 44 Fair Dupl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1339, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987) (older employee fired because of higher, seniority-
based pay stated cause of action under the ADEA) with EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936,
942, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256, 262 (4th Cir. 1992) (older employees fired because of
seniority and higher pay do not state a cause of action under the ADEA) and Williams v. General
Motors Corp., 656 E2d 120, 130 n.17, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1381, 1388-89 n.17 (5th
Cir. 1981) (older employees fired because of seniority status do not state a cause of action under
the ADEA), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
6 See Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1412, 57 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) 1160,
1162 (1st Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Biggins]; White, 862 F.2d at 62, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 001; Metz, 828 F2d at 1206, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1342.
7 See Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 943, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 263; Williams, 656 F.2d
at ISO n.17, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1388 n.17.
N White, 862 F.2d at 62, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 601. The Court of'Appeals overruled
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine whether White had been subjected to age discrimination. Id.
For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the use of the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories under the ADEA, see infra note 54.
9 While, 862 F.2d at 58-59, 48 Fair Em pl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 598.
1 °./d. at 58, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 598.
11 id. at 62, 48 Fair Empl. l't-ac. Cas. (DNA) at 601. The vestiture of White's pension was based
solely on his years of service with the company and not the attainment of a certain age. See id.
at 58-59, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 598.
12 See id. at 62, 48 Fair Em pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 601.
13 Id.
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Similarly, in 1987, in Metz v. Transit Mix, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the ADEA using the
disparate treatment theory, held that an employer could not fire
higher-paid, more senior employees even if it claimed the move was a
cost-cutting measure." Transit Mix fired the 54-year-old, highly-paid
Metz and replaced him with a 43-year-old assistant manager for ap-
proximately half the salary Metz received. 15 Even though Metz and the
assistant manager were both within the class protected by the ADEA,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that allowing such economic discrimina-
tion would undermine the policies behind the ADEA.I 6 The court
reasoned that employment decisions based upon such economic fac-
tors like savings in salary constituted age discrimination."
The court rejected the defendant's argument that ADEA liability
only applied when such economic factors affected older workers as a
whole and not when the company evaluated such factors on an indi-
vidual basis.' 8 The court reasoned that this distinction was incorrect
because the ADEA was intended to protect the individual employee,
not a class of employees.' 9 The court held, therefore, that employment
actions based on economic factors such as salary increases based upon
an employee's seniority within the company, even when carried out in
individual cases, would amount to age discrimination.°
Conversely, in 1992, in EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the move by Clay
Printing to remove more senior, higher-paid workers did not violate
the ADEA, as understood under the disparate treatment theory, even
though years of service played a part in the decision-making process. 2 '
In Clay, the company fired five long-time employees, all of whom were
over forty and, therefore, within the protected class. 22 The court rea-
soned that no connection exists between the age and length of service
of an employee." The fact that an employee has served a company for
14 828 F.2d at 1206, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1342.
15 Id. at 1203-04, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1340.
16 /d. at 1207, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1343.
17 Id. at 1206, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1342. The court also cited a Second Circuit
opinion which held that employment decisions based upon an employee's unpaid pension
benefits would likewise constitute age discrimination. Id. at 1208, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA)
at 1343 (citing Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Stipp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part,
reed and remanded in part without opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979)).
19 See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1206, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1342.
19 1d.
" Id.
21 955 F.2d 936, 943, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256, 263 (4th Cir. 1992).
2 '.4 Id. at 938-39, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 259.
29 Id. at 942, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 262.
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many years, the court reasoned, does not necessarily mean that workers
will have reached an age within the protected class. 24 Thus, the court
concluded that pensions, and other benefits based upon years of serv-
ice, are not connected to age for the purposes of interpreting the
AD EA. 25
Finally, in 1981, in Williams.
 v. General Motors Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that seniority and age
were unrelated for the purposes of ADEA claims as understood under
the disparate treatment theory. 26
 Fifteen employees of General Motors
brought suit against the company after they were either terminated or
demoted from salaried to hourly wage positions. 27
 The court pointed
out that the statute protects only persons who have reached an age
within the protected class. 28
 The court reasoned that persons within
the protected class may, or may not, have reached the years of service
required to receive benefits associated with seniority such as the vesting
of a pension plan.2"
Thus, the Fifth Circuit implied that the ADEA should not be
extended to protect workers on the basis of arguably what are only
"age-related" factors." The court stated that the law requires only that
employers not discriminate on the basis of age, but it does not force
them to accord special treatment to members of the protected group. 31
The court, therefore, held that employers who discriminate based
upon arguably "age-related" factors should not be held liable under
the ADEA.32
During the Survey year, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the United
States Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits by holding that
an employer did not violate the ADEA when it fired a worker solely on
the basis of factors other than age." In so holding, the Court adopted
24 Id.
25
 See id. at 943, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 263.
26 656 F.2d 120, 130 n.17, 26 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) 1381, 1388 n.17 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Court of Appeals chided the district court for blurring the analytical distinction that the
Court of Appeals held existed between age and seniority status. Id.
27 Id. at 122, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 1382.
25
 Id. at 130 n.17, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1388 n.17. The changes in the employees'
positions occurred during widespread "personal adjustments" that the company instituted during
a recession. Id. at 122, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1382.
29 1d. at 130 n.17, 215 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1388 n.17. The court set out a simple
example illustrating the distinction: a 35-year-old worker, who falls outside the protected age
group, could have more seniority than a protected 55-year-old worker. Id.
5" See id.
31 Williams, 656 F.2d at 129, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1388.
32 Id. at 130 n.17, 26 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1388 n.17.
"113 S. Ct.. 1701, 1705, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793, 795 (1993).
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the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that decisions to fire
employees based upon factors such as pension benefits or seniority
status are analytically distinct from age discrimination." After Hazen,
therefore, employers will not be liable under the ADEA merely for
interfering with an older worker's pension benefits or factors other
than age, unless a clear connection is made between such an interfer-
ence and discrimination based upon the employee's age. 35
The respondent in Hazen, Biggins, was the first technical director
for the petitioner Hazen Paper Company (hereinafter "Hazen"). 36
Biggins worked for Hazen for more than nine-and-a-half years." His
benefits package included a pension plan which would have provided
him with $93,000 when it fully vested after ten years of service to the
company." Biggins became embroiled in a salary dispute with his
employer and was discharged when he was 62-years-old." He then filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
set. 40is Biggins claimed that Hazen had violated the ADEA. 4 '
The district court awarded Biggins damages under all of his claims
against Hazen. 42 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit upheld the district court's findings and held that, since the "age
discrimination" was willful, Biggins was entitled to liquidated damages
under the ADEA.43 Even though his pension plan was based upon
Biggins' years of service, the court noted that "but for" Biggins' age,
his pension rights would not have been within a "hairbreadth of vest-
ing."'" The First Circuit, therefore, concluded that it was appropriate
for the jury to decide whether age was inextricably linked to Biggins'
termination and whether Hazen's action violated the ADEA. 45
34 See id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
35 See id.
35 Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1410, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1160,
1162 (1st Cir. 1992),
"Id.
38 Id. at 1411, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1163.
39 Id. at 1410, 1411, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1163, 1164.
40 Id. at 1408, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1160-61.
41 Biggins, 953 F.2d at 1408, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1161. Biggins also claimed
that the company had violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1988), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12 §§ 11(11) (I) (1986), and
various state law claims. Id.
42 Id. at 1408, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1161. The jury awarded Biggins $560,775
for the AREA claim, $100,000 for the ERISA claim, $315,098 on a fraud claim, $266,897 for
breach of contract and a token award of $1 for state civil rights violations. Id.
43 Id. at 1416, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1167. The court slightly lowered the original
amount awarded by the jury before liquidating the damages. Id. The final award for the ADEA
claim was $838,908.76, Id.
44 Id. at 1412, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1164.
45 Id.
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On grant of certiorari to resolve the ambiguity in the circuit
courts, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
First Circuit's decision." The Court held that frustration of a worker's
pension benefits and other employment decisions based wholly on
factors other than age could not lead to ADEA liability for an em-
ployer. 4'? A majority of the Court reasoned that ADEA protection could
not be extended to Biggins if he was fired solely because he was close
to vesting, and it therefore remanded the case to determine if there
was sufficient evidence to show that Biggins' age was Hazen's primary
motivation for firing him."
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the primary
evil the ADEA sought to eliminate was "inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes" about older workers." Justice O'Connor implied that al-
though Biggins' age placed him within the protected class, if pension
interference, by itself, were considered actionable under the ADEA an
employee outside the class could win on an ADEA claim. 50 Using
reasoning similar to that used in Williams v. General Molars Carp.,''
Justice O'Connor concluded that a person could have enough years of
service to qualify for pension benefits and yet not have reached the
minimum age of forty required for ADEA protection.52 The majority,
therefore, reasoned that age and years of service are analytically dis-
tinct's The majority concluded that interference with Biggins' pension
benefits, by itself, did not necessarily constitute impermissible age
discrimination as interpreted under the ADEA using the disparate
treatment theory. 54
46 11azen Paper Co. v, Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1710, 61 Fair Entpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793,
798 (1993).
47
 Id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796. The Court also clarified the meaning
of "willful" under § 7(b) of the ADEA stating that a plaintiff' only has to show that an employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard over whether it violated that law to establish willfulness.
Id. at 1710, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 798.
48 1d. at 1707, 1708, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796, 797.
49
 Id. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795.
50 See id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
51 See supra note 29.
52
 See Hawn Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 796.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1705, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, prefaced her opinion by clarifying the distinction between the disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories utilized in analyzing cases of possible employment discrimination in
Title VII sexual harassment claims. See id. at 1705-06, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 795.
Justice O'Connor stated that, under a disparate treatment claim, if an employer discriminated
against a worker because of a certain trait, it would be imperative that the worker prove that the
trait was the determinative factor behind the disparate treatment. Id. at 1705, 61 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 795. In contrast, Justice O'Connor noted that under a disparate impact claim, a
worker need only show that a facially neutral employment practice fell more harshly on his or
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The majority emphasized that its decision did not mean that an
employer could lawfully fire a worker merely to avoid paying full
pension benefits. 55
 The majority limited its holding by stating that this
case involved a claim of disparate treatment and not disparate impact.56
The majority also noted the possibility that an employee in such a
situation could seek relief on other grounds. 57
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Thomas and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, asserted that the majority's opin-
ion should not be read to imply that the disparate impact theory will
succeed in ADEA cases. 58
 Justice Kennedy argued that the Court had
not previously addressed this question and that there were substantial
questions about the propriety of extending the disparate impact analy-
sis from Title VII to ADEA cases.59
 Furthermore, the concurrence
pointed out that the issue was not raised in this case, because Biggins
only asserted a disparate treatment claim against Hazen.°
The majority did not foreclose the possibility that pension status
could play a role in a successful ADEA claim. 61 For example, an em-
ployer who makes the logical link between age and pension or seniority
status and then discriminates against older employees could be liable
under the ADEA.62
 Likewise, an employee might successfully sue an
employer under the ADEA if a company discriminates on the basis of
age and pension status.65 Finally, the majority implied that ADEA liabil-
ity could arise in the event that a company fired an employee before
his or her pension was about to vest as a result of reaching an age
within the protected class. 64 In spite of these alternatives, the fact
remains that unless the employee makes a clear connection between
possibly "age-related" factors and age, the ADEA cannot be used to
prevent discrimination based upon anything other than age. 65
her protected class and that the practice could not he justified by business necessity. Id. Justice
O'Connor further observed that the disparate treatment theory could be used in ADEA cases,
but that the Court had never decided whether the disparate impact theory could also be utilized.
Id. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795. The majority declined to examine the issue,
because Biggins had only claimed disparate treatment. Id.
55 Id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
56
 Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795,
57 See id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796. For example, the Court did not
disturb the ER1SA and state law claim judgments that Biggins received. See id.
58 Id. at 1710, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 798-99.
59 1d. at 1710, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 799.
6° Id. at 1710, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 798.
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The majority, while adopting the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' posi-
tion that there is a distinction between age and pension or seniority
status, declined to discuss whether disparate impact cases can be
brought under the ADEA. 66 The Metz case, however, which was cited
approvingly by the majority, discussed two precedents in which employ-
ers were held liable under the ADEA through the use of the disparate
impact theory.° Since the Hazen majority declined to address this issue,
employees within the protected class may still try to use the disparate
impact theory as a potential avenue for holding employers liable under
the ADEA if they discriminate on the basis of pending pension vestiture
or other possibly "age-related" benefits. 68
The Hazen majority also suggested, in dicta, other ways in which
the interference with pension or seniority status or other possibly
"age-related "
 benefits may be utilized to successfully sue an employer
under the ADEA. 69
 If a plaintiff demonstrates that the employer made
the logical link between pension benefits and a worker's age and then
fired that employee, the employer might be liable under the ADEA."
Similarly, if a plaintiff proves that a company took action based upon
pension or other possibly "age-related" benefits and age, the company
could be liable under the ADEA, 7 ' Lastly, in the unlikely event that a
person's pension vested because he or she had reached an age within
the protected class, then the employer could be held liable under the
ADEA. 72
In sum, the decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins definitively
resolved that an employer's interference with a worker's pension
benefits did not, by itself, constitute age discrimination under the
ADEA as interpreted using the disparate impact theory." Although
employees will not succeed by merely proving that employment deci-
sions were based upon pension or seniority status or the existence of
other possibly "age-related" benefits, companies will not have an im-
penetrable defense if they claim to be making these decisions based
upon such "economic factors."74 As the Hazen majority implied, an
66 See Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795.
67 See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1207-08, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 1339,
1343 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir.
1983) and Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981)).
68
 See. Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795.
69 1d, at 1707-08, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796-97.
7° See id. at 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
71 See id. In fact, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court because there was sonic
evidence that might lead 10 liability for Hazen under the ADEA as well as ERISA. See id.
72 See id.
" See 113 S. Ct, at 1705, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795.
74 Id. at 1707-08, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 796-97.
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employee will have the burden of proof to show the nexus between
such factors and impermissible age discrimination. 75 An employee may
also be successful if he or she can demonstrate that a purportedly
neutral employment action involving pension or seniority status, or
similar "economic factors," disparately impacts older workers. 76 In the
final analysis, it appears that the majority in Hazen has only made it
more difficult, but not impossible, for plaintiffs to gain ADEA protec-
tion when employers interfere with their pension, seniority or "age-re-
lated" benefits,"
VI. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. *An Employer's Duty to Accommodate its Employees' Religious Beliefs
Under Title VII: Cook v. Chrysler Corporation'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's religion. 2 It
was unclear when Congress passed Title VII, however, whether an
employer was prevented from discharging an employee who, for relig-
ious reasons, refused to work during the employer's normal workweek. 3
This question was first addressed by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC") in its 1966 Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Religion.' The EEOC initially required that an employer
affirmatively accommodate the religious needs of employees short of
serious inconvenience to the employer's business. 5 In 1967, the EEOC
amended its guidelines to require employers to reasonably accommo-
date employees' religious needs short of undue hardship on the em-




* Reed Sussman, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 981 F.2d 336, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 647 (8th Cir. 1992).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a) ( I), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1988). This provision states
in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin
3 See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1697,
1700 (1977).
4 BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 210 (2d ed.
1983); 29 CFR § 1605.1(a) (2) (1966).
5 29 CFR § 1605.1 (a) (2) (1967); TWA, 432 U.S. at 72, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1700.
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to mitigate the impact of employer policies, neutral on their face, upon
employees whose religious convictions prohibited them from working
on the Sabbath or other religiously observed days.?
In 1970, the EEOC's amended Guidelines were challenged by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co.8 In Dewey, the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to work
on Sundays in accordance with his religious beliefs. 9 The court, in
holding for the employer, concluded that the requirement of accom-
modation to religious beliefs was contained only in the EEOC Guide-
lines and was without statutory basis.° In 1971, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision by an equally
divided court." Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision was not
entitled to precedential weight, and the issues of "reasonable accom-
modation" and "undue hardship" were therefore left undefined. 12
In 1972, Congress resolved the issue raised in Dewey by amending
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'s A newly added provision, section 701(j),
placed upon employers a statutory affirmative duty to "reasonably
accommodate" employees' religious beliefs, still limited by the proviso
that such accommodation need not go so far as to impose an undue
hardship on the employer's business." Section 701(j), however, did not
provide any practical guidance for determining the degree of accom-
modation required by an employer or what constitutes an undue hard-
ship.'' Furthermore, the scant legislative history of section 701(j) of-
fered little assistance in ascertaining the extent of the obligation
created by the amendment. 16
 Likewise, cases decided in the circuit
7 SCH	 & GROSSMAN, .Supra note 4, at 210.
See 429 F.2d 324, 327, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 687, 688 (original opinion), reh'g
denied, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 869 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court,
402 U.S. 689, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 508 (1971).
9 See id. at 329, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 869.
1 ° See id, at 334, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 870.
11 402 U.S. 689, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 508 (1971). The Court split 4-4, with Justice
Harlan not taking part in the decision.
"Id. See 3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 92.11 (1993);
see also TWA, 432 U.S. at 73 n.8, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1701 (judgment entered by
an equally divided court is not "entitled to precedentiall weight"(quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 192 (1972))).
13 See SCH LEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 211. Section 701 (j) states:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accom-
modate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 70I(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
14
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
15 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988); TWA, 432 U.S. at 74,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1701.
16 See 118 CoNG. Rm. 705 (1972). See TWA, 432 U.S. at 74-75, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
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courts since the passage of section 701(j) provided little guidance
concerning the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate an em-
ployee's religious beliefs.' 7
In 1977, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the United States
Supreme Court clarified the "reasonable accommodation" standard by
holding that employers need not take accommodation steps which
would require the employer to bear more than a de minimis financial
cost.'' In TWA, the plaintiffs religion required that he refrain from
performing any work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday.' 9
The work shifts of all TWA employees were governed by a seniority
provision in a collective bargaining agreement, whereby the most sen-
ior employees would have first choice for job and shift assignments as
they became available." A conflict arose when the plaintiff, because of
his low seniority, was asked to work Saturdays. 21
Upon being informed of the plaintiffs religious needs, TWA
made an effort to find the plaintiff another job where the hours would
not conflict with his religious observances. 22 When this failed, the
plaintiff proposed either that his shift be exchanged with another
worker or that he work only four days per week." TWA informed the
(BNA) at 1701-02; LAitsox & LARSON, supra note 12, at § 92.11, 19-34; Sara L. Silbiger, Note,
Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title VII's Religious Accommodation Requirement Since
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53 Foitintam L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1985). Senator Jennings
Randolph, the proponent of the § 701 (j), expressed his general desire "to assure that freedom
from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by law,"
but made no attempt to define the circumstances under which the "reasonable accommodation"
requirement would be applied or how it would be applied. TWA, 432 U.S. at 74-75, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1701-02.
17 See Sally Brandes, Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment—The Undoing of Title VII's
Reasonable Accommodation Standard, 44 Bitoolt. L. REV. 598, 600 n.12 (1978). The Fifth, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits have found the accommodation standard satisfied in cases where employers
have refused to take steps that would permit an employee to observe the Sabbath at the expense
of other employees. See Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 489, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 5, 9, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1408 (10th Cir.
1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 E2d 512, 521, 11 Fair Finial. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 129,
136 (6th Cir. 1975), milk denied, 525 F.2d 986, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 608, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1408 (1976); Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 497 F.2d
128, 130, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 371, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
however, have reached the opposite conclusion on similar fact patterns without attempting to
justify the differing results. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 522, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1975); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113,
1118, 4 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1972).
18 See 432 U.S. at 84, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1705.
19 /d. at 67, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
20 Id. at 67, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1698.
21 Id. at 68, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
22 Id.
23 TWA, 432 U.S. at 68-69, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
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plaintiff that they could not accommodate either of his proposals, 24
The plaintiff continued to miss work on Saturdays and was eventually
discharged for unexcused absences. 25
The Court, holding for the employer, interpreted section 701(j)
to mean that employers need only make a good faith effort to accom-
modate an employee's religious beliefs and need not take accommo-
dation steps which would require the employer to bear more than a de
minimis financial cost. 26 The Court focused its opinion on the effect
that accommodating the plaintiff's religious needs would have on the
plaintiffs co-employees. 27 The Court concluded that, to accommodate
the plaintiff, TWA would have to deprive other employees of their shift
preferences because they did not adhere to a religion that observed
the Saturday Sabbath:2' After examining section 701 (j) and its legisla-
tive history, the Court concluded that the emphasis of Title VII is
on eliminating discrimination, and such discrimination is proscribed
when it is directed against majorities as well as minorities. 29
Furthermore, the Court determined that the collective bargaining
agreement itself represented a significant accommodation to the
needs, both secular and religious, of all of TWA's employees." The
Court reasoned that, although a collective bargaining agreement may
not be employed to violate Title VII, the duty to accommodate does
not require an employer to take steps inconsistent with an otherwise
valid agreement.' 1 Finally, the Court reasoned that to accommodate
24 See id. The plaintiff's proposal to have his shift exchanged with another employee was
rejected because the union was not willing to violate the seniority provisions set out in the
collective bargaining contract . . . ." Id. at 68, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1699. The
plaintiff's proposal that he only work four days a week was also rejected because:
[His] job was essential, and on weekends he was the only available person on his
shift to perform it. To leave the position empty would have impaired supply shop
functions, which were critical to airline operations; to fill the plaintiff's position
with a supervisor or employee from another area would simply have undermanned
another operation; and to employ someone not regularly assigned to work Satur-
days would have required TWA to pay premium wages.
Id. at 68-69, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
23 See id. at 69, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699.
26 See id. at 78-79, 84, 14 Fair Pimp]. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1703, 1705.
27
 See id. at 80-81, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1704.
28 TWA, 432 U.S. at 81, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1704.
29 Id. ("It would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommodation' Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as well as
deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs
of others . . .").
3° Id. at 78, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1703.
31 Id, at 79, 14 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1703 ("Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting
workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our
national labor policy ... ,").
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the plaintiff, TWA would have to cover his shift with other available
employees at premium wage." The Court reasoned that this accommo-
dation surpassed the threshold requirement of de minimis cost and was
therefore an "undue hardship."'
Following TWA, the Eighth Circuit has consistently applied the
TWA Court's interpretation of section 701 (j) . 34 For example, in 1979,
in Wren v. T.I.M.E.—D. C., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that an employer need not take steps to ac-
commodate an employee's religious needs if doing so would deprive
other employees of their contractual rights." Wren involved a member
of the Worldwide Church of God who sought relief from driving his
truck on Saturdays." The Wren court, holding for the employer, con-
cluded that arranging for the plaintiff to have Saturdays off would
violate the seniority system of the collective bargaining agreement."
Furthermore, the court found that replacing the plaintiff on Saturdays
would require the employer to bear more than the threshold de mini-
mis cost." These costs included finding replacement drivers and mak-
ing contributions to insurance and pension funds, as required when
utilizing such replacement drivers." Consequently, the court held that
the employer had not violated Title VII in discharging the plaintiff.°
During the Survey year, in Cook v. Chrysler Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an employer's obli-
gation to "reasonably accommodate" an employee's religious beliefs
does not require that the employer compromise other employees'
contractual rights as secured by a collective bargaining agreement, or
engage in preferential treatment based solely on an employee's relig-
ious beliefs if the financial cost of such treatment is more than de
s2 1d. at 84, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1705.
"See TWA, 432 U.S. at 84, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1705.
34 See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, 762 F.2d 671, 674, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1409, 1411 (8th Cir. 1985)(no violation of Title VII because collective bargaining agree-
ment in effect provided reasonable accommodation of plaintiff's religious needs); Brown v.
General Motors Corp., 601 E2d 956, 958-59, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94, 95-96 (8th Cir.
1979) (Tide VII violated where accommodation would neither contravene collective bargaining
agreement nor result in more than de minimis cost to employer); Wren v. T.I.M.E.—D.C., Inc.,
595 F.2d 441, 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 584, 587 (8th Cir. 1979) (no Title VII violation
where accommodation would deprive other employees of their contractual rights and would
require employer to bear a more than de minimis cost).
"595 F.2d at 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 587.
36 See id. at 443, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
37 Id. at 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 587.
38 Id.
"Id. at 443, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
40 See Wren, 595 F.2d at 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 587.
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minimis. 4 ' In Cook, the plaintiff, Jesse L. Cook, was an assembly line
worker whose religious beliefs forbade him from working on the Sab-
bath.42
 The court reasoned that to accommodate Cook's requests for
relief from his Friday night shift, Chrysler would have to contravene
the seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement and
incur significant costs to its business. 43
 Accordingly, the court held that
Chrysler had not violated Title VII by discharging Cook.'"
Cook began his employment in Assembly Plant 1, one of Chrys-
ler's two automobile plants in St. Louis in January, 1976. 95 As a member
of the Local 110 UAW ("Union"), Cook's employment was covered by
a national collective bargaining agreement with Chrysler.° The na-
tional agreement set forth a two-shift production schedule; Shift 1
operated Monday through Saturday from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM and Shift
2 operated Monday through Saturday from 4:00 PM to midnight. 47
Under this agreement, shift assignments at the St. Louis plants were
determined by seniority and could not be changed by Chrysler without
Union vote and approval." The agreement also provided a no-fault
absenteeism policy, known as the Uniform Attendance Procedure,
which provided a six-step system of progressive discipline to deal with
excessive absenteeism.° In addition, to address the particular problem
of Friday night absenteeism, the local agreement at Plant 2 was
amended in 1985 to include a "book system" which allowed employees
to sign up in a book for an excused day off on a first-come-first-serve
basis."
In October 1985, Cook became a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church.51
 One of the tenets of the Church is that a member
41 See 981 F.2(1 336, 338, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 647, 648 (8th Cir, 1992).
42 Id. at 337, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at (147.
See id. at 338, 339, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 648, 649.
44 See id. at 340, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 649.
45
 Id. at 337, 60 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 648.
45 Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 779 F. Stipp. 1016, 1018, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1180, 1 182
(E.D. Mo. 1991).
47 Id.
45 See id. at 1018-19, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1182.
49 Id. Under the procedure, no discipline is mandated for the first six absences in any six
month period (excused or unexcused) but additional unexcused absences result in progressive
discipline in six successive steps. Id. at 1018, 57 Fair Erupt Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1182. For the first
unexcused absence, the worker is counseled by Chrysler and the Union. Id. at 1018-19, 57 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1182. The second step is additional counseling, the third is a five day
lay-off, the fourth is a fifteen day lay-off; the fifth is a thirty day lay-off, and the sixth step results
in permanent discharge from employment. Id. at 1019, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1182.
50 Id. at 1019, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1182. Friday nights were the most sought
after night for excused absences. Id,
51 Id. at 1020, 57 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 1183.
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may not perform manual labor from sundown Friday to sundown
Saturday." While working at Plant 1, Cook was assessed Step I disci-
pline under the Uniform Attendance Procedure due to unexcused
absences on Friday nights. 55 In January 1986, however, Cook was laid-
off from Plant 1 and then transferred to Plant 2 before any additional
disciplinary measures were taken for these unexcused Friday night
absences at Plant 1."
Soon after his transfer to Plant 2, Cook informed his supervisor
of his religious beliefs and his inability to work on Friday nights. 55 Cook
proposed a shift change, working on a Sunday instead of Friday, or
alternatively, a flexible schedule.56 His supervisor contacted the Union
shop steward and the labor relations supervisor in an effort to accom-
modate Cook. 57
 While waiting for a response from his supervisor, Cook
continued to accrue unexcused absences on Friday nights." He was
progressively disciplined pursuant to the six-step procedure.TM' Shortly
thereafter, Cook's supervisor informed him that Chrysler could not
accommodate him by changing his shift. 6° Cook continued to miss
work on Fridays and was eventually discharged. 61
On September 24, 1986, Cook filed a religious discrimination
claim with the EEOC against Chrysler. 62
 The EEOC issued a Right to
Sue letter, and Cook subsequently filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 65 He alleged that he was discharged by Chrysler on
the basis of his religion and sought reinstatement, back pay, seniority,
lost benefits and legal fees." The district court ruled in favor of Chrys-
ler, holding that Chrysler's efforts to accommodate Cook satisfied the
requirements of Title V11. 65
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision by applying a two-pronged
52 Cook, 779 F. Supp. at 1020, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1183.
1d.
59 Id.





59 See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the six-step procedure.
60 Cook, 981 F.2d at 338, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 648.
61 Id.
62 Cook, 779 F. Supp. at 1022, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1184.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1022, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1184-85.
65 Id. at 1025, 57 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1187-88.
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test to determine whether Chrysler had violated Title VII's "reasonable
accommodation" standard. 66
 The test, which mirrored the Supreme
Court's reasoning in TWA and the Eighth Circuit's previous line of
cases, stated that differential treatment of co-employees resulting from
the accommodation of an employee's religious needs runs afoul of
Title VII if it: I) compromises other employees' contractual rights as
secured by a collective bargaining agreement; or 2) confers a privilege,
the cost of which is more than de minimis, solely on the basis of the
recipient's religious belief's.°
Addressing the first prong of the test, the court held that accom-
modating Cook would indeed compromise other employees' contrac-
tual rights as secured by the collective bargaining agreement.° The
court concluded that to grant Cook the shift change he desired, Chrys-
ler would have had to contravene its seniority system. 69
 The court
stressed that shift preference under this system was highly prized by
the employees and that accommodating Cook would deprive other
employees of this privilege." Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
seniority system, which established a neutral method of minimizing the
number of occasions when an employee would have to work on a day
he would prefer to have off, itself provided a significant accommoda-
tion to the religious and secular needs of Chrysler's employees. 7 '
Turning to the second prong, the court held that all possible
accommodations that would not violate the collective bargaining
agreement would result in more than a de minimis cost to Chrysler."
According to the court, to allow Cook excused absences every Friday
would result in his becoming a part-time employee with full-time
benefits." Chrysler provided evidence demonstrating that the cost of
a benefits package when an employee was absent once a week ex-
" Cook, 981 17.2d at 338, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 648. This two-pronged test was
first introduced by the Eighth Circuit in Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2c1 956, 962, 20
Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) 94, 98 (8th Cir. 1979).
67 See Cook, 981 F.2d at 338, 61) Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 648; TWA, 432 U.S. at 84-85,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1705-06; see also Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, 762 F.2d
671, 674, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409, 1411 (8th Cir, 1985); Brown v. General Motors
Corp., 601 F.2d at 962, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98; Wren v. T.I.M.E.--D.C., Inc., 595
F.2(1 441, 445, 19 Fair Etnpl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 584, 587 (8th Cir. 1979); Huston v. Local No. 93,
Intern. U., United, Etc., 559 F.2c1 477, 480, 16 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) 326, 328.
68 Cook, 981 F.2d at 338, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 648.
69 1d. at 338, 60 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 649.
70 See id. at 338-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 649.
71
 Id. at 339, 60 Fair Empt Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 649.
72 Id.
73 Cook, 981 F.2d at 339, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 649.
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ceeded $1,500 per year." In addition, the court reasoned that replacing
Cook every Friday night would require Chrysler to utilize a "floater"—a
full-time employee who replaces other workers due to vacations, ad-
vanced excused absences, or medical emergencies. 75 Furthermore, if a
floater was needed to replace Cook on a regular basis, another floater
would have to be hired at full wages to keep an adequate number of
floaters available for other absences. 76 Finally, the court concluded that
Cook's absence would affect the quality of work because more repairs
and lower efficiency result when a temporary worker is used on the
After Cook, it is highly unlikely that an Eighth Circuit court will
ever find that an employer has failed to accommodate an employee's
religious beliefs. The Cook court's two-pronged test practically eviscer-
ates the employer's burden of accommodating an employee's religious
practices. In effect, the Cook court has circumscribed an employee's
right to seek a meaningful accommodation of his or her religious
beliefs. 78
 If an employee's work schedule is governed by any contract
or policy which is neutral on its face, the employer's duty to accommo-
date is satisfied. 79
 Even if no contract exists, or an accommodation is
suggested by the employer that does not contravene such a contract,
the employer need only show that the hardship caused by such an
accommodation passes the very low threshold of de minimis cost. 8°
The Cook court's two-pronged test, which puts great emphasis on
the concept of unequal treatment of co-employees, also seems incon-
sistent with the purpose behind section 701(1). Although it has been
well documented that the legislative history of the amendment is of
no assistance in setting guidelines for the standards of "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship," the purpose of the amend-
ment can be clearly discerned. 8' Senator Randolph, the sponsor of
section 701(j), made it clear that the statute's purpose was to protect
Sabbath observers from employers who discharge employees whose
74 Id.
75 See Cook, 779 F. Supp. at 1021, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1184.
76 Cook, 981 F.2d at 339, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 649.
77 Id.
78 See Laurel A. Bedig, Comment, The Supreme Court Narrows an Employer's Duty to Acrom-
modate an Employee's Religious Practices Under Title VII, 53 BROOK. L. Ray. 245, 268 (1987).
79 See Cook, 981 F.2d at 338-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 648-49.
8° See id. at 338, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 648.
81 See 118 CONG. Ityc. 705 (1972). See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74-75,
14 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1701-02 (1977); LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, at
§ 92.11; Silbiger, supra note 16, at 841-42.
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religious practices require them to abstain from work on particular
days. 82
To truly conform with the meaning and purpose of section 701(j),
employers should be obligated to consider all possible accommoda-
tions, even if the employee's work schedule is governed by a neutral
contract. Only if all possible accommodations are shown to result in
an "undue hardship" should the employer be relieved of its Title VII
obligation. Focusing on the unequal treatment of co-employees con-
tradicts the original purpose behind section 701(j).
Furthermore, the de minimis cost test for "undue hardship" is far
too low a threshold for section 701(j) to have any true meaning.
"Undue hardship" arguably comprehends more hardship than simply
that which is necessary to bring about accommodation at al1. 8s Under
the de minimis test, however, hardship is more likened to inconven-
ience. To truly reach the purpose of the statute of protecting employ-
ees' religious liberty, employers must be obligated to make more than
mere de minimis economic sacrifices to insure that their employees are
being accommodated.
Currently, however, employers in the Eighth Circuit know that all
they need to do is offer the bare minimum in terms of accommodation
to their employees. 84 Courts interpreting section 701(j) should seek a
compromise between the employee's religious needs and the em-
ployer's economic needs. Courts should not analyze accommodation
cases utilizing a rigid two-pronged test, but rather should adopt a more
sensitive inquiry into the facts of each case. This inquiry should value
the employee's moral commitment to his or her religious beliefs
equally with the employer's economic interests. This approach would
more likely reach Senator Randolph's original purpose in enacting
section 701(j) of protecting employees with special religious needs.
Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit does not seem interested in ap-
proaching its accommodation cases with this heightened level of sen-
sitivity.
In sum, the Eighth Circuit has interpreted section 701(j) to pro-
tect the employers and their economic interests, not the employees
and their religious beliefs. The Cook court, by resorting to a rigid,
standardized two-pronged test, has struck another harsh blow to the
"reasonable accommodation" duly, which was already wounded by the
82 1 18 CONG. Rec. 705 (1972). See TWA, 432 U.S. at 89, 14 Fair Entpl. Vrac. Cas. (MA) at
1708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 See Silbiger, supra note 16, at 841.
84 See Bedig, supra note 78, at 268.
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Eighth Circuit's treatment of section 701(j) in previous cases. If an
employee's work schedule is governed by any neutral policy, or if the
cost of accommodating the employee outside of that policy is more
than de minimis, the employer has satisfied its obligation under section
701(j). Barring Supreme Court intervention, it is doubtful that in the
future an employee will recover under section 701(j) in the Eighth
Circuit.
